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In this thesis, the claim that a flourishing family life should be characterised as a social 
practice, according to Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition of a practice, is defended. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the social practice of making and sustaining family life 
pursues certain goods, the achievement of which are constitutive of the family’s 
flourishing. The argument proceeds through the following stages. In the first part I focus 
on the Aristotelian premises of the argument and set out MacIntyre’s theoretical 
framework. I then apply this framework of the relationship between practices and 
institutions and internal and external goods to the family. In the second part I explore 
three important contemporary moral theories and how they address what a flourishing 
family life involves. In doing so, I look at how the Aristotelian approach adopted in this 
thesis compares to these approaches. The three approaches explored are contemporary 
liberalism (in particular liberal perfectionism), liberal feminism and feminist care ethics. 
At the end of this part of the thesis I argue that a synthesis of the Aristotelian framework 
and the particular insights of care ethics will provide a richer view of what a flourishing 
family life involves. In the final part of the thesis I provide an outline of some of the goods 
internal to the practice of life and the different activities and relationships which are 
constitutive of these goods. I then go on to suggest how families often fail to flourish as a 
result of the pursuit of external goods as ends in themselves or due to a lack of external 
goods. The conclusion of this thesis and its original contribution to knowledge is twofold: 
firstly, that MacIntyre’s contemporary Aristotelianism in combination with the insights of 
care ethics provides the tools with which we can identify the goods that contribute to and 
constitute familial flourishing. Secondly, that in order to identify the barriers to flourishing 
that families encounter, we must first understand what the goods internal and external to 
the practice are. We must then ensure that the institutions designed to sustain the family 
subordinate the goods external to family life to the internal goods, which only family 
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1. The theoretical background 
This work is concerned with what constitutes a flourishing family life. In what follows I 
defend the thesis that, in order to understand what a flourishing family life involves, the 
family should be characterised as a social practice, according to Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
definition of a practice. Furthermore, through this practice family members pursue their 
common good. The thesis uses a philosophical framework developed by MacIntyre in the 
tradition of Aristotelian thinking, which claims that human beings participate in a range of 
socially established, cooperative human activities called practices. These social practices 
are sustained through institutions that are designed to supply external goods for the 
instrumental use of the practice. My goal is to apply this framework to the family and to 
ascertain, drawing on a range of philosophical and empirical sources, what the goods 
internal to family life are and how they contribute to its overall flourishing. From this 
argument about what familial flourishing involves, it will be possible to suggest what 
some of the barriers to familial flourishing are.  
Any working definition of the family will be too narrow or too broad for the purposes of 
this thesis. What I aim to capture is a shared understanding of family in which the roles of 
parents and children, of siblings, aunts, uncles, in-laws, and grandparents are so defined 
that there is a shared practice of family life, so that it is possible to speak of particular 
families at particular times as stable or unstable, as functioning well or functioning badly, 
as scenes of conflict and/or of reconciliation. What it is for a family to be stable or 
unstable, to function well or badly, to be a place of fruitful or frustrating conflict, has 
been and is of course understood differently by different observers and rival theorists, so 
it would be a mistake to include any one such understanding in an initial definition. 
Indeed, who count as family members and what the significance of biological and legal 
family ties are, is fundamentally contested throughout the literature. Many theorists of 
the family have questioned defining the family because of the range of diverse forms in 
which it comes. The family is not easily defined as it varies from one culture to another 
and it succeeds or fails for different reasons. Furthermore, the increase in reproductive 
technologies and the separation between reproductive and caretaking contributions 
forces us to reassess assumptions about parenting claims and therefore the ‘ideal’ form 
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of the family (see Cutas and Chan 2012). Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2009) argue 
that there are specific ‘relationship goods’ that can only be realised within familial 
relationships, such as the parent-child relationship, which contribute to human 
flourishing. They argue that these relationship goods cannot be realised in state-run 
institutions which may conform more to egalitarian principles, but deny adults and 
children ‘those aspects of well-being that derive from participation in familial, parent-
child relationships’ (2009, 51). On the other hand, Anca Ghaeus (2012) argues that family 
relationships have no special or unique value, because other intimate relationships 
outside of the family embody love and it is love which makes family relationships 
valuable. Her conclusion is that familial relationships between adults should be afforded 
no special social or moral protections except where a high degree of commitment might 
be required, as in the case of co-parents. Current philosophical debates about the family 
therefore show that different models of the family are emerging, which question societal 
assumptions about our moral obligations to family members and how far we should 
advance the wellbeing of our family members at the expense of others in society. Due to 
the diversity of family types where one size does not fit all, it seems more practical to talk 
about the family in terms of what it does, or should do, rather than in terms of what it 
looks like or by privileging one type of family structure over another.  
What I hope I have constructed  in my thesis is a compelling argument in favour of one 
particular way of understanding these matters. I will argue that the practice of family life 
is the activity of an association of people who work together to pursue distinct goods that 
cannot be achieved in the same way by other associations. These functions include the 
moral education and nurturance of children, care and support for elderly and disabled 
members, conjugal and sexual relations, and maintaining intergenerational bonds. The 
realisation of these functions by family members results in the achievement of internal 
goods and should therefore not be understood as sociologically functionalist; in other 
words, in this model the family is not carrying out functions on behalf of society but 
rather enables family members to function well as family members and as human beings, 
thus achieving their good. A family may achieve each of the internal goods simultaneously 
or they may be reordered and pursued at different points in the life course of the family.  
Thus the family may be aiming at the goods of the education and nurturance of children, 
when family members have dependent children in their care, but this does not mean that 
other goods, such as the goods of intergenerational bonds should be sacrificed. However, 
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they may be ordered in different ways at different stages in the life of the family 
according to what will make the family flourish at that time.  
In contrast to Ghaeus’ claims, I will argue that the family is valuable and that it is a form 
of association in which love and care is expressed in distinct ways. Using MacIntyre’s 
conception of practices, I will argue that the practice of family life is an activity that unites 
individuals towards a common end. The practice of family life can therefore be defined as 
the engagement by a group of people, united through custom, biology or legal ties, in 
common activity that is aimed at certain kinds of goods. These goods are usually only fully 
realisable when people live together, dedicate themselves to each other, raise children 
together and care for those for whom they find themselves responsible as a result of 
biology, law or custom. Familial roles can as such be unconventional, flexible and non-
biological; for example, one’s biological aunt or grandparent may sometimes take on the 
role of one’s parent and many adults adopt or foster children. The tendency of people to 
live together in small groups in order to support each other at their most vulnerable (i.e. 
as children, in sickness, in disability and in old age) suggests that the family is natural 
because it meets human needs and demonstrates that human nature is social. This does 
not mean that family needs to be biologically constituted in order to be natural but that it 
is in our nature to form small-scale, long-lasting intimate bonds which are the basis of 
family life. 
It should be made clear that in this thesis I recognise that there are a range of family 
types from the nuclear to the extended, from the conventional to the single-parent or 
post-divorce, second family. This understanding of the family does not provide an ideal 
type of family structure because family structures are constantly changing as time passes. 
Furthermore, it is the adaptability of family life to human needs which has allowed it to 
survive as a practice for so many generations. The thesis will assume therefore that all 
family types have the potential to flourish; though some will encounter more barriers to 
flourishing, in other words, more challenges, than others. The purpose of the thesis is to 
understand what the functions and goods of family life are, not what form family life 
should take. An account which focuses on the form of the family or which assumes that 
the nuclear family is best, fails to capture the essence of what a family actually is because 
it ignores the many different family types that perform the functions of family life well. 
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The following chapters will argue that MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism offers a practical 
framework for understanding what is uniquely valuable about family life, what the 
features of a good family are and how the good of family life can be corrupted. Lately, a 
great deal has been written about what, if anything, makes family life worthwhile and 
what a good family looks like. Liberals such as David Archard have defended the claim 
that ‘good families can exhibit a plurality of forms’ (Archard 2010, vii) but that a good 
family is one which fulfils a certain social function; that of the care, guidance and 
protection of children. Others have questioned whether families are uniquely valuable at 
all and concludes that commitment between co-parents may be necessary for advancing 
the wellbeing of children but that it is relationships based on love, not families per se, 
which are uniquely valuable (Gheaus 2012). On the other hand, Swift and Brighouse argue 
that the family, and in particular the parent-child relationship, is uniquely valuable, and 
thus needs protecting with rights. They do so by weighing up what is good for parents 
against what is good for children and then using the conclusions to set limits on the 
fundamental rights of parents (Brighouse and Swift 2006).  
Feminist activists and theorists have long debated what a good family looks like in terms 
of how women are treated, and have critically examined the roles that women have 
traditionally inhabited. Carole Pateman notes the long history of debates around equality 
and difference within the feminist movement and feminist scholarship relating to women 
and the family (Pateman 2011). She argues that, while many in the feminist movement 
wanted women to have equality with men, their claims were not necessarily in direct 
opposition to difference arguments, which aimed for the recognition of women’s 
distinctive characteristics and activities in society. As such, feminists were not simply 
aiming for equality with men but also for recognition of women’s traditional contribution 
to society through mothering and home-making. This suggests that at least some feminist 
scholars and activists thought that the family, traditionally a woman’s domain, was 
valuable and that a good family would be one in which women’s economic dependence 
on men was lessened, while at the same time the social and economic value of what 
women did in the home was recognised and distributed more equally between the sexes.  
Others, working outside of the liberal tradition, have also discussed the value of family life 
and what family life looks like at its best. Feminist care ethics emphasises that a good 
family is one which is embedded in a society that recognises human dependence and 
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frailty. While some ethics of care theorists have claimed that women have a unique moral 
voice, which is not accommodated by contemporary liberal rationality (Gilligan 1993), 
others have focussed more on the parent-child relationship as a moral paradigm for social 
relations (Held 2005). Carol Gilligan’s approach emphasises difference between men and 
women as a result of the kind of worlds men and women tend to live in. Since women 
tend to participate in more intimate, particularistic relationships through caregiving, they 
develop empathy and recognise dependency. Men on the other hand, Gilligan argues, 
exercise morality according to rational precepts which apply universally. The value of 
family life is that it develops empathy and understanding of the particular Other, as 
opposed to the generalised Other of liberal thinking to whom we apply universal rules. 
Furthermore, from a care ethics perspective, family life is a response to the dependence 
and vulnerability of human beings. All human beings are born completely helpless and 
require the care and nurture of adult human beings. What is widely acknowledged across 
different perspectives is that the best place for these dependent and vulnerable infants to 
grow and develop, into more independent adults, is within a family. The form that the 
family can or should take and the extent to which the family is separated from public life 
is, however, widely contested from one theoretical tradition to the next.  
Also working outside of the liberal tradition is the Aristotelian Thomist philosopher, 
Alasdair MacIntyre. Like the care ethics feminists, MacIntyre emphasises the dependence 
and vulnerability of human beings. While his main focus is not on the family itself but 
rather on communities, what he does say about the family is illuminating. For MacIntyre, 
‘Families at their best are forms of association in which children are first nurtured, and 
then educated for and initiated into the activities of an adult world in which their parents’ 
participatory activities provide them both with resources and models’ (MacIntyre 1999, 
133). MacIntyre thus argues that the family cannot flourish if its social environment does 
not also flourish, and as the social environments of families vary from one context to 
another, so does the mode of flourishing. MacIntyre would, therefore, appear to agree 
with David Archard that good families take many forms. As such they both refute 
Tolstoy’s claim that ‘Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way’ (Tolstoy 2003 chap. 1). Yet there are significant differences between their 
approaches which will be explored in this thesis. 
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What do we mean, then, when we speak of a happy or flourishing family? Each of the 
approaches mentioned in outline above may or may not reach similar conclusions, but 
they would certainly approach the answer in different ways.  Methodologically, the 
argument of this thesis begins with Alasdair MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism and his practices 
and institutions framework. This approach takes an Aristotelian view of human nature 
that human beings are fundamentally social and political animals who pursue goods and 
have the capacity for practical reasoning which allows them to rank order those goods. 
For MacIntyre, many goods constitutive of a good life are pursued through practices in 
cooperation with others. However, Aristotelianism, as a tradition of enquiry, may well 
seem irrelevant to how we speak in contemporary situations. Indeed, Morgan (2008) has 
argued that if MacIntyre is correct about the modern self as being individualistic and self-
interested with no interest in common goods, then we are unable to explain why 
MacIntyre’s work has resonated with so many. Furthermore, if MacIntyre’s diagnosis is 
correct, one might question the relevance of an Aristotelian account of social forms and 
moral standpoints for the problems we face here and now. MacIntyre argues that the 
language of morality in the modern world, particularly since the Enlightenment when the 
Aristotelian tradition was widely rejected, is in grave disorder (MacIntyre 1985, 2). On the 
other hand, he also claims that we are all proto-Aristotelians because we all ask questions 
such as ‘How are we to work together?’ (MacIntyre 2008, 266) and ‘what is my good?’ 
which leads to questions such as ‘what is the good for humans beings?’ (MacIntyre 1998, 
145–6). His solution to this apparent contradiction between our lack of a coherent moral 
language and our ability to ask questions about the good, is that the modern self is a 
divided self because she has not been allowed to develop, or has not allowed herself to 
develop, her life in an Aristotelian form despite having that potentiality (1998, 147). For 
this development to take place, we need practices that are in good order; supported by 
institutions which are subordinate to those practices.  
The problem MacIntyre identifies with modernity, following Elizabeth Anscombe (1958), 
is that moral philosophy is no longer able to move from statements of facts about how 
the world is, to statements about how one ought to act. MacIntyre’s answer is a practical 
philosophy wherein the precepts of rational ethics are the means for the transition of 
‘untutored human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be’ to ‘human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-
realized-its-telos’ (MacIntyre 1985, 53). The final end (telos) is rational happiness or 
eudaimonia; in other words it is the fulfilment of human potentiality, or a life well lived. 
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The precepts of rational ethics ‘enjoin the various virtues and prohibit the vices which are 
their counterparts instruct[ing] us how to move from potentiality to act, how to realize 
our true nature and to reach our true end’ (MacIntyre 1985, 52). The virtues, MacIntyre 
argues, are given their content by what the good life for human beings, as the telos of 
human action, is understood as. Without the virtues, the goods internal to the practice of 
making and sustaining family life are barred to us. The virtues enable us to achieve those 
goods. Furthermore, the goods internal to a practice ‘are qualitatively distinct from, and 
not substitutable for, one another’ (Keat 2008, 245). As such these goods have their own 
intrinsic value for human beings and one good cannot be traded for another. The virtues 
play a key role in MacIntyre’s account of human practices and institutions. It is through 
participation in practices that one cultivates and exhibits the virtues. Thus MacIntyre’s 
approach is to restate the Aristotelian tradition ‘in a way that restores intelligibility and 
rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments’ (MacIntyre 1985, 259). 
MacIntyre’s project makes the bold claim that the Aristotelian tradition of thought is the 
only tradition which makes human action intelligible. All other traditions, he claims, are 
simulacra of moral thinking which have inherited some of the vocabulary in a fragmented 
way, lacking ‘those contexts from which their significance derived’ (MacIntyre 1985, 2).  
In an attempt to make family life intelligible as a universal human activity, this thesis has 
as its premise that the family is a practice in MacIntyre’s sense and must be seen as part 
of the narrative unity of a human life – not a separated or partitioned arena. We are born 
in a state of untutored human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be. Our socialisation into the 
practice of family life, and our particular roles in that family, are where we first begin to 
learn not only how to stand back from our desires and reason about the good, but also 
how to sustain complex networks of human relationships of caregiving and dependence 
that are constitutive of a good life. What we begin to learn in the family as children, and 
what we continue to learn from participation in family life as adults, is how to form and 
sustain relationships which pursue common goods, rather than relationships which are or 
may appear to be merely useful to our own individual ends. We learn how to make 
someone else’s good part of our own good. 
The approach used in this thesis also draws on a conception of the good life of human 
beings rooted in a view of human nature which sees us as dependent practical reasoners.  
This view, which is most fully developed in Alasdair MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational 
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Animals, proposes that Aristotle was right insofar as he saw that human beings have a 
function, or essential nature, which they have to fulfil in order to achieve their telos, or 
final end. MacIntyre’s reading, however, accepts that human beings fulfil their essential 
nature in a plurality of ways through participation in a range of human practices 
(MacIntyre 1985, 187–8). According to Aristotle, the human telos is eudaimonia, 
understood here as flourishing. Each human being has the potential to achieve this 
ultimate good through the cultivation of virtue and exercise of rational powers, primarily 
through participation in the political life of the polis. However, they can be frustrated in 
various ways and need the right kind of education and training. That training has to be 
practical rather than simply abstract or theoretical. One cannot learn how to be good by 
studying the theory of goodness or sitting in a classroom listening to a lecturer; one has to 
receive an initial training which will make one educable as someone who can cultivate the 
virtues. For Aristotle, ‘a person shows what he thinks is a good life, at least a good one for 
himself, by the kind of life he actually leads rather than by giving assent to abstract 
arguments and conclusions’ (Cooper 1986, 62). MacIntyre’s conception of practices 
demonstrates that we learn virtues through practical activity, from others to whom we 
are apprenticed. 
MacIntyre’s philosophy avoids the biological essentialism about human nature that we 
find in Aristotle, without descending into relativism. From a MacIntyrean perspective, 
practices have goods internal to them which are achieved through the activity of the 
practitioners. This does not imply essentialism about human nature because it depends 
on people choosing and acting to pursue those goods. In order to achieve the goods of 
the practice, practitioners must engage in certain kinds of activities but these activities 
have been developed over time by persons engaged in these practices. The practices have 
histories and sociologies and are therefore not biologically determined.  
While MacIntyre recognises in Dependent Rational Animals (DRA) that he was mistaken in 
After Virtue to attempt an account of the virtues within  social practices independent of 
Aristotle’s metaphysical biology, he is still not a hardcore essentialist. His argument, for 
now developing an ethics which is not independent of biology, has two reasons: 
The first is that no account of the goods, rules and virtues that are definitive of our 
moral life can be adequate that does not explain – or at least point us towards an 
explanation – how that form of life is possible for beings who are biologically 
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constituted as we are, by providing us with an account of our development towards 
and into that form of life. That development has as its starting point our initial animal 
condition. Secondly, a failure to understand that condition and the light thrown upon 
it by a comparison between humans and members of other intelligent animal species 
will obscure crucial features of that development (MacIntyre 1999, p. x). 
Thus in DRA MacIntyre develops his account of the virtues through recognition of the 
nature of the vulnerability and disability of human beings due to their initial animal 
condition. This would go some way towards explaining why family life is so widespread, 
developing as a result of biological human needs, and yet can be found in so many 
different forms according the histories and social orders in which they developed. 
Another way in which Aristotle falters, is in the extent to which we are different from 
other animals. While he recognises that human beings are indeed animals, he argues that 
only human beings have the capacity for phronesis (practical reasoning)1. MacIntyre on 
the other hand argues that some non-human animals also have a capacity for practical 
reason (MacIntyre 1999). As MacIntyre demonstrates with reference to dolphins, many 
non-human animals are social and engage in practices such as hunting, play and family 
life. Thus the functional capacity for engaging in social practices is not only prelinguistic 
but also pre-institutional. However, the way human animals participate in practices is 
distinct from – while sharing many common features with – other intelligent animals. 
Seeming to support MacIntyre’s claims, some evolutionary socio-biologists have found, in 
studies of the young of great apes compared with human children, that while great apes 
are able to recognise others as animate, goal-directed, intentional agents, humans have ‘a 
species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other 
persons’ (Tomasello et al. 2005, 675). This, they argue, results in activities of joint 
intention and attention, cultural learning, the creation and use of linguistic symbols and 
the construction of shared norms and institutions. They propose that ‘human beings, and 
only human beings, are biologically adapted for participating in collaborative activities 
involving shared goals and socially coordinated action plans (joint intentions)’ (2005, 676). 
Since humans are not only social but also political, we have constructed institutions, 
language and rules in order to sustain our practices.   
                                                          
1 As MacIntyre points out (1999, p. 5-6) Aristotle did seem to ascribe practical rationality to some 
nonhuman animals ‘that clearly have a capacity for forethought about their own lives’ (NE 1141a 27-28). 
However, what is not explored by Aristotle is ‘how the phronesis of some types of nonhuman animal is 
related to specifically and distinctively human rationality’ (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 6). 
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A second area in which MacIntyre diverges from Aristotle is with regard to dependency 
and human vulnerability. For Aristotle, dependency and vulnerability are feminine 
weaknesses whereas for MacIntyre dependency is a fact of human animal lives. Aristotle 
does not accept that the best kind of human being can experience dependency. Rather, 
dependency in adulthood is a sign of flourishing being frustrated. While he emphasises 
the importance of virtuous friendship and friendliness between the citizens of the polis 
(city-state) he does not allow for the good friend, or the good citizen, to need others in a 
dependent capacity. MacIntyre thus addresses whether or not an Aristotelian ethics can 
accommodate dependency within human flourishing and not see it only as a barrier to 
flourishing. This thesis will argue that a contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics needs to 
be synthesised with the insights of feminist care ethics in order to fully accommodate 
human dependency into a flourishing life (including those practices which support 
dependent humans), focussing in particular on the practice of family life. 
This thesis implies, but does not separately set out, a defence of MacIntyre’s theory 
against familiar lines of criticism. What I aim to show instead is how, in the study of 
particular institutions and practices, MacIntyre's central concepts find illuminating 
application, as Ron Beadle had done in his studies of the circus (Beadle and Könyöt, 2006; 
Beadle 2013) and Angus Robson had done in his study of Scottish banking (Forthcoming). 
My thesis follows in their steps and, insofar as it provides a fruitful way of understanding 
contemporary family life, it is in itself a further rejoinder to MacIntyre's theoretical critics. 
Objections that his account is too problematically conservative, relativist and 
traditionalist for thinking about contemporary family life, in a way that is compatible with 
certain feminist goals, are addressed throughout, as and when they arise. 
Chapter 1 will explore in more depth why MacIntyre’s Aristotelian philosophy is relevant 
to a thesis on family life. Drawing on the development of the Aristotelian tradition, I 
argue that families can be considered good insofar as they begin to enable family 
members to actualise their human potential through caring relationships. In order to do 
this, families should enable human beings to fulfil their functions as family members and 
as human beings. As family members, they pursue goods internal to the practice of family 
life which can only be realised through that practice. As human beings, the pursuit and 
achievement of those goods contributes to their overall human flourishing by cultivating 
virtues and practical reasoning and developing networks of caregiving and receiving. If 
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families stop or hinder human beings from achieving their telos then they can be 
evaluated as dysfunctional families or, at least, as families that need help. If families as 
such always hinder human flourishing then there may be grounds for advocating the 
abolition of the family as we know it and, instead, propose some alternative. If only some 
families hinder the flourishing of particular human beings in a particular society, then 
there may be grounds for institutions outside of the family, within that society, to 
intervene in family life either directly or indirectly. These issues will be addressed 
throughout.  
This thesis will not, however, provide a sustained consideration of cultural differences 
regarding the nature, scope, roles and functions of the family. The aim of this work is to I 
provide the outlines of a practice, which might then prepare the way for empirical 
research on the family. I will therefore consider the practice of family life (as opposed to a 
specific cultural form of the family), in order to develop a potential framework which 
could be applied to families in different cultural contexts. Indeed, MacIntyre argues that 
practices to some extent develop evaluative standards independent of ‘the particular 
cultural and social order which we happen to inhabit and whose language we happen to 
speak’ (MacIntyre 2006a, 46). For MacIntyre, the culture which we inhabit and the 
language we happen to speak do not provide the only standards by which we can judge 
what is good.  MacIntyre claims that ‘The criteria for the identity of practices are in 
important respects transcultural’ and that ‘It is from within the practice... that shared 
standards are discovered, standards which enable transcultural judgments of sameness 
and difference to be made’ (2006a, 47). While MacIntyre does not ignore the influence of 
culture – ‘This does not mean that how a practice develops within a particular social and 
cultural order is not characteristically affected by other features of that order’ (2006a, 48) 
– he does claim that the practice develops its own ‘institutionalized tradition’ which 
practitioners are inducted into and which has its own history somewhat independent of 
the social order. I will use an example of a different practice to illustrate the point. The 
practice of singing is different in Mongolia to South Africa, the UK and Switzerland. 
Singing can have different cultural functions and purposes, from religious ceremonies to 
folk singing to pure popular entertainment. It has also developed in very different styles 
from opera to throat singing to yodelling and from singing with accompaniment to singing 
a cappella. Each style and purpose for singing has developed within particular cultures 
and has its own history. Nonetheless, everyone recognises it as singing and that it has a 
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limited range of functions and purposes for its practitioners which are understood across 
cultural boundaries.  
Therefore, while it is both interesting and important to consider the cultural differences 
between families of different social orders, this will not be the focus of my thesis.2 I will 
be instead concerned with the general functions and roles of the practice of family life, 
drawing occasionally on culturally specific examples of the Western, modern family 
(because that is the culture which I inhabit), whilst also recognising that the framework 
developed here could have application in other cultural contexts. This understanding of 
practices as transcultural is also why MacInytre is not a communitarian. As Knight points 
out, MacIntyre argues for criterion for judgements of truth which are independent of a 
communal consensus (Knight, 2008c). The practice of philosophy for example, has 
differences according to the cultural context in which it is practiced but it is nonetheless 
true that there are standards and rules of philosophical enquiry which must be followed 
in order for the activity to be classed as philosophy.  
 
2. The functional family 
At this stage in the argument, it is relevant to note that most people in contemporary 
situations do not subscribe to MacIntyre’s Aristotelian practical philosophy and 
conception of the good life for human beings. Western states, for instance, are, broadly 
speaking, liberal capitalist democracies and, despite the range of ideologies subscribed to 
by different governments and political parties, most, explicitly or implicitly, accept the 
principles of contemporary liberalism that the state should be neutral between different 
conceptions of the good. Furthermore, within this context of liberal democracy, particular 
families are influenced by their own cultural traditions, religious belief systems and world 
views, some of which conflict with one another, and with liberalism itself, exerting 
different moral, cultural, political, social and religious claims on individuals. However, 
each claim is operating within the context of a liberal state which promotes a mixture of 
tolerance, pluralism, rights, duties, liberty and differing conceptions of justice in order to 
enable individuals to pursue their own conception of the good life. On such a liberal view, 
in order to assess whether or not a family is flourishing, a fairly thin and limited 
                                                          
2




conception of the good family must be employed which does not infringe too much on 
the individual’s conception of the good life. Thus families should raise children according 
to their own conception of the good but within the confines of certain liberal principles. 
Nevertheless, there are attempts to say more within this context.  
The first attempt worth noting, because it tries to say more in a liberal context, is the US 
Department of Health’s ‘Research on Successful Families’ (Krysan, Moore, and Zill 1990) 
the goal of which was ‘to discover the conditions and behaviour patterns that make for 
family success’. The second is the report by the UK’s Family Commission ‘Starting a Family 
Revolution: Putting Families in Charge’ (The Family Commission 2010) which employed 
surveys, focus groups, and regional study visits to bring together the views of 10,000 
families in the UK. 
The report by the Family Commission in the UK argues that, due to the domination of 
public discourse by images of toxic families that fail their children, the state and its laws 
have forgotten that families are ‘a huge resource’ (2010, 5). Instead, they are often seen 
as part of the problem; for example, they are often characterised as ‘possibly dangerous, 
certainly less competent than the child protection experts’ (2010, 5). The report also 
states that: 
Over the last two decades family structures have changed and diversified. 
Marriage looks very different today. Work has invaded our private lives, so 
that trying to carve out the time our children need has become a real struggle. 
Family members are scattered around the country and sometimes the world 
(2010, 5).  
Despite these dramatic changes the survey conducted by the commission found that for 
the majority of families ‘the most important aspects of family life are the unconditional 
love, the fun and the support we give each other’ (2010, 6).  
In the US report, referred to above, researchers for the Department of Health and Human 
Services put together  
a body of research on families that are enduring, cohesive, affectionate, and 
mutually-appreciative, and in which family members communicate with one 
another frequently and fruitfully. They are families that raise children who go 
on to form successful families themselves. They are not necessarily families 
that are trouble-free. Some have experienced health problems, financial 
difficulties, and other problems. But they are adaptable and able to deal with 
crises in a constructive manner (Krysan, Moore, and Zill 1990, 2). 
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The purpose of both pieces of research, carried out two decades apart, was to show how 
families are successfully sustained, focussing on the positive attributes of family life 
rather than where families go wrong. The emphasis of the research, then, is on how 
families can succeed rather than how they fail; in other words, what constitutes a 
successful or flourishing family life. One of their aims therefore was to counteract the 
emphasis on family failure and dysfunction within social policy.  
As the US report points out, just as health is not reducible to the absence of disease, 
equally, a good family is not simply one that lacks major problems. The report states it is 
important to research strong healthy families as well as dysfunctional problem families 
for practical reasons: to prevent problems occurring in the first place, to provide a 
broader range of social indicators for family functioning, and, finally, to promote positive 
actions through public information. Prevention, measurement and education are the 
practical motivations; however, the study argues that the ethical motivation is that 
societies need healthy families because we rely on them to perform essential functions 
ranging from providing for the economic needs of dependents, to rearing and nurturing, 
to caring for the frail and disabled. The study, therefore, finds that the family is a 
worthwhile institution because it fulfils certain social functions, and it also gives reasons 
why contemporary Western societies do, and should, want to preserve the family as a 
social institution. Furthermore, it proposes what characteristics are needed to succeed in 
fulfilling those functions: ‘families that are enduring, cohesive, affectionate, and mutually-
appreciative, and in which family members communicate with one another frequently 
and fruitfully’ as stated above. The study claims to be trying to ‘discover the conditions 
and behaviour patterns that make for family success’ (Krysan, Moore, and Zill 1990, 2) yet 
the researchers already seem to have a preconceived idea of what these might be. The 
report does not choose an outcome to measure and then discover the characteristics 
which achieve the outcome. This is because we cannot measure the success of a family on 
outcomes alone.  
The length of time a family stays together, the wealth a family accumulates, the 
educational outcomes of its children or the kind of citizen the family produces are not 
enough on their own to determine whether or not a family is a good family. Family life is 
not merely a preparation for the rest of life; it is an intrinsic component of a good life for 
many people and many of us will be a part of some family from birth to death. Implicit in 
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their claims is that how a family functions on a day to day basis and what activities it 
pursues are just as essential for understanding whether or not a family is successful, as 
outcomes are. Despite the researchers involved in the report coming from different 
disciplines and perspectives, they were able to produce a list ‘of structural and 
behavioural attributes which characterize successful families’ (Krysan et al. 1990, 3).  
On the other hand, determining the social functions of the family, rather than focusing 
purely on outcomes, is not a new approach. One of the earliest sociological theorists of 
the family, Talcott Parsons, who coined the term ‘nuclear family’, also put forward a 
functional argument which claims that changes in modern society led to a refining of the 
role and functions of the family (1956; 1949; 1964). Parsons does not see the nuclear 
family as ahistorical but rather as an adaptation to change. In other words, according to 
Parsons, ‘the modern family is particularly well suited to an industrial economy in that it 
facilitates labour mobility, socialises children and provides a source of emotional support 
for adults in an otherwise competitive, rootless and impersonal society’ (Elliot 1986, 35). 
This functional argument is also highly structural. Parsons sees the family as a constituent 
element of the societal system and looks at the functions of that institution within the 
social structure. He also makes large structural generalisations about changes in society 
and in the family. He claims that ‘the modern family is a structurally isolated nuclear unit’ 
(Elliot 1986, 37) and that kinship groups have almost completely disintegrated in response 
to the needs of an advanced industrial economy. This narrowing of the social functions of 
the family is not something to be lamented according to Parsons. Whereas previously the 
family had performed social functions of a religious, political, educational or economic 
nature directly on behalf of society, for Parsons, the modern family’s specific functions 
were now of the socialisation of children and psychological support of adults, while other 
institutions took over broader social functions. According to Parsons, these narrower 
functions were more suited to helping individuals cope with the social and psychological 
demands of modern life outside of the nuclear family. 
Parsons’ thesis is a powerful one but is nonetheless widely rejected by social theorists 
today. Criticisms range from problems with his claim that the nuclear family is a 
distinctively modern phenomenon whereas the pre-modern family was always a large-
scale kinship group, to problems with his conceptualisation of the modern family, to 
problems with his gender politics and his value-laden judgements about society. It seems 
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that one of the main problems with Parsons’ thesis is the idea that there is such a thing as 
‘the Family’ in the homogenous sense and that the modern nuclear family has developed 
as a perfect adaptation to modern industrial demands. This generalisation ignores the 
diversity and plurality of family forms in modernity. Furthermore, his emphasis on the 
gendered division of labour as providing what children need and the idea of the nuclear 
family as a haven from a competitive and impersonal society, are far more problematic 
than he claims, as we shall see. Finally, his functional argument focuses on how the family 
functions for society’s needs in a society which only seems to value competitiveness and 
profit. While he does discuss the needs of children and adults, it is only their needs within 
such a society which are considered, rather than how the family enables good human 
functioning. What I mean by human functioning, as opposed to societal functioning, is 
elaborated below. 
The idea of the family fulfilling certain functions for the benefit of society and its 
members, as a sort of cog in the machinery of social life, is the approach taken both by 
sociological functionalism and to some extent by the two pieces of social research 
outlined above; though the latter’s use of function is more theoretically innocent and 
thus conceptually ambiguous. The view of a functioning family proposed in this thesis 
differs in that, I will argue, a good family is one which enables human functioning and, as 
such, contributes to human flourishing. This claim is based on Aristotle’s conception of 
functioning derived from his metaphysical biology – that each thing, from a tree to an 
animal, has a function which is closely connected to the telos, or final end, of that thing. 
And, as we have already ascertained, for human beings, that final end is eudaimonia 
(flourishing). According to MacIntyre, participation in practices, where our own good can 
only be realised by achieving common goods through shared practical reasoning, is 
constitutive of a flourishing human life. A practice, such as the family, is in good order 
only when it enables the practitioners to function well through reasoning with one 
another. This good functioning is partially dependent on the institutions that help to 
sustain the practice also being in good order and directed towards the good of the 
practice. One function of practitioners in family life might be to take care of dependent 
family members. In doing so the family member gives care without calculating what he 
will gain in return and contributes to the common good of the family. This contribution to 
common goods is an end in itself which is constitutive of the family member’s own good 
(rather than being simply a means to that end). The family functions well when it achieves 
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its goods. What this really means is that the family members qua practitioners achieve 
their common goods through their specific activity. It does not involve some abstract 
concept of ‘the family’ working as a structural force upon the lives of its members and 
within the wider social structure, as Parsons’ functionalism implies. As such, the 
Aristotelian conception of functioning is morally purposive. The functions of a human 
being or a social practice are to actualise some good; they do not come about 
spontaneously, independent of any shared human intention. In MacIntyre’s 
Aristotelianism, there is no ‘functionality to society that is independent of actors’ 
purposes’ (Knight 2013, 83). 
 
3. The structure of the thesis 
Thus far I have set out the thesis question as well as provide some context for why this is 
an important question and how I intend to approach it. This section describes in more 
detail the structure of the thesis and how the argument in response to the question will 
be made.  The first part of the thesis focuses on the Aristotelian premises of the argument 
and sets out the theoretical framework. Chapter 1 gives an account of what a broadly 
Aristotelian position entails. In doing so the chapter attempts to summarise some of the 
key ideas and concepts used in Aristotelian thought such as the human good, virtue and 
flourishing. I argue that an Aristotelian position requires us to think about what is good 
for human beings in this or that context, which will be constitutive of their wellbeing 
overall. The chapter then goes on to expound MacIntyre’s claims about practices and 
institutions and how they contribute to, and sometimes inhibit, human flourishing.  
The second chapter of the thesis takes the theoretical framework offered by MacIntyre 
and applies it to the family. In this chapter I argue that making and sustaining family life is 
a socially established, co-operative human practice which not only attends to our basic 
needs but also plays an important role in developing our moral and intellectual capacities 
so that we are able to reason for ourselves about the good and participate in the political 
life of our particular society. I also critically examine the institutions of the family 
including marriage, state welfare agencies and private profit-making institutions of care. 
In doing so, I demonstrate how these institutions can both sustain and corrupt the 
practice of family life. 
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Using an Aristotelian approach is not common in studies of the family. In order to 
demonstrate the contribution a MacIntyrean Aristotelianism can make requires a review 
of the dominant approaches.  The next part of the thesis thus explores three examples of 
modern moral theory which attempt to address the issue of what makes a good family, as 
well as how these theories deal with the role of institutions in family life. 
The third chapter examines a prime example of a liberal theory of justice and what its 
proponent, John Rawls, says about the family. Liberal accounts of the family 
characteristically take a successful family to be one in which individual family members 
achieve what liberals take to be desirable: being enabled to pursue one’s own conception 
of the good without causing harm to others and to work co-operatively with others in 
society to achieve one’s own ends. A family should provide a minimally decent life for 
children and is the primary institution set up by society to carry out that function. How 
families do so is up to them, within certain limits. Many liberal theorists generally seem to 
assume that the internal lives of families will be free and flourishing, if only minimally 
constrained, but avoid giving an account of what that flourishing entails. The focus 
remains on the individual and what the family enables or disables an individual to do in a 
free, rights-based society. For Rawls, no distinction is made between human practices and 
the institutions which sustain them. Rather Rawls begins by talking about a practice and 
later switches to talking about institutions with no conceptual distinction made. For 
Rawls, the family is a social institution which is somewhat outside of the political sphere 
and should therefore only be subject to the principles of justice in a limited way. 
However, some perfectionist liberals are beginning to discuss the relationships of the 
family as constitutive of a good life, in which goods are realised that are more intrinsically 
valuable than those goods with which social justice is concerned to distribute.  
The fifth and sixth chapters of the thesis will explore modern feminist approaches to the 
family; specifically, modern liberal feminism and feminist care ethics. While I recognise 
that there are a range of other feminist perspectives on the family, it is not within the 
scope of this thesis to review all of the feminist literatures on the family but to focus on 
two related but often contradictory perspectives. Liberal feminism rejects the male-
orientated approach of most mainstream liberalism. Moreover, this form of feminism 
has, arguably, re-shaped family and working life for contemporary men and children, as 
well as for women. These accounts characteristically identify ways in which types of 
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family structure may be inimical to the flourishing of women. In doing so, they pose the 
question of how women would fare in families that were governed by principles of justice 
in the same way as other social institutions, or if the family were to be completely 
abolished and replaced with something else. Liberal feminists have often criticised the 
institution of marriage both for its exclusion of same sex union and for the unequal power 
relations between the sexes which it has historically perpetuated. Furthermore, liberal 
feminist accounts of the family provide important critical analyses of the unjust 
distribution of external goods and barriers to flourishing that families often generate 
between the sexes.  
Feminist care ethics, on the other hand, is a newer branch of feminist theorising which 
goes further in rejecting some of the central claims of liberal theory, arguing that, in 
liberal theory’s quest for justice and individual rights, it has ignored the need for care and 
the recognition of vulnerability and dependence.  How, therefore, can liberal theory truly 
understand the family, which is a site of caregiving and receiving? Care ethics thus begins 
to give an account of good caring relationships which are crucial to the sustaining of 
family life and particular relationships. In other words, families cannot function well 
without good care. It has also said a great deal about institutions of care which support 
the family looking at the extent to which they empower or disempower families, 
caregivers and the disabled. However, the paradigm moral relationship for care ethics 
theorists is that of an asymmetrical parent-child relationship. Further criticism is directed 
at its focus on mothering, almost mythologizing the mother, and marginalising other 
relationships within family life.  
In chapter 6 I will argue that it is only with reference to the practical philosophy of some 
Aristotelian thought and the idea of human flourishing, in combination with the mosaic of 
insights provided by care ethics that we can make the questions that need asking about 
family life intelligible, such as, what qualities do children need for flourishing? What 
qualities do parents and other familial caregivers need to enable and promote this 
flourishing, and that of other dependent family members in their care? How do parents 
judge when their family life is going well? What can institutions outside of family life do to 
aid familial flourishing?  
The seventh chapter will attempt to address these questions in order to answer the 
overarching question: what constitutes a flourishing family life? This chapter explores 
20 
 
some of the key activities and relationships of family life which are constitutive of familial 
flourishing. The eighth chapter will then address the problem of dysfunctionality in the 
family. Only when we have a clear idea of what a good family might look like can we say 
what a bad family might look like. This chapter focuses, in particular, on the external 
goods of family life and the corrupting effects of these goods, as well as how a lack of 
these goods can be equally damaging. The ninth chapter summarises the conclusions of 




1. Why MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores Aristotelian concepts and how they can be put to use in the 
contemporary family. MacIntyre’s approach to Aristotelianism will be shown to be a 
practical framework, from which we can understand what constitutes a flourishing family. 
In the following, a precise definition of flourishing will not be given because Aristotle 
warns against looking for precision in the same way for everything and instead urges us to 
only look for the kind of precision that is appropriate for the particular sphere of enquiry. 
We are not attempting to define something like an atom in particle physics: ethics is not 
mathematics. In the same way, we cannot precisely define the good family; nor should 
we.  As Jonathan Lear notes, ‘if ethics is not a set of rules, then a treatise on ethics cannot 
be treated as a piece of software which one ingests in order to become a good person’ 
(1988, 158). If this is so, then how do we find use for an Aristotelian view of human 
flourishing in a contemporary context? It is precisely because Aristotle does not attempt 
to provide a set of moral imperatives, from an abstract standpoint of pure rationality, that 
we can put Aristotle to work in the particularities of contemporary family life. 
Furthermore, it is through the developing and dynamic tradition of Aristotelian thought 
that we can find contemporary relevance in Aristotle’s premises.  
Aristotle states that one must begin with what is knowable in relation to us. One does not 
need to know why something is such and such in all cases as it will suffice to know that 
something is what it is because it has been well shown to be the case. This, he argues, is 
true of starting points and that ‘Of starting points, some are grasped by induction, some 
perception, some by a sort of habituation, and others in other ways’ (Nicomachean Ethics, 
heareafter NE, 1.7 1098b3-5).3  Aristotle begins by identifying characteristically human 
activity, which his audience can recognise and identify with, and then persuades them 
that some aims are more rationally defensible than others.  
However, our modern view is, according to MacIntyre, an impoverished one because 
there is no contemporary agreement about common goods and the ultimate good of a 
human life.  What we think about family life, therefore, is influenced by conflicting 
                                                          
3 The translation of the Nicomachean Ethics I use is the Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe 
version (Aristotle 2002). 
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contemporary norms and values, by government, media, global capitalism and Western 
consumerist culture. Yet, while there may not be agreement about the common goods of 
a society or the ultimate human good, there is a case to be made for generalised 
agreement about what is constitutive of a good family life. Since participation in family 
life is such a common, shared experience, general agreement about what constitutes 
familial wellbeing, and what the ends and functions of family life are, can be reached. 
However, such general agreement may also be diminished, according to MacIntyre, if it is 
divorced from the wider community and other human practices.  
This chapter will explore an approach to Aristotelian thinking, advanced by MacIntyre, 
and its relevance to the thesis question in order to show why an Aristotelian theoretical 
framework is appropriate for understanding what constitutes familial flourishing. 
 
1.2 Flourishing 
As has already been stated, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the highest good of human 
activity is eudaimonia, translated as happiness, flourishing or wellbeing (Lear 1988, 160–
161). According to Aristotle, the general public widely agree that the highest human good 
is wellbeing or happiness, but most people are in dispute over what this actually is (NE 1.4 
1095a 17-23). In this thesis, the translation of eudaimonia as ‘flourishing’ will primarily be 
used, though sometimes reference to ‘wellbeing’ will be made if more appropriate; I will 
use them, however, to refer to the same idea. The translation of eudaimonia as happiness 
will be avoided due to its modern association with subjective feeling, transitory states and 
satisfaction of immediate desires. Happiness can be construed as a fleeting moment of 
elation or a state of ignorant self-satisfaction: it does not capture the more particular, 
long-term meaning of eudaimonia. Flourishing, on the other hand, implies development 
and healthy growth towards the fulfilment of one’s potential. It also implies good 
functioning and the satisfaction of worthwhile ends.  
We are still in dispute about the meaning of happiness today.4 Its contentiousness 
provides yet another reason to avoid translating eudaimonia as happiness. Aristotle 
                                                          
4 In November 2010 the British government announced plans to measure people’s psychological 
and environmental wellbeing with a ‘happiness index’.  The survey is intended to gauge the 
general wellbeing of citizens by looking at participants subjective happiness in order to steer 
government policy (Stratton 2010). The fact that the survey is focussed on subjective happiness 
suggests that we are still no nearer to a widely agreed upon understanding of what happiness is.  
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maintains that the most vulgar of men suppose eudaimonia to be pleasure or the 
satisfaction of our immediate desires (NE 1.5 1095b 15-16). These men he likens to 
grazing cattle because they live a life of consumption. The hedonistic life is, for Aristotle, 
not a life of action and wellbeing but a passive life controlled by appetite:  
Since the pleasure-seeker has done nothing to organize the state of his soul, 
thus remaining at the level of a beast, the basic appetites are in an important 
sense . . .  directing his activities . . .  they remain forces within him pulling him 
toward this pleasure and that (Lear 1988, 161).  
As such, the satisfaction of untrained desires and a life in the pursuit of simple pleasures 
cannot lead to flourishing. Only the peculiarly human life lived through peculiarly human 
activity (as opposed to the activity of a beast) will discover the ability to truly flourish, 
according to Aristotle. What is particularly useful about the concept of flourishing, as 
opposed to happiness, is that it takes into account the whole human life. Flourishing 
means the full development of an organism over its life and does not rely on attempts to 
measure subjective transitory states of feeling. Rather, it presupposes that human beings 
have potentialities which they can actualise through particular forms of human activity, 
and it is through this realisation of potential that human beings prosper and achieve 
excellence. It is the rational part of the soul which guides the other more animal parts 
towards the good for human beings. Flourishing is, therefore, universalisable because it 
appeals to objective standards of wellbeing; although the constitutive means of its 
achievement will be particular to the social context. 
Aristotle supposes that humans have an end, or telos, in the same way that all living 
organisms have an end. Having a telos is to be directed towards a particular goal which is 
an end in itself and serves no higher goal. The end is thus the cause – the driving force – 
of action. However, for Aristotle, the human telos is not a terminus or end point, where 
the ends justify any means. Rather, it entails living a certain kind of life of ‘activity of the 
soul and actions accompanied by reason, and it belongs to a good man to perform these 
well and finely, and each thing is completed well when it possesses its proper excellence’. 
It follows then that ‘the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance 
with excellence . . . But furthermore it will be this in a complete life’ (NE 1.7 1098a13-19). 
The fact that it must be over a complete life as opposed to a day or a month, or in one 
particular action, is central to Aristotelian thought. It means that one cannot be truly 




flourishing if one lives in accordance with excellence, or the virtues, for only a short 
period and then returns to being vicious and indulging in beast-like behaviour when a 
particular short-term end is achieved. Such behaviour would not be the embodiment of 
virtue in action but rather a mere simulacrum. Emulating the actions of a good person in 
order to deceive or win over another — as the Vicomte de Valmont does in Les Liaisons 
Dangereuses — will not, according to Aristotelian thinking, lead to flourishing, even if 
those actions happen to have positive outcomes, as they did for the poverty-stricken 
family whom the Vicomte assists. It is not enough to appear to be good: one actually has 
to be good, as Socrates plainly knew.  
Flourishing, then, entails a life well-lived, and virtuous activity must be done for its own 
sake and not for the sake of some other end; for example, the end of winning another’s 
heart. Of course, not being excellent in all of one’s endeavours does not mean that one is 
automatically a beast or a hedonist. One may aim at excellence in one’s activities without 
being completely successful. Moreover, one may be an excellent artist or chess player 
and at the same time be vicious qua father or husband. Having patience and dedication to 
one’s art but not with one’s family does not lead to flourishing, even if it makes one an 
excellent artist or makes a major contribution to the development of an artistic 
movement. Only those who have cultivated a virtuous character qua human being can 
live the best kind of life. Virtues, when truly habituated, should be dispositions of one’s 
character which have application throughout one’s life.5   
Aristotle believes that being virtuous in the most complete sense is out of reach for the 
majority. However, MacIntyre’s conception of a human practice, which embodies activity 
constitutive of flourishing, sociologises Aristotle so that the activities, which are 
constitutive of human flourishing, turn out to be social rather than individual activities.6 
As such, virtue becomes something accessible to all members of a society who participate 
in practical activity aiming at common ends. MacIntyre defines a practice as,  
                                                          
5 MacIntyre, in After Virtue (1985, chap. 15), discusses the importance of the narrative unity of a 
human life which is often absent in contemporary liberal societies because such societies 
encourage the compartmentalisation of not only the different activities we participate in, but also 
the different stages of our life from young to old. As such we might be encouraged to adopt a 
certain virtue in our work life that is appropriate to our work, which we then put to one side in 
our home life. The virtues are not then truly habituated and a part of our moral character but are 
little more than skills or dispositions, instrumental to the achievement of our goals. 
6 As opposed to the republican ideal of virtue being cultivated only in the public political activities 
of the state, for MacIntyre, virtue can be cultivated in a range of human practices. MacIntyre’s 
approach is therefore much more pluralistic.  
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any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved are systematically extended . . .  In the ancient and 
medieval worlds the creation and sustaining of human communities – of 
households, cities, and nations – is generally taken to be a practice in the 
sense in which I have defined it. Thus the range of practices is wide: arts, 
sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining 
of family life, all fall under the concept (MacIntyre 1985, 187–8) [emphasis 
added]. 
MacIntyre’s conception of a social practice is thus a way for all human beings to actualise 
their potential rather than just a small elite section of society (which for Aristotle was 
embodied in the male Athenian citizen). A practice has goods internal to it which can only 
be realised through participation in that practice. There are also a related set of goods 
which are external or contingent which can always be achieved through alternative 
means. These goods are attached to the practice by accidents of social circumstance and 
such goods might include prestige, status, money and power (MacIntyre 1985).7 These 
external goods, and their relation to the family, are explored in more depth in chapter 8 
after the discussion on internal goods in chapter 7. Furthermore, according to MacIntyre, 
a practice entails ‘standards of excellence and obedience to rules’ and ‘. . . to enter into a 
practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own 
performance as judged by them’ (MacIntyre 1985, 190). The way that virtue is fostered in 
practices is through learning the standards of excellence of that practice from teachers. 
Kelvin Knight refers to MacIntyre’s oft-cited example of the chess-playing child who is 
initiated into the game of chess with the incentive of candy but who eventually finds  
in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a highly particular kind 
of analytic skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of 
reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular occasion, but for 
trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands (MacIntyre 1985, 
188).  
                                                          
7 Russell Keat also argues, more explicitly than MacIntyre, that there are goods which are human 
goods but which are neither external nor internal to practices. These goods might be other 
personal relationships such as friendship, which can be acquired within or without practices and 
are not unique to a particular practice, various pleasurable bodily and sensory experiences, and 
various ‘intrinsic satisfactions’ which are worthwhile for their own sake but are not internal to the 




Knight argues that this socialisation of the child into the practice educates her desires. 
Furthermore, ‘this is a good that is internal to the practice of chess, in the sense that it is 
limited to those who participate in the practice of chess-playing. More precisely, it may 
be said to be “internal to” individuals qua chess-players’ (Knight 2008a, 230). MacIntyre’s 
example identifies certain goods, goods which develop the person who participates in the 
practice, which are internal to the game of chess. They are not attached to the game by 
accident of circumstance, like the prestige and money which might be attached to playing 
chess competitively or the candy used to encourage the child to play. The development of 
certain virtues and skills are constitutive of the fulfilment of playing the game of chess.  
 
1.3 Virtue 
Now that we have a general understanding of flourishing as the human telos, though we 
do not have much of the content of that telos, further exploration of the concept of 
virtue, or excellence, and how it operates within the teleological scheme is needed. How 
does Aristotle define virtue or excellence? In book II of NE, Aristotle argues that virtues 
are not feelings, nor are they capacities because ‘we do not become good or bad by 
nature’ (NE 1106a 8-9) and we are not praised or blamed for how we feel without 
qualification, only for how we express that emotion and act on it; for example, being 
angry in a certain way. As such, virtues are a result of rational choices — how we direct 
emotions through reasoning to be in a certain state. Excellence of moral character, it 
turns out, requires the person also to be practically wise. However, virtue is not just a 
state of being, for Aristotle, but a certain kind of state. His first definition of the virtue of a 
human being then is ‘the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform 
his characteristic activity well’ (NE 1106a 23-4). However, this definition is incomplete. 
Aristotle also explains how this happens by reference to the mean, or that middle point 
which is neither excessive nor deficient. The mean in this context is not fixed, as it is in 
arithmetic, but is relative to us and as such is not one single thing or the same for all. In 
particular, Aristotle is interested in the virtues of character because ‘it is this that is 
concerned with feelings and actions, and it is in these that we find excess, deficiency and 
the mean’ (NE 1106b 16-8). To have the right feelings ‘at the right time, about the right 
things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way is the mean and 
best; and this is the business of virtue’ (NE 1106b 21-3). Aristotle also claims that it is 
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possible for there to be an excess and deficiency in actions and it is with both feeling and 
action that virtue is concerned. His second more complete definition of virtue then is:  
A state involving rational choice, consisting in a mean relative to us and 
determined by reason – the reason, that is, by reference to which the 
practically wise person would determine it.  It is a mean between two vices, 
one of excess, the other of deficiency. It is a mean also in that some vices fall 
short of what is right in feelings and actions and others exceed it, while virtue 
both attains and chooses the mean (NE 1106b35 – 1107a6) [emphasis added]. 
Hitting the target of the mean is difficult because, Aristotle claims, badness is unlimited 
whereas people can only get things right in one way (though that one way is relative to 
the person, and her emotions, and the context). It also seems important to realise that 
even though Aristotle distinguishes between the moral and intellectual virtues, between 
the condition of desire and the condition of the mind, these two aspects of human 
excellence are inseparable. The training of desires and instincts to form a settled 
character requires practical reason. The good life is thus achieved through possession of 
the virtues which direct human activity towards good ends. However, it is not a simple 
means-ends relationship. The exercise of the virtues is not simply one means that human 
beings can choose to bring about a desired end (MacIntyre 1985, 149). Rather the 
exercise of the virtues is a constitutive part of a whole human life, lived at its best, ‘not a 
mere preparatory exercise to secure such a life’ (1985, 149). Now we can see how ethics 
is the science which enables human beings to move from a state of untutored human 
nature to ‘man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos’.   
Aristotle is keen to identify the best life with what his audience already hold in esteem or 
consider to be pleasurable activities, and then ‘expends his efforts in establishing that 
what is most eudaimonistic is what is lastingly admirable rather than most sensually and 
subjectively pleasurable’ (Knight 2007, 14). He does not deny pleasure; on the contrary, 
he claims that activity which is most in accordance with virtue is also pleasurable. 
Aristotle recognises that humans are political animals who are not self-sufficient 
individuals and therefore spend most of their time engaged in practical rather than 
contemplative activity. Moral character cannot be improved through contemplation of 
abstract forms as Plato believed. Thus the practical activity, or praxis, of politics which 
involves the hierarchical ordering of all other forms of activity towards the human good of 
flourishing is the highest form of activity after theoria (contemplation). While theoria 
requires the exercise of theoretical wisdom (sophia), praxis requires practical wisdom 
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(phronesis). The form of human activity which is lower than both of these, according to 
Aristotle, is production (poiesis), which requires technical expertise (techne). However, 
techne differs from practical and theoretical wisdom for Aristotle because he considers it 
to be a capacity, rather than an activity or virtue, which may or may not be acted upon 
and may be used for good or bad ends (Knight 2007, 18). Productive and craft activity is 
therefore used analogously and is not actually a form of excellence according to Aristotle. 
Techne refers to the skill of the craft, the end being the transformation of an artefact 
rather than the human being.8 Sophia and phronesis on the other hand can only be for 
the human good. 
MacIntyre is critical of Aristotle’s belief that praxis and poiesis are lower forms of human 
activity and cannot fully actualise human potential in the way that theoria can. Instead, 
he reconceptualises Aristotle’s idea of goods internal and external to the human being 
and applies them to the idea of a human practice. For MacIntyre’s conception of a 
practice, goods are internal or external to this or that particular social practice, though, 
according to Knight, this does not mean that there are not goods internal and external to 
human beings as well. While internal goods denotes ‘goods internal to practices’, Knight 
claims that it also connotes goods internal to human beings qua practitioners (Knight 
2008b). According to Knight, this does not lead to a contradiction because MacIntyre’s 
‘idea is that the goods internal to practices exist prior to the participation of individual 
practitioners but that participation in those practices involves practitioners internalizing 
those goods’ (Knight 2008b, 114). MacIntyre elaborates his account into a coherent moral 
critique of liberal modernity; central to MacIntyre’s critique is the notion of a practice 
(Knight 2007). Thus (re)productive activity, or activity which requires technical skill, can 
still be ethically educative because it often requires the exercise of virtue in order to be 
carried out well, for example, a parent needs more than a set of skills in order to be a 
good parent. Skills are essentially goods of effectiveness for MacIntyre because they 
provide us with the potential to act for the good. Also included in goods of effectiveness 
are goods external to practices such as money, power and status. Again, these may 
enable us to do good acts or bad ones.  
What, then, is the significance for Aristotle of goods, either internal or external? Having a 
good character is not a guarantee of eudaimonia, though one cannot be fulfilled without 
                                                          
8 See Tom Angier’s Techne in Aristotle’s Ethics: Crafting the Moral Life for the importance of the 
concept of craft in Aristotle’s ethical approach (Angier 2010). 
29 
 
living a life in accordance with the virtues or excellences. Aristotle refers to those things 
that are instrumental for living well as external goods. Of these, the highest good is 
honour because honour is something bestowed upon us by others when we have done a 
noble act (NE 4.3 1123b 20-21). According to Aristotle external goods also include wealth 
or money, political power, leisure, friends, slaves and one’s children (Knight 2007, 26). If 
these external goods are pursued as ends in themselves, then one’s flourishing will be 
frustrated. Thus, according to Aristotle, if someone lies about herself because she takes 
pleasure in falsehood then she is ineffectual; if she does so for the sake of reputation 
(honour or status being external goods) then she is to be censured; but the one who lies 
for the sake of profit (also an external good) is, according to Aristotle, the more 
disgraceful figure (NE 4.7 1127b10-13). However, if a person is truthful about her life and 
possessions, it is ‘by virtue of being such by disposition’ (NE 4.7 1127b3). A virtuous 
disposition is simply the habituation of, or tendency towards, excellence in one’s 
character. However, according to Rosalind Hursthouse, virtue also must include having 
certain motivations or reasons for one’s actions rather than there simply being a 
tendency to act in a certain way. For example, having the virtue of compassion ‘includes 
being moved by the suffering of others and treating their suffering as a reason for acting 
and not acting in certain ways’ (Hursthouse 2002, 48).  
Thus the person who always practices truth-telling about herself and her life will not have 
to try hard to tell the truth each day but will do so by virtue of the excellence of her 
character, because that is who she is and because she is motivated by good reasons to do 
so.  It is this kind of person that will flourish according to Aristotelian thought. However, 
Aristotle does not deny that wealth and influence improve one’s chances of living a 
flourishing life: a vagrant, for example, will not have the opportunity to live a flourishing 
life. MacIntyre similarly argues that practices cannot survive without external goods to 
sustain them in the pursuit of internal goods; however, the pursuit of these goods as ends 
in themselves will corrupt practices. MacIntyre uses a distinctly Aristotelian framework to 
make his claims. When Aristotle refers to internal and external goods it is usually in 
relation to some individual i.e. the goods are internal or external to him or herself. 
However, for MacIntyre philosophy presupposes sociology and Aristotle is no exception. 
MacIntyre thus points to the goods internal and external to practices where the good life 
is pursued in a plurality of ways. Furthermore, goods are teleologically ordered towards 
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the highest good so that external goods are instrumental to the achievement of internal 
goods. Internal goods are good in themselves and, therefore, constitutive of a good life.  
The highest internal good is that for the sake of which all other goods are ordered. For the 
Aristotelian, this highest good is human flourishing, or eudaimonia, as argued towards the 
beginning of this chapter. MacIntyre appeals to the virtues because a person habituated 
to the virtues, through a practice, has trained their desires to enjoy what is good and 
most noble. That person seeks what is good for this particular practice and what is good 
in general. The former is hierarchically ordered towards the latter and if anyone pursues 
external goods for their own sake ‘they would be making a mistake about what is good 
for humans’ (Keat 2008, 47). 
 
1.4 MacIntyre’s Aristotelian framework 
Thus far we have explored two important concepts in Aristotelian thought: flourishing 
and virtue. Furthermore, we have seen how MacIntyre begins to make these concepts 
relevant to contemporary social and political life. What is clear from an Aristotelian 
perspective is that the right degree of external goods is necessary in life for one to have 
the opportunity to flourish. Human beings are incapable of self-sufficiency and can only 
actualise their potential in the best conditions. For Aristotle, the most self-sufficient unit 
is the polis or city-state. The household (oikos)9 is less self-sufficient and the individual 
even less so. An individual who is stateless cannot fulfil her human potential according to 
Aristotle. A state for Aristotle is a small-scale political community with shared rational 
deliberation and a common good. Therefore, we must be cautious in applying his 
reasoning to contemporary political conditions. The modern nation-state is not what 
Aristotle had in mind. For MacIntyre, it is more fruitful for us to talk about practice-based 
communities because it is in and through these that human beings can deliberate 
rationally about their shared ends. Practice-based communities tend to be local and, in 
the Western world, tend to provide examples of resistance to liberal individualism and 
capitalist forces (though, especially in After Virtue, they can be seen as a defeatist retreat 
                                                          
9 The oikos in Aristotle’s time was the economically self-sufficient household. The household was 
the site of economic activity. It therefore doesn’t follow that the oikos is a practice in MacIntyre’s 
sense because it was the bearer of a number of practices including productive practice. For 
Aristotle, the household provided for the basic human needs. It wasn’t self-sufficient politically 
and socially, however.   
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from the modern world). Examples of such practice-based communities are few and far 
between.10 Before we can explore how MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism might be applied to 
the contemporary family, we must first elaborate what MacIntyre’s framework is.  
We have seen that one cannot act well without the virtues (goods of excellence) and 
without the instrumental means (goods of effectiveness).  Being able to complete action 
is central to Aristotle’s ethics and good intentions are not enough to live a flourishing life. 
External goods are thus instrumental to enable virtuous action and, as discussed above, 
are not ends in themselves. Activity in this Aristotelian sense (energeia) is the 
actualisation of a being’s specific potential (Knight 2007, 13). Therefore, one who is truly 
flourishing is one who is fully realised in a completed form. What the Aristotelian 
recognition of the importance of chance and prosperity demonstrates is that external 
goods create the necessary conditions for flourishing. External goods are the resources 
that make virtuous human activity possible and possession of these goods depends on 
how fortunate one is. What the Aristotelian perspective also illustrates, however, is that 
pursuit of these external goods as ends in themselves hinders human flourishing. At best 
it demonstrates ineffectuality and at worst it demonstrates badness of character.  
In After Virtue, MacIntyre does not dwell on the precise range of practices in any given 
society, giving only a few examples from different times and places. However, practices 
for MacIntyre are pluralistic in that there can be practices in several different areas of 
social life and ‘the good life for individuals typically involves engagement in many or all of 
these domains or kinds of practices’ (Keat 2008). Instead he elaborates what a practice 
entails and the related concepts which are crucial to its understanding. MacIntyre notes, 
however, that the good of the practice is not reducible to the goods of individual 
practitioners. Rather, members of a practice advance the standards of excellence of their 
practice and progress it ‘as a historically and socially given kind of activity’ (Knight 2008, 
230). According to MacIntyre, this relationship is a social tradition. It is from this 
historical, social tradition that we learn all we can about our practice, but we must also 
confront and question it. Moreover, ‘This is what renders MacIntyre’s concept of 
practices progressive rather than conservatively conventionalist’ (Knight 2008a, 230). 
                                                          
10 Some examples of practice-based communities, which MacIntyre refers to, are fishing 
communities in New England in the past 150 years, Welsh mining communities, farming co-
operatives in Donegal, Mayan towns in Guatemala and Mexico and ancient city-states (1999, p. 
143). Other MacIntyrean scholars have also come up with examples for study such as the 
traditional circus (Beadle and Könyöt 2006). 
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Practitioners act in accordance with the rules of a practice which are means to the goods 
internal to practices. However, rules can be broken or changed in order to advance the 
practice in some way. There may also be external goods attached to a practice, such as 
status, wealth, power or prestige, but as MacIntyre points out, these are characteristically 
scarce goods so that the more one person has of them the less another has. 
One further aspect of the concept of a practice relevant to our discussion is that, 
according to MacIntyre, as practitioners, we have to subordinate ourselves in our 
relationships with other practitioners. We must learn to recognise  
what is due to whom; we have to be prepared to take whatever self-
endangering risks are demanded on the way; and we have to listen carefully 
to what we are told about our own inadequacies and to reply with the same 
carefulness for the facts (MacIntyre 1985, 191).  
This requires us to accept the virtues of justice, courage and honesty as a necessary 
component of any practice with internal goods. Thus virtues are integral to any practice. 
In fact, practices can be seen as schools of the virtues. To put it a different way MacIntyre 
states that  
The virtues are those goods by reference to which, whether we like it or not, 
we define our relationships to those other people with whom we share the 
kind of purposes and standards which inform practices (MacIntyre 1985, 191).  
Thus the virtues, as goods of excellence, provide an objective reference point or standard 
of excellence which practitioners can use in order to define their relationships with other 
practitioners with whom they share common goods.  
Despite the fact that many of the examples of practices used by MacIntyre and 
MacIntyrean scholars often require technical, artistic or scientific skill or technique, a 
practice is never just a set of technical skills, even if there is some unified purpose to 
those skills and even if the exercise of the skills can be enjoyed for their own sake. There 
needs to be, according to MacIntyre, certain goods, which are good in themselves, which 
guide our actions and decisions within a practice. However, desiring these goods on their 
own is also not enough to guide actions. Practitioners need to foster certain virtues of 
character which are developed through human powers of reasoning about the good and 
which guide a person to direct their emotions and desires towards that good. Therefore, 
internal goods cannot be attained or enjoyed without the habituation of virtue. Virtues 
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are goods internal to human beings and, once habituated, they guide our actions towards 
what is good for us as practitioners and as human beings. 
The goods and ends of the practice are ‘transformed and enriched by these extensions of 
human powers and by that regard for its own internal goods which are partially definitive 
of each particular practice or type of practice’ (MacIntyre 1985, 193). By ‘human powers’, 
MacIntyre appears to mean human capacities, which are then are improved and 
extended by the cultivation and exercise of virtue. For example we have the capacity to 
care for other human beings. The cultivation of the relevant virtues such as compassion, 
patience, justice and friendship would extend the human power to care and enrich the 
goods of the practice of family life. While powers can be used for bad ends, virtues 
cannot. Thus, powers would fall under those goods of potentiality as discussed earlier. 
MacIntyre distinguishes between virtues, skills and neutral powers thus: 
Virtues differ from both skills and from character traits, such as reliability and 
perseverance, precisely in that they are habits directed towards goods. They 
are not neutral powers, equally available for the pursuit of either good or bad 
ends (2007, 153). 
Remember that the virtues, for Aristotle, are the mean between extremes of passions. 
Someone who is too honest has gone too far to one extreme and does not aim at the 
mean. Someone who is prudent in a ruthless way is miserly and cruel and thus also misses 
the mean. This is not using virtue for bad ends but missing virtue completely. One may 
exercise a skill or capacity, however, for selfish or destructive ends. It is difficult perhaps 
to see how the skills of caregiving or the capacity to care about someone can be 
destructive – because care is widely seen to be a good thing in itself – unless one is 
incompetent in these skills or cares about the wrong person (an abusive partner or 
someone who does not care about us) or thing (one may care about fame or becoming 
rich). However, even if one becomes an effective caregiver, one’s motivation for learning 
and practicing the skills of caregiving may not be good. For instance, I may give care 
simply to look ‘good’ or to receive the rewards of praise or money and as such I may not 
give care in the right way or at the right time or I may abandon my charge when it suits 
me. Even if I have the right motivation, for example if I am moved by suffering or 
genuinely care about my charge, I may still not have the requisite virtues (such as 
patience or generosity) to carry out the activity of caregiving well. However, having the 
right motivation for action is a better place to begin cultivating the virtues than being 
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motivated by goods of money or status. What is particularly Aristotelian about 
MacIntyre’s account of a practice is, firstly, that it is teleological – goods are hierarchically 
ordered towards the highest good or final cause – and, secondly, that ‘Someone who 
achieves excellence in a practice . . . characteristically enjoys his achievement and his 
activity in achieving’ (2007, 197). 
MacIntyre also argues that ‘no practice can survive for any length of time unsustained by 
institutions’ (2007, 194), through which external goods are acquired for the sake of the 
ends of the practice. External goods are scarce resources of money, power and status, as 
already stated. One way to think of MacIntyre’s conceptual scheme, then, is to see 
institutions as providing the external conditions for a flourishing life. Aristotle recognised 
well enough the need for these instrumental goods, and they are indeed goods, in order 
to pursue a life of virtue. However, problems arise when they are pursued for their own 
sake. When institutions subordinate the internal goods of a practice to the external goods 
then the practice becomes corrupted: the good of the practice becomes incidental to the 
goods of power, status and wealth. 
MacIntyre argues that resistance to the corruption of the internal goods of the practice is 
the essential function of the virtues of courage, justice and truthfulness. Without these 
virtues the goods internal to the practice can become subordinated to the goods external 
and contingent to it. Preventing this subordination is one of the reasons why the virtues 
are important to the flourishing of a practice. Virtuous practitioners are able to resist the 
corrupting influence of external goods. Acting justly or truthfully might, however, mean 
we are less well-off or less powerful. As MacIntyre affirms, 
the cultivation of truthfulness, justice and courage will often, the world being 
what it contingently is, bar us from being rich or famous or powerful . . . We 
should therefore expect that, if in a particular society the pursuit of external 
goods were to become dominant, the concept of the virtues might first suffer 
attrition and perhaps something near total effacement, although simulacra 
might abound (MacIntyre 1985, 196). 
Here we might safely assume that MacIntyre is referring to Western capitalist societies 
where the pursuit of external goods is encouraged by institutions of both the state and 
the workplace. As a result, the pursuit of virtue within these institutions is difficult, 
though we may still value certain dispositions, relevant to particular spheres, which are 
not considered appropriate in other spheres of life. Thus: 
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To be a successful actor in all spheres requires both cultivating the perceived 
virtue of flexibility, and therefore abandoning one’s integrity as a human 
being, and cultivating each of several different sets of norms and supposed 
virtues appropriate to each of one’s spheres of activity toward, for example, 
truth-telling (Knight 2008b, 117–118). 
The implications of this argument are that the compartmentalised lives many of us in 
Western society currently lead, do not translate to us participating in different practices. 
It does not translate simply because what count as good reasons in one sphere do not 
count at all, or are largely unintelligible, in other spheres. Practices therefore must be 
embedded in communal forms of life and must foster virtues which are good for human 
beings in all aspects of their lives, not simulacrum of virtues or neutral dispositions which 
are only appropriate to one sphere; for example, our workplace. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
For MacIntyre, the range of practices is wide and includes intellectual as well as 
productive and deliberative activity and, of particular note for this thesis, he includes the 
making and sustaining of family life. According to MacIntyre, practices are where virtues 
are fostered. However, this is not to say that virtues are only exercised within practices. 
MacIntyre’s approach is to develop Aristotelianism as a dynamic tradition of thought. 
Where Aristotle often refers to some well-defined human activity when speaking of 
human excellence, MacIntyre develops the social conception of practices which aim at 
common goods rather than purely individual excellence. One major difference between 
Aristotle’s conception of praxis and MacIntyre’s conception of social practices is that 
goods internal to a practice are not the same as the ultimate good of human being – 
eudaimonia. However, they are teleologically ordered in the same way, such that the 
ends of a practice are pursued for their own sake as good in themselves. They should also, 
however, constitute the ends of the ultimate human good of flourishing because practices 
are a way for humans to actualise their potential and cultivate virtue.  This does not mean 
that practices are purely a means to this end but rather that they are constitutive of the 
good life. This argument, combined with MacIntyre’s rejection of contemporary 
compartmentalised lives, resolves the problem of the excellent practitioner of a particular 
activity who is also a vicious human being. Socially established cooperative human 
activities aim at common goods and are constitutive of a good human life: they are not 
purely self-interested endeavours that require cooperation for the sake of individual 
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ends. Activity in a particular practice thus informs the individual’s moral character qua 
human being.  
The other development of Aristotelian thought put forward in MacIntyre’s ethical theory, 
thanks to his early Marxism, is the proposal that some kinds of productive and practical 
activity require the exercise of the virtues (as well as technical skill) and are therefore 
capable of actualising human potential.  The practice of the making and sustaining of 
family, which is (re)productive and requires the exercise of certain skills, it will be argued, 
is partially constitutive of the good life for human beings as social and political animals, as 
it provides our earliest form of socialisation into practices and therefore society.  
Furthermore, it entails not only skills, such as feeding, bathing, administering medicines, 
educating and socialising, or the capacity to care, but also requires the virtues to direct 
those skills and capacities towards good ends.  
In this chapter, MacIntyre’s development of the Aristotelian tradition to include a 
plurality of human practices, as the constitutive activities of human flourishing, has been 
demonstrated. In the next chapter, MacIntyre’s theoretical framework of social practices 




2. Applying MacIntyre’s Aristotelian Framework to the Family 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In After Virtue MacIntyre notes that making and sustaining family life is a form of human 
practice. In order to develop this claim into a full account of what we should mean when 
we speak in contemporary situations of a family which functions well, we need to apply 
MacIntyre’s distinction between practices and institutions, as well as internal and 
external goods. Such an account must also consider the insights of alternative 
contemporary moral approaches to the family and what these approaches take to be a 
well-functioning family (this will be explored in the following chapters). In this chapter I 
will discuss why the making and sustaining of family life (henceforth ‘the practice of 
family life’ or ‘family life’) is indeed a practice in MacIntyre’s sense and how marriage is its 
institutional bearer. Furthermore, this chapter will explore how other institutions external 
to the family, but which nonetheless interfere with family life, impact on its capacity to 
achieve its goods. Despite the fact that MacIntyre seems fairly pessimistic about the 
possibility of shared rational agreement in contemporary Western societies, perhaps 
agreement can be reached on what constitutes a good, well-functioning family – from the 
simple fact that most human beings have a family. Not all participate in the practice of 
family life, but most have the opportunity to do so. However, the problem, from a 
MacIntyrean perspective, is that not all families are rooted in some form of community. 
The increasing privatisation and atomisation of family life entails that many Western 
families are distinct entities; separate spheres of life which do not overlap with other 
spheres – and which attempt to be self-sufficient – in the absence of a community of 
others with whom they can deliberate about shared ends. This issue will be addressed 
towards the end of this thesis. 
In the introduction it was argued that it is through our socialisation into the practice of 
family life that we begin to learn to stand back from our immediate desires and reason 
about our own good, and the good of our family. In doing so, we learn how to sustain 
networks of human relationships constitutive of a good life. Initially, we learn how to 
sustain these networks of caregiving and receiving from other family members who care 
for us. However, if we are badly cared for, we fail to learn this. Who cares for us might not 
always be parents but may also include other family members – and not just when we are 
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children. Families are therefore diverse and include a range of roles and relationships. 
Marriage, on the other hand, is a (now state-sanctioned) site of institutionalised status 
and power-relations. Who is allowed to marry is determined by the state and is often 
influenced by wider religious and cultural institutions. The presence of state-sanctioned 
marriage in a family should not, from a MacIntyrean perspective, determine the goodness 
of a family. However, if the institution of marriage is in good order, it should play a role in 
sustaining family life. 
Martha Nussbaum also argues that family forms are diverse and that they should be 
judged on their ability to cultivate a threshold level of capabilities, rather than on their 
structure or form (Nussbaum 2000). However, unlike Nussbaum, I believe it is necessary 
to distinguish the practice of family life from other social practices which enable similar 
human functions but have different ends. Examples include the women’s collectives 
Nussbaum studied in India (Nussbaum 2000) or L’Arche communities which aim to enable 
people with and without disability to live more interdependent lives. The practice of 
making and sustaining a family life is found across different cultures and throughout 
history. It can therefore be understood as a cultural universal, though of course its form 
and its functions vary widely. Furthermore, it is the first practice most human beings 
become a part of and, with regards to one’s family of origin, have no choice about being 
inducted into. It is also a unique practice in that it socialises children, introducing them to 
other social practices through the guidance of older family members who act as their 
primary guardians throughout their early dependency. The socialisation and care of 
children is widely regarded as one of the primary functions of the family. 
In this chapter I firstly identify the key ways in which the making and sustaining of family 
life is indeed a practice and how this relates to MacIntyre’s wider conceptual scheme, in 
particular his conception of a social tradition. Secondly, I explore what this means for the 
family and the various forms it takes. Thirdly, I look at the relationship of the practice of 
family life to the institution of marriage, and to external institutions, and discuss the 
potential corrupting power of these institutions on family life.  
 
2.2 Family life as a social practice 
If the making and sustaining of family life is indeed a social practice, then it has goods 
internal to it which develop the practitioner in a way they could not be developed outside 
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of family life. It follows from this that family life is uniquely valuable. But it also assumes 
that the practice is in good order. We are all, or should be, acutely aware that family life 
has the potential to be as damaging as it has to be developing and fulfilling. In fact, it is 
one of the practices most open to abuse because of how vulnerable to the power of 
others it makes certain less powerful members of society i.e. women, children, the sick 
and the disabled. 
That members of a practice advance the standards of excellence of their practice and 
progress it ‘as a historically and socially given kind of activity’ is not to suggest that all 
family members in a given society somehow revolutionise family life through their 
activity. Yet each family member is learning from other, typically older, members of their 
own family and from the general standards set by others in their own society, and then 
contributing to those standards and that body of knowledge. One does not engage in the 
practice of family life as an adult with an abstract view-from-nowhere about how one 
ought to participate in that practice. There are certain expectations which govern family 
life in a given historical and social context, and one does not begin the next stage of 
family life as an adult without some engrained knowledge of these standards and 
expectations.  
As children, we are socialised with sets of rules about how to behave and certain 
standards which are appropriate to family life. Later, as adults, we learn from those 
around us through participation in other practices as well as drawing on our own 
experiences. When we enter into family life, either through birth, adoption or through 
choice, it is not just a relationship with those who are part of the family we create but 
also a relationship with past practitioners, particularly those who extended or improved 
the practice in some way. Our relationship may be with those from whom we are 
immediately descended or with those who changed the form of family life, or the way we 
raise children, in our particular culture, for better or for worse. Every practice has its own 
history and the history of making and sustaining family life is not a singular history but a 
complex, divergent and often overlapping collection of histories, which vary according to 
cultural, religious and political norms as well as upheavals. We engage with the traditions 
of our own families through stories about our past, which are often passed down from 
grandparents. However, they are also transmitted through local museums and heritage 
centres that document and record local and national histories, not just of politics, work 
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and nation, but also of how war and immigration affected family life, as well as the 
histories of rural farming families and families of the industrial age. Understanding how 
modern family life has evolved from and relates to family life historically, is also why 
history lessons at school should not only be about important dates, battles, political 
struggle, monarchies and invasions but should also be about where we came from, how 
we have changed and what lessons we can learn about family life from the past, both 
good and bad.  
Thus far we can infer, from MacIntyre’s claims about practices, that the practice of family 
life has goods which are internal to the practice and which are only fully realisable 
through that practice. As was discussed in the previous chapter, there may also be 
external goods attached to being part of a family such as status, wealth, power or 
prestige but as MacIntyre points out, these are characteristically scarce goods so that the 
more one person, or family, has of them the less another has. These are the kinds of 
goods which Rawls’ Theory of Justice is concerned to distribute more equitably and whose 
distribution through the family is problematic for the realisation of social justice (Rawls 
1999) (see chapter 3 for further discussion). They are the goods which Aristotle claims are 
‘such things necessary to life’ (The Politics I 1256b 30)11. As a result, if a family lacks 
resources that are ‘necessary to life’, such as money, shelter, food and other basic 
material goods, it will not be able to function well because its members will struggle to 
survive. If they have only these basic goods to a minimal degree but not enough to 
engage in worthwhile activity within and outside of the family, thus actualising the 
potential of each family member, then they will simply be surviving or existing rather than 
flourishing. Thus there are other less basic external goods than food, shelter and money 
which are instrumental to sustaining a well functioning family. 
Furthermore, in order for families to function well, family members must subordinate 
themselves in their relationships with other family members and must accept the virtues 
of justice, courage and honesty. Just as MacIntyre’s chess playing child is willing to cheat 
in her early days of learning chess, so too are children willing to lie, pretend to be good, 
blame others for their mistakes and so on to escape punishment, be rewarded or receive 
affection. Equally some parents may be willing to bribe their children in order to maintain 
                                                          
11 The translation of the Politics used is the Cambridge Texts in Political Thought version (Aristotle 
1996) which uses Jonathan Barnes’ translation from The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised 
Translation, Princeton University Press, 1984. 
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the appearance of a well-ordered family life or for peace and quiet, or they may be less 
than honest with their spouse because they lack courage to speak up and ask for help 
with domestic responsibilities or with financial difficulties. Courage is also needed in 
spades within family life to stand up to injustice, be it where a parent or relative has a 
favourite child and demonstrates this in his actions, to the detriment of the other child, or 
where a parent or spouse is abusive.  
MacIntyre’s list of virtues (justice, courage and honesty) necessary to a practice seem 
particularly relevant to the practice of family life. We certainly owe it to other members 
of our family to care for them, listen to them and to share our external goods with them; 
we have to take risks for our children or other vulnerable family members which might 
endanger our own wellbeing; and as family members we will only learn what our own 
inadequacies are through honesty from those for whom we are responsible or who are 
responsible for us.   
What feminist thought highlights, however, is that those in family life who have 
traditionally subordinated themselves in their relationships with others have primarily 
been women as wives, mothers, daughters and caregivers in general. This has resulted in 
a lack of recognition of what is due to women in families, women who have often taken 
on subordinate roles because of the expectations and standards of excellence in family 
life of their particular social context. Although MacIntyre does not address this particular 
injustice, it seems that his conceptual scheme is equipped to do so. Arguably, the 
institution of marriage has instantiated and provided legitimacy to oppression. The 
institution of marriage has historically, and often still, allocated power in a hierarchical 
and patriarchal way, institutionalising gendered power structures. Before we can discuss 
in more detail what is meant by the corrupting power of an institution on a practice, 
however, we must first look at what the practice of family life involves. 
 
2.3 What the practice of family life involves 
Thus far, I have argued that family life is indeed a practice. Certainly, the making and 
sustaining of family life cannot be reduced to a set of technical goal-directed skills even if 
parents and other caregivers require certain skills to carry out their role well. The practice 
of family life is more than the basic skills required to raise a healthy child, for example, 
because otherwise parents and other caregivers could be replaced by machines or paid 
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employees12. Being a good parent or a good sister or grandparent cannot be learned from 
a handbook or a parenting class, even though some would have us believe that we can 
and must do so, and even though learning basic skills may be a good start for some 
parents. One may be able to, for example, learn a technique for negotiating the temper 
tantrums of a child but this alone does not make a good parent.  Specifically, a child may 
be raised physically healthy by receiving appropriate nourishment and shelter, and by 
taking part in appropriate exercise, but the practice of family life, when successful, also 
develops the child’s moral character, intellectual capacities and creates a nurturing set of 
relationships between family members.   
How does the Aristotelian tradition help us to understand what a well-functioning family 
in contemporary situations is? Firstly, it illustrates the difference between goods which 
are purely instrumental and goods which are good for their own sake; in other words, 
constitutive of a good life. Secondly, it emphasises the importance of thinking about the 
common good of the practice of family life and how the family might deliberate about its 
ends. Justice is an important virtue for achieving the common good. Without just social 
relations between family members some members will suffer the injustice of the position 
of others. For example, it would be unjust if, all other things being equal, the 
responsibility of caregiving fell to the daughter of a sick parent and not equally to his 
sons; particularly if the only reason for her bearing full responsibility is because of her 
gender. Thirdly, Aristotelianism provides an account of the transformation of inclinations 
into virtue through habituation. In a familial or intimate relationship with another we act 
from an affectionate regard for that other.  MacIntyre, in Dependent Rational Animals, 
argues that it is through the education of dispositions (i.e. the affections, sympathies and 
inclinations) that we can act both justly and generously towards another who suffers from 
certain deprivations. And while one could argue that our affections are not ours to 
command, MacIntyre responds that we can train our inclinations to feel as well as to act, 
and to act with and from a certain amount of feeling (MacIntyre 1999).   
Virtuous action usually does not come naturally to human beings, though we may feel 
affectionate towards intimate others or towards those with whom we sympathise. Rather 
we require an education into such virtuous action and feeling, and this begins with our 
families, where we first form intimate and highly particular relationships.  Above all, with 
                                                          
12 Taken to its extreme we might have a Brave New World scenario (Huxley 1955). 
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those for whom we feel a natural affection, we can educate this feeling so that we act 
appropriately and give both generously and justly to those people and to others. Through 
the education of inclinations we give care willingly and ungrudgingly, without any analysis 
of what we might get in return. To explain this further, MacIntyre argues that the contrast 
between self-interested market behaviour and altruistic behaviour delineated by Adam 
Smith, obscures those activities where the goods achieved are genuinely common goods 
‘as the goods of networks of giving and receiving are’ (MacIntyre 1999, 119).  What 
altruism translates to, according to MacIntyre, is ‘blandly generalized benevolence’ 
towards the abstract Other, which makes us feel good about ourselves (1999, 119).  Thus 
egoism and altruism are both forms of self-interestedness.  According to MacIntyre these 
categories do not allow us to think about what qualities are needed in order for us to 
participate in relationships with particular others and learn to share common goods; 
rather they only allow us to think about ourselves and our initial desires.  What MacIntyre 
wants us to think about is the relationship between justice and generosity which is not 
usually recognised (1999, 120-8).   
There need to be, according to MacIntyre, certain goods, which are good in themselves, 
which, through reasoning about the good life, guide our actions and decisions within the 
family. However, desiring these goods on their own is also not enough to guide actions. 
Family members need to foster certain virtues of character which are developed through 
habituation and which guide a person to direct their emotions and desires towards a 
particular worthwhile good. Therefore, the internal goods of family cannot be attained or 
enjoyed without the habituation of the relevant virtues, and how we order those goods, 
and determine what is worthwhile, cannot be done without practical reasoning and 
rational deliberation with other family members.  
The traditional catalogue of the virtues, if cultivated in the young, allows them to become 
independent practical reasoners; but because of our inherent vulnerability as human 
animals, we must also cultivate the necessary counterpart to these virtues of 
independence and they are the virtues of acknowledged dependence. Otherwise we will 
never know when it is necessary or appropriate to depend on the reasoning or care of 
another. MacIntyre admits that there is no central virtue in the conventional list of virtues 
which we can say is exhibited in relationships of giving and receiving.  While generosity 
and justice are both qualities that may be related to such relationships, neither supply 
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what is needed, seeing as one can be just without being generous and one can be 
generous without being just. MacIntyre argues the central virtue of acknowledged 
dependence must then contain aspects of both.  For us to have just-generosity then, we 
must exhibit uncalculating giving because we owe it to the particular other that needs it:  
‘Because I owe it, to fail to exhibit it is to fail in respect of justice; because what I owe is 
uncalculating giving, to fail to exhibit it is also to fail in respect of generosity’ (MacIntyre 
1999, 121).  Following Thomas Aquinas, MacIntyre shows that we must cultivate 
dispositions which allow us to exemplify, in one action, the various virtues of doing good.  
This one action might be what we have called caring activity or caregiving. If we attend to 
someone in need, we must act justly, liberally, out of charity and out of pity.  Care must 
therefore embody all of these virtues. Through being able to act in such a way we are 
then able to sustain relationships of giving and receiving.  However, this does involve 
training our desires and affections.  Therefore, when we respond to someone who is in 
need, we act virtuously from affectionate regard for that particular other.  In other words, 
through the cultivation and habituation of the virtues of acknowledged dependence, 
which are complementary to the virtues of independence, we can sustain our 
relationships of giving and receiving.  To not act from such an inclination, of affectionate 
regard for another, is a sign of moral inadequacy according to MacIntyre.  We train this in 
ourselves and others, such as children, through habituation, repeating the virtue-
embodying activity again and again in our day-to-day lives until it becomes second nature.  
As stated in the previous chapter, a person who achieves excellence in a practice 
characteristically enjoys his achievement and his activity in achieving. Thus with family 
life, a parent characteristically enjoys expending his efforts on raising his child to be a 
good and flourishing adult, and children characteristically enjoy learning and developing 
their relationships. For example, Nel Noddings describes the burdens of parenting as joys:  
When my infant wriggles with delight as I bathe or feed him, I am aware of no 
burden but only a special delight of my own . . .   Many of the “demands” of 
caring are not felt as demands. They are, rather, occasions that offer most of 
what makes life worth living (Noddings 1984, 52). 
It is not only the flourishing of the cared-for which is fostered in the act of caregiving but 
also the flourishing of the caregiver. As Aristotle teaches us, we can find pleasure and 
enjoyment in doing what is good, and it is through the cultivation of virtues that our 
desires are transformed to want what is good, not just what is immediately felt.  
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Caring activity is a constitutive part of human flourishing; not to give care generously and 
justly when it is needed is to be morally deficient.  But also, due to our vulnerability, we 
often need the care of others in order to flourish.  MacIntyre maintains that we, as social 
animals, usually find ourselves in complex networks of giving and receiving where often 
how much we can give depends somewhat on how much we have received.  However, 
what we give and receive is not a matter of strict reciprocity or cost-benefit calculation, as 
in a market relationship, because often those that we give to are not the same as those 
that we have received from and, more importantly, what we owe is uncalculating giving.  
We ought to always remember to whom it is we are in debt (usually our parents) but 
often we do not know who it is that we will be called upon to give to.  If we have children 
it is clear who we are called upon to give to, but we are often also called upon by other 
family members, members of our community, friends or strangers who may need us 
without warning. And if we are called upon to give care to our parents, what we give is 
incommensurable with what they gave to us by way of care and nurture.  Hence a 
network of giving and receiving, which characterises a family, is not based on some form 
of market relations or abstract rationality.  For the reason that we often do not know in 
advance what it is that another whom we are called upon to care for will need, we set no 
limits to those needs, though we often call upon others to help us to tend to those needs.   
Through practicing different types of friendship, or what Aristotle called philia, with 
intimate others, particularly family members on whom we are so often dependent, we 
learn how to cultivate the virtue of just-generosity towards strangers and intimates alike, 
as well as recognise our own vulnerability and dependencies.  MacIntyre stresses that we 
must acknowledge our dependence on others.  Without that understanding, we cannot 
understand how others might need us.  If someone has been deprived of the affectionate 
regard or philia of others, then it falls to those who have not been so deprived to tend to 
their deprivations.  True character friendship (the best kind of philia) in the Aristotelian 
sense can be used as a paradigm for how we should treat people who suffer such 
deprivations.   
The family is the smallest and most natural kind of community.  The making and 
sustaining of a common life is generally considered by Aristotelians to be natural because 
human beings are social animals and desire to live with others and share common goals.  
Discussing philia in book eight of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle singles out friendship 
46 
 
between members of the same family as having more of the pleasant and useful about it 
than those not related by family, insofar as they have a more shared life and belong more 
to one another. He argues 
No one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all the other good 
things . . .   since what use would such prosperity be if they were deprived of 
the possibility of beneficence, which occurs most, and is most to be praised, in 
relation to friends? (1155a5-10). 
Furthermore, what counts as justice is different depending on the friendship, so that it is 
more unjust, according to Aristotle, to fail to help out a brother than a stranger. Aristotle 
states that 
It is the friendship between good people, those resembling each other in 
excellence, which is complete; for each alike of these wishes good things for 
the other in so far as he is good, and he is good in himself (NE VIII 3. 1156b7-
10). 
Thus if a parent is good, she will want her child to be good and wish good things for him 
or her, and, therefore, the child is likely to resemble her in excellence as he or she grows 
into an adult.  Similarly, adults would not form families together if they did not wish good 
things for their spouse or partner and find in them an equality of excellence; though of 
course Aristotle did not believe men and women could equal each other in excellence as 
women were considered to be deficient in reason and virtue. However, I believe that 
disregarding this aspect of Aristotle’s account of human nature does not damage his 
account of friendship. In fact I consider it to be more damaging to Aristotle’s account of 
friendship, particularly in the family, to assume the inferiority of women when we now 
know women do equal men in terms of moral and intellectual character. Both Hollie 
Mann (2012) and Sibyl Schwarzenbach (2009) argue that while the friendship most valued 
by Aristotle is between persons already of equal character, both committed to living a life 
in accordance with excellence, the friendship between family members, particularly those 
characterised by inequality and caregiving, can also cultivate the capacities for character 
friendship and develop into true character friendship. In fact, Schwarzenbach argues that 
this is indeed desirable and that it should be the end of parent-child relationships over a 
complete life (2009, 49-50). Moreover, Mann suggests that ‘friends are most valuable 
because they form an important structure in which we learn other-regarding thought and 
action, and they also become the enabling conditions for our own acting and doing well, 
for living virtuously’ (2012, 198). If friends do not find equality of excellence, then their 
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relationship is likely to fail unless it is based on utility or pleasure and these are usually 
not long-lasting on their own, according to Aristotle. Families must, therefore, be based 
on character friendship, which means that each must want the good life for the others 
with whom they form families and a good common life for the activities in which they 
share. What Mann says of good friendship in general is particularly applicable to the 
relationships between family members. They are important, 
not simply because they make us feel good or provide us with a sense of 
solace and security, though they surely do that, but because they call on us to 
do well by others, to act benevolently toward those with whom we share an 
ethical and political life, and they are the contexts within which we learn how 
to do this successfully (2012, 198-9). 
Familial philia then provides the first relationships in which we learn about the needs of 
others, how to live a good life and how to share our goods with particular others in 
accordance with the virtues. On an Aristotelian account, then, in order to flourish family 
members must find their good in common and, as I will argue, the internal goods of 
family life require care of each family member for one another.  Only through exercising 
certain virtues within mutually caring relationships can these goods be achieved, and the 
cultivation of these virtues will not be a means to an end but will rather be constitutive of 
the good human life. 
The practice of making and sustaining family life, broadly defined, thus fulfils certain 
functions and aims at certain goods, as has been argued. The practice is usually composed 
of mutually supportive adults engaged in relationships characterised by love and/or 
biological ties, often raising children or caring for other dependent family members 
related through blood, law or custom. The practice of family life in Western societies is 
usually situated within one household, though, due to increasing geographical mobility, 
many families stretch across multiple households and geographical regions. As such, 
family life in the West (particularly Anglo-American countries) has become increasingly 
atomised, fragmenting the extended family and reducing it to its most nuclear form. This 
form of the family has been seen by some social theorists as the ideal for family life to 
succeed in an increasingly competitive and heartless world (Lasch 1997; Parsons 1949). 
However, the practice varies greatly from one cultural and historical context to the next. 
It is important not to define family life too prescriptively, therefore, because the family is 
probably one of the most variable and adaptable practices in human social life. As Munoz-
Darde argues, it is this adaptability which makes it so striking as a permanent part of 
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social life (1999, 59). Archard similarly claims ‘the family is above all the great survivor; 
indeed it seems inconceivable that any modern society should be able do without it in 
some form’ (2012, 132–3). 
One thing families need to be is adaptable to changes in their fortunes and 
circumstances. Biological or legally-prescribed roles often become blurred when 
circumstances demand it. Cultural or legal norms do not commit individuals to one 
familial role throughout their lives and, as a result, we often find grandparents or aunts 
and uncles parenting the children of their own offspring or siblings, respectively. There 
are also many examples of young carers looking after sick or disabled parents, or of adult 
siblings living together in old age for mutual support. These different arrangements may 
be more or less unconventional; some may be unjust and may require external 
interference from society. The basic point, however, is that we must not assume that 
conventional families with roles assigned by cultural or legal norms are always the best 
kinds of families. It makes more sense to accept a wide variation in the formation of 
families.  
On the other hand, I would rule out communes or institutional care as examples of the 
practice of family life. Communes, with communal child-rearing, economic inter-
dependency or a shared religious or philosophical vision are not families, but share some 
of the characteristics of families situated in larger communities such as neighbourhoods, 
religious congregations and small villages. In fact, they may often constitute examples of 
what MacIntyre refers to as practice-based communities. They are not families in 
themselves because they generally come about for ends which are distinctive from the 
internal goods of family life and are better characterised as intentional communities. 
They might have political or religious goals or they may adopt an experimental lifestyle.13 
They may also aim to perform the same functions as family life but usually they have 
further ends and, unless they are all part of a kinship group rather than simply choosing 
to live communally, then it is difficult to see how they are a family as opposed to a 
commune. What I am interested in, for the purposes of answering my initial question, is 
the socially-established practice of family life and how it can function well. Communes 
                                                          
13 Examples of different communes might be hippy land communes, kibbutzim (Israeli collective 
community), eco-villages, urban co-housing, co-operatives, L’Arche communities (an alternative 




have their own separate social and historical development and their cultural significance 
varies according to their wider goals, whether political, religious or experimental. 
Furthermore, their goals often run counter to the dominant culture in which they are 
situated and offer an alternative way of life.  
I have also ruled out institutionalised care as a form of the family, simply because 
institutions such as elder care homes or children’s homes exist when families cannot 
satisfy particular human needs due to either a loss of family (where there are no family 
members left alive), deficiencies in the practice of family life or a lack of external goods 
needed to maintain care. Institutionalised care is the expression of society’s duty to care 
for those individuals who are deprived of the attentive and affectionate regard of others 
(MacIntyre 1999) or whose families do not have the resources to care for them alone. It is 
a matter of just-generosity that society provides for those who are left alone in the world 
or whose families cannot provide for them, when we consider that this deprivation could 
happen to any one of us at any time and when we consider each human being to be of 
equal worth. Institutional care is, therefore, not a replacement for the family but either 
complements it or substitutes for it in extreme cases. 
Within the family, there is no institutional body which selects those people, deemed to be 
good caregivers, to be parents or other relatives, except in adoption cases. Good parents 
perhaps choose each other or choose to have children together on the grounds that each 
thinks the other to be a good caregiver, or has the qualities needed to be a good partner 
and parent, but there is no formal assessment of skill or interview process to determine 
each other’s qualities. Within the family there is likely to be investment in the wellbeing 
of others because of the bonds which family life fosters. Furthermore, most people are 
not motivated to care about family members because of the rewards of external goods 
but because they genuinely love and care about members of their family. This is not to 
suggest that family members are never distracted from the internal goods of family life by 
external goods. Indeed it will be argued that this is often how families become 
dysfunctional or break down altogether. 
Firstly, however, the discussion will turn to the role of institutions in family life. To what 
extent is the institution of marriage good for the family?  Does it cement the bonds 
between parents (or potential parents) to provide a stable family life or does it distribute 
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power unequally so that some family members are left powerless? Finally, what roles do 
other institutions external to family life play in sustaining or subordinating the family? 
 
2.4 Institutions of the family 
This section will consider the institution of marriage and other institutions external to the 
family, created for the sake of sustaining family life, in MacIntyrean terms, in order to 
determine in what ways family life is sustained by these institutions. It will further 
consider in what ways the practice of family life can be corrupted by the institution of 
marriage and other institutions. Moreover, I will be arguing that the pursuit of external 
goods as ends in themselves damages family life and the wellbeing of family members, 
particularly as family life is where human beings are first educated about virtues and 
vices. 
If marriage was merely about status, the formalisation of power relations, or the 
acquisition of wealth, then it would provide a weak and unstable foundation for the 
practice of family life and would corrupt the goods internal to the life of that family. 
Examples of this are: the person who marries for money or to improve their social status, 
or the man who wants to formalise his authority over his wife, thus reinforcing patriarchal 
relations. On the other hand, the corrupting influence of the institution on the practice 
may not only be the result of an individual’s motivations for entering into that institution. 
It may be a result of the institutional form; for example, a marital system that 
subordinates women to men. Practitioners who have cultivated the virtues have the 
capacity to resist the corrupting power of the institution. One key way in which the 
practice-embodying institution of marriage has undermined and corrupted the practice of 
family life throughout history has been through the patriarchal power relations of the 
social and political environment that the institution reinforces. John Stuart Mill and his 
wife Harriet Taylor resisted the power relations of the institution of marriage in their time 
when Mill recorded a formal protest against the powers given to men over their wives’ 
rights and property. In reference to these powers Mill stated:  
I, having no means of legally divesting myself of these odious powers (as I 
most assuredly would do if an engagement to that effect could be made 
legally binding on me), feel it my duty to put on record a formal protest 
against the existing law of marriage, in so far as conferring such powers; and a 
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solemn promise never in any case or under any circumstances to use them 
(Mill 1984, 99). 
Mill did not limit his protest to his own marital circumstances either but also fought to 
have the institution changed and wrote extensively about the issue of women’s rights in 
relation to marriage.  
The conceptual distinction between the practice of making and sustaining family life and 
the institution of marriage is useful because it allows us to understand family life as a 
socially constituted activity. The activity of family life is sustained or corrupted by its 
institutional bearer, depending on whether the goals embodied in that institution are 
directed towards the good of the practice or instead towards external goods. The practice 
of family life is sustained not so much by the household, which only distributes wealth 
acquired elsewhere and is no longer an economically productive unit in the Western 
world (as it was for Aristotle),14 but by other institutions of employment outside of the 
home and of the state. Household income, usually from external sources, and state 
institutions of welfare provide the external conditions necessary for family life to survive 
and even flourish. The institution of the family is now primarily marriage. Married persons 
share their economic resources from work and provide for dependent family members 
and where marriage fails, other institutions—usually state ones but also including 
charities, increasingly private profit-making agencies and to some extent religious 
institutions—step in to provide support in the form of welfare, advice, help with 
caregiving, housing, et cetera. Without support, either from other family members or 
from external institutions, family caregivers are unlikely to be able to carry out the 
activity of caregiving well.  
To draw a parallel, a caregiver working in a care home similarly needs resources (e.g. a 
decent wage and time off) to be able to give good care. An overburdened and 
overworked caregiver, whether providing care for a wage or out of love or obligation, is 
unlikely to flourish or be able to assist the one being cared for to flourish (Sanders and 
Kittay 2005). For a person giving care to someone with dementia, anger and frustration, 
which can easily result from caregiving due to the burdens inherent in the activity, will 
not enable a caregiver to give care well or enable the caregiver to flourish. Caregivers 
who are not well supported with family and respite or colleagues, resources, decent pay 
                                                          
14 There are of course exceptions, noted earlier, such as family farms and traditional circuses. 
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and enough time off are going to be more susceptible to losing control over their 
character and giving in to the vices of anger directed at the cared-for, frustration and 
impatience. Thus, even if an institution recognises the importance of the virtues in the 
staff it employs or even if a family member has all the virtues of a good caregiver, virtue 
will not be enough if that caregiver is over-worked, underpaid, powerless, and 
emotionally and physically tired all of the time. While most family carers would not 
expect to be paid for their work, they still need enough financial resources, respite and a 
strong network of support to carry out their caregiving role well and to flourish. An 
example of the kind of support caregivers require is provided by Eva Kittay in her 
discussion of the United States Family and Medical Leave Act which she argues is ‘a rare 
piece of social policy insofar as it recognizes a public responsibility for dependency care’ 
(1995, 9). The policy is designed to protect family caregivers in their role, to the extent 
that they are permitted unpaid leave for caregiving regardless of gender and are not 
forced to return to work or risk losing their job; although Kittay also discusses the extent 
to which the policy is still very limited in its scope. 
 The care home is also part of a set of wider institutions which support the practice of 
making and sustaining family life. Where good caregiving cannot be provided within the 
family due to the lack of resources or time, or where it can only be partially provided, 
paid caregivers support families to sustain the very young, the elderly and the disabled 
through nursery schools, sheltered accommodation, home help, palliative care  and 
residential homes, to name a few. Being entirely responsible for a dependent other, 
whether through choosing to have children or finding oneself responsible for a relative 
with a disability or age-related illness, is more than one person can cope with alone. It can 
be physically demanding, economically fraught and emotionally straining (Sanders and 
Kittay 2005, 15).  
However, if good caregiving, within the family or within institutions which sustain caring 
practices that supplement the family, requires the exercise of individual virtue then how 
can it be ‘valued’ materially? In other words, is paying for care immoral? My argument, 
drawing on MacIntyre’s theoretical framework of practices and institutions and internal 
and external goods, is that virtue on its own is not enough because care also requires 
resources both for the activity itself and to sustain the caregiver. On the other hand, 
there are those who think that throwing a lot of money at caregiving is the best response, 
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but a well-paid caregiver who does not have the necessary virtues will not likely be able 
to provide good care and will not flourish in his or her role. Thus there needs to be 
institutional acknowledgment of the role of the virtues in good caregiving. Indeed, in the 
practice of family life, a rich family does not necessarily make for the most caring family. 
Wealth or material possessions are not a substitute for good care. Caregiving in family life 
is essential to its flourishing (qua family) and for the good of human beings (qua family 
members) precisely insofar as the success of caregiving relies on the cultivation and day-
to-day deployment of the virtues. State support for caregiving in family life is, therefore, 
ultimately justifiable insofar as the state is concerned with the genuine flourishing of its 
citizens and not simply because financial resources (absent virtue) yield effective forms of 
care. 
One of the great dangers to the family of these supplemental institutions is that they can 
become too involved in family life and damage a family’s ability to achieve their internal 
goods. For example, social workers might be able to decide what kind of care and housing 
an elderly person needs (through a community care assessment in the UK), which may 
contradict what that person’s family thinks she needs. The family may not have the space 
or resources to directly care for their elderly family member but nonetheless want to be 
near her and be as involved in her care as they can. Not only does the danger lie in the 
power the social worker has over these decisions, it also lies in what drives such 
decisions; and often a driving factor is budgets and funding (Priestley 1998, 663–666). In 
such cases, the decision about a person’s care might be driven by prioritisation of 
available funds, or staying within budgetary targets, rather than prioritising what is best 
for the family member and how best to facilitate the family’s involvement in her care. 
Mark Priestley refers to this issue as a ‘“glass ceiling” of budgetary constraints’ (1998, 
663). 
Consequently, the virtues are not only needed to give good care but are also needed to 
resist the corrupting power of institutions. This is another reason why paid caregivers 
working in large institutions need the virtues in order to sustain their practice. Without 
these virtues the goods internal to the practice of family life or other caregiving practices 
can become subordinated to the goods external and contingent to it.   
Furthermore, an increase in the external goods of caregivers, as opposed to those of the 
institution through increased profits, may also help caregivers to resist their own 
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exploitation. Power, through unionization, and money, through wages which reflect the 
true value of care work to society, would greatly strengthen the position of care-workers 
in society. In the case of the institution of marriage, historically women have been given a 
subordinate role which often went hand-in-hand with caregiving. Giving women greater 
power in the marital relationship has allowed them to begin to change caring practices 
and has allowed men a greater role in caregiving, supported in the UK, for example, by 
the introduction of family-centred policies such as paid paternity leave.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued for a revisionary Aristotelian approach to the family in order to 
understand what constitutes a well functioning family in contemporary society. 
MacIntyre’s practices and institutions framework was applied to the family. This 
framework sociologises Aristotle’s own naturalistic thinking about action to include a 
range of different cooperative human activities as constitutive of the good life; not just 
political and contemplative activity, only accessible to a well-educated, leisured elite. For 
Aristotle, the good life cannot be found in such a range of activities because any kind of 
production, including the management of children’s upbringing, he regarded as not a 
‘free activity, or praxis, and therefore as inappropriate for  free, male citizens’ (Knight 
2008b, 117). From MacIntyre’s revisionary Aristotelian perspective then, the practice of 
family life, with its (re)productive activity, can be understood as constitutive of human 
flourishing for both men and women. 
Furthermore, MacIntyre adds to his version of Aristotelianism the concept of an 
institution which is created in order to sustain a practice. Through the institution, or set of 
institutions, external goods are necessarily sought which are then subordinated to the 
goods internal to the practice of family life which it sustains, in order for the practice to 
flourish and enable its members to achieve their goods in common. However, MacIntyre 
also recognises that because the purpose of institutions is to acquire external goods, they 
are often a threat to the good functioning of practices and their practitioners. When the 
goods internal to the practice of family life (the goods of excellence that participation in 
the practice cultivate in its members) are subordinated to the goods of effectiveness 
(those goods external to the practice such as money, power and status, and goods such as 
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skills which are then used to achieve external goods) then the practice ceases to function 
well and practitioners become vulnerable to corruption by these goods.  
We are now closer to answering the question proposed at the beginning. A family which 
is functioning well is a family in which adult members are able to reason well about their 
good in relation to the goods of family life. Those responsible within the family for the 
care of dependent others are able to judge what is best for those dependent others 
whilst allowing and assisting those dependent others to develop their own practical 
reasoning as far as they can. In a well-functioning family, adults also foster a network of 
mutually supportive caring relationships into which young children are socialised. 
Furthermore, family members are aware of the history of their activity and its rules and 
standards of excellence. They are able to fully understand, interpret and question those 
rules when required in order to advance the practice as a socially given activity. In a well 
functioning family, the goods of family life are not be subordinated by any family member 
to external goods which may be attached to the family as an accident of circumstance. 
Finally, a well functioning family is adaptable to changes in fortunes and circumstances 
and recognises that roles are not fixed biologically or legally. Family members inhabit 
multiple roles simultaneously, throughout their lives, depending on their relationship to 
other members and the ethical demands of those relationships.  
Because the family is, with a few exceptions, no longer economically self-sufficient and 
yet is increasingly isolated from local communities, institutions designed to supplement 
the family (such as state institutions of care) are increasingly important in Western 
countries. These institutions have the power to interfere with family life for the good of 
the family in order to aid dysfunctional families, support those who cannot provide care 
and provide what is needed for those who no longer have families. The goods internal to 
family life, however, are also vulnerable to corruption by these other institutions 
designed to supplement the family. The power of these institutions has the potential to 
lead them to attempt to replace the family, rather than supplement it. Furthermore, the 
goals of the institutions might not be driven primarily by the good of the families they are 
designed to support, but by external and contingent concerns such as budgetary targets. 
In a society where the state is not fit for the moral education of its citizens, perhaps the 
practice of making and sustaining family life is the best chance people have for education 
into the virtues, as long as the family is able to resist the corrupting influence of the 
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institutional pursuit of external goods which do not cultivate human excellence. Virtues 
are required for this resistance, so it helps if those adults who found families already 
exercise the virtues. Thus adults concerned only with the satisfaction of their immediate 
or self-interested desires, perhaps do not make the best family members and may enter 
into marriage and the creation of a new family for bad reasons. 
We do not yet have a full answer to the thesis question of what a flourishing family life 
involves, however. Further development and analysis of the goods internal to family life is 
needed alongside discussion of how families can become dysfunctional. Firstly, I will 
critically explore three alternative contemporary approaches to the family in moral and 
political thought, which differ substantively from Aristotelian thinking, particularly in 
relation to how they conceptualise institutions and their relation to family life. This 
comparative assessment is done in order to demonstrate the contribution a MacIntyrean 




3. Liberalism and the Family 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the first part of this chapter I will explore John Rawls’ approach to the family and how it 
is situated within his theory of justice. Like MacIntyre, Rawls also refers to social practices 
and institutions but for Rawls the two terms denote the same thing within society. As 
such he switches from talking about practices, in his 1958 paper on ‘Justice as Fairness’, 
to institutions by the time he writes A Theory of Justice. In A Theory of Justice, what we 
have called the social practice of family life Rawls understands as an institution within the 
basic structure of society, which the state is concerned to distribute primary goods to in 
accordance with the principle of justice as fairness. For Rawls, individuals within these 
institutions are free to pursue their own conceptions of the good in accordance with the 
principles of justice. The family should, therefore, be treated neutrally by the state, in 
terms of the conception of the good its members pursue, except where the family might 
create injustices for its members, in which case the state has a duty to do what it can to 
reduce these injustices.  
The idea of liberalism as a tradition in MacIntyre’s sense with its own conception of the 
good, as opposed to a doctrine of neutrality, will also be explored in this chapter. Not all 
contemporary liberals agree with Rawls that the state can indeed be neutral between 
different conceptions of the good life. Russell Keat argues that, in perfectionist liberalism, 
autonomy is seen as a human good and the state is, in principle, permitted to secure it for 
its citizens. He draws on Raz’s idea that the human good of autonomy is an achievement 
rather than a given feature of human beings. For Raz, an ‘autonomous person is part 
author of his own life. His life is, in part, of his own making’ (1988, 203). Autonomy is 
incompatible with individualism because autonomy requires, not just a range of options 
but acceptable options which he argues entails the provision of collective goods.  Other 
liberals who reject liberal claims to neutrality also argue that ‘classic liberal theories, 
whether contractarian, utilitarian or deontological, depend upon a more concrete social 
ethos or ethic than they explicitly acknowledge’ (Sullivan 1990, 150). In other words, they 
claim that liberalism does have its own general conception of the good; one that is 
sceptical about dogma and attempts to maximise individuals’ opportunities to explore 
different moral, religious and political forms of the good life.  
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Liberal positions on the family that do accept liberalism as promoting ideals of the good 
life will be explored in the final part of this chapter and compared to the contemporary 
Aristotelian view of the family presented in the previous chapter. I will argue that 
liberalism lacks a genuine conception of the common good and is concerned more with 
collective or public goods. As a result, it cannot give a satisfactory account of what a well-
functioning family life entails because the good family has to be more than a group of co-
operative, mutually self-interested, autonomous individuals, each pursuing their own 
distinctive and separate conception of the good.  
 
3.2 Rawls’ approach to the family 
I argued in the previous chapter that MacIntyre makes an important distinction between 
social practices, through which human beings pursue common goods constitutive of 
flourishing, and organisational institutions, designed to sustain those practices through 
the pursuit of goods external to the practice such as money, power and status. Rawls, on 
the other hand makes no such distinction. As Knight points out, Rawls used practices and 
institutions synonymously throughout his work (Knight 2008a, 230 f). Rawls defines a 
practice, early on in his writings on the principles of justice, as  
any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, 
moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its 
structure. As examples one may think of games and rituals, trials and 
parliaments, markets and systems of property (Rawls 1958, 164 f). 
His argument begins from the claim that justice is a ‘virtue of social institutions or what I 
shall call practices’ (1958, 164) and goes on to elaborate the system of practices into what 
he later calls the basic structure of society. For Rawls, if an institution is governed by just 
rules (which will be elaborated on below) then it will achieve its purpose of being 
advantageous to all those who participate and cooperate in it.  
One of the advantages of MacIntyre’s approach, against Rawls’, is that the distinction 
between a practice and an institution allows us to distinguish between different types of 
ends – those worthwhile to human flourishing for their own sake and those which are 
merely instrumentally worthwhile because they enable us to achieve intrinsically 
worthwhile ends. For Rawls, all of these goods are not hierarchically ordered but instead 
are lumped together as goods which human beings might see as desirable for the sake of 
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their own chosen way of life. Within his basic structure some people may pursue wealth 
and status as an end in itself while others may pursue less egoistic and more altruistic 
ends. This distinction between ends is irrelevant to the principles of justice so long as no 
one who is less well off in the distribution of goods is not disadvantaged for the sake of 
someone more well off (though, if the other way round, inequalities of advantage may be 
more acceptable). While practices for Rawls are constituted by collectively intended rules 
for mutual advantage, for MacIntyre practices are not only constituted by collectively 
intended rules but ‘by commonly intended goals and goods, and it is these goods that 
give point and purpose to the shared rules’ (Knight 2014, 81).  
 For Rawls, moral principles or rules are not informed by a comprehensive conception of 
the good life because each person should be free to pursue their own conception of the 
good. The principles one accepts place restraints on one’s interests and provides one with 
good reasons for limiting one’s interests. Rawls argues that ‘having a morality is 
analogous to having made a firm commitment in advance; for one must acknowledge the 
principles of morality even when to one’s disadvantage’ (Rawls 1958, 172–3).  Thus moral 
principles are not constitutive means to achieving the good life but rather operate like 
constraining rules, which, if accepted through the participation in some practice or other, 
generate obligations that allow each party who benefits from the practice to weigh up 
their claims against one another in the design of the practice. Furthermore, what we 
expect from others we must also apply to ourselves so that we cannot unfairly advantage 
ourselves in the distribution of benefits and burdens. For Rawls, different parties come 
together to cooperate in a practice for mutually beneficial ends. The only inequalities that 
are permissible are those which are beneficial to the worst off and are those which are 
attached to offices, open to all, which will encourage those who take up the office to do 
the best job they can do. Rawls’ approach is not teleological partly, he argues, because he 
offers a theory of justice which only  applies to the basic structure of society (Rawls 1999). 
He argues that any conception of the good in a liberal democracy must not be pursued 
politically and that public institutions must remain neutral between conceptions of the 
good (Rawls 1993). Other liberals have questioned whether Rawls’ theory is genuinely 
neutral, and I will return to this argument later. For now, I will consider how the family 
fits into Rawls’ theoretical framework. Rawls’ theory of justice does not entail that he 
denies that human beings do indeed pursue the good life but rather that he believes that 
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a comprehensive conception of the good life should not be pursued politically or imposed 
on one group by another.  
The family is, according to Rawls, part of the basic structure of society. It is an institution 
which must have the principles of justice applied to it externally. However, the state must 
not interfere with it internally because that would entail interfering with private attitudes 
regarding what is a good life to live, and the state must remain neutral about such 
matters. This state neutrality between conceptions of the good means that the family 
must allow its members to choose their own conception of the good, but if a woman has 
freely chosen to be a housewife with no career, and to raise children while her husband 
goes out to work, then that is perfectly fine. What allows her to have that free choice is 
her rights as a married person to divorce, to win custody of her children in a court of law 
in the event of divorce, to vote and to have her own property. As such her husband is 
constrained and she is protected by the law enabling her to make a free choice about the 
kind of family life she wants to have and how she will weigh that up against her other 
commitments. Rawls assumes that in a just society, governed by the principles of justice 
as fairness, the family will also be just. To reiterate the core of his argument about 
morality, the rules which govern family life are not constitutive of the common good of 
family members but rather act as constraints on the individual members in pursuit of 
their own individual interests, which they sign up to in advance when entering into the 
practice. Entering into the practice and accepting constraints on one’s actions is done 
because the practice itself is seen to be beneficial to all of its participants.  
Rawls also takes it that the family, in some form, will be part of the basic structure of a 
well-ordered society. As such, parents have legitimate authority over their children at first 
and children are not in a position to question the propriety of parental injunctions. Rawls 
assumes that parental injunctions are justified because he is also assuming that the 
society from which the injunctions are derived is well-ordered. The ‘veil of ignorance’, 
from behind which he derives the principles, acts as an analytic device for justifying the 
rules of existing institutions, such as the family. Crucially he supposes that in time the 
child will come to love the parents ‘only if they manifestly first love him’ (Rawls 1999, 
404). Recognition of this love leads the child to love in return but it is not, according to 
Rawls, a purely instrumental rational act, on the part of the child, in fulfilment of self-
interested ends.  
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How does this love come about then? Rawls believes it is through the child associating his 
parents with his own successes and the sustaining of his world. If the parents are indeed 
worthy of esteem and follow the precepts set out for the child then the child will want to 
emulate them. But the child will also rebel at times because the injunctions seem 
arbitrary and go against his natural inclinations. However, if he does love and trust his 
parents, he will be more inclined to own up to his offences, seek reconciliation and ‘in 
these various inclinations are manifested the feelings of (authority) guilt. Without these 
and related inclinations, feelings of guilt would not exist’ (1999, 407). More importantly, 
however, Rawls argues that the absence of these inclinations would represent a lack of 
love for the parents. Thus one can infer that in this account of a child’s moral 
development, children who do not love their parents will lack fear of disappointing their 
parents and of losing parental esteem. Children who do love their parents however, will 
want to not only continue to have their needs for love and affection satisfied but will 
want to go further and make their parents esteem them.  
I dispute little in the part of Rawls’ account which suggests that loving care from parents 
will bring out the best in children and that love for their parents in turn will lead children 
to want to act so to be esteemed by their parents. What might be added to this account is 
that parents also need to teach children, as they become older and more capable of 
understanding, why certain precepts should be followed and the moral purpose of their 
injunctions. The injunctions provided by parents surely ought to lack arbitrariness and not 
go against natural inclinations, as though one’s nature is something to be suppressed and 
overcome, but rather help to control those inclinations and order them towards 
something better. Rawls’ account implies that gaining a child’s love and trust and thus 
successfully teaching them to follow injunctions is the means for teaching them to 
recognise legitimate authority. Moreover, he states that parents must be worthy of 
admiration for the child to love and admire them and to want to be like them, but he 
does not discuss what being a worthy object of admiration involves. Presumably parents 
must be just in that they have justifiable rules and do not exert unnecessary power over 
the child, instead treating her fairly. In this way the norms of a just society are supposedly 
transmitted (Morse 1999). However, Rawls has no account of the virtues and, because his 
approach leaves people to pursue their own interests, he does not allow room for 
discussion of the kinds of virtues which parents ought  to possess in order to be worthy of 
admiration. Instead, being ruthless and competitive at work or angry and violent at home 
62 
 
might be seen as just as worthy as being just, generous, prudent and courageous. All are 
valid in a neutral political morality. 
From an Aristotelian standpoint, good parents are not simply teaching their children to 
recognise and submit to an arbitrary moral authority but are teaching them how to live 
the best life they can and help others to do the same. Rawls may not disagree with the 
general idea that parents should teach their children to live the best life they can but 
would argue that whatever parents teach their children, it must be regulated by the 
principles of justice and it is these principles which need to be transmitted from one 
generation to the next. He also does not see the principles of justice as arbitrary because 
he argues that they are justified. They are justified on the grounds of an equal liberty for 
all. The principles of justice express our own ordinary sense of justice if we were able to 
discard the knowledge of our own position and status in society. Our sense of justice is 
expressed in our considered judgements (as opposed to those judgements made with 
little confidence or with hesitation). However, our considered judgments, formed under 
ideal circumstances, still may not accord exactly with principles formulated behind the 
veil of ignorance, hence the need for reflective equilibrium whereby ‘a person has 
weighed various proposed conceptions and has either revised his judgments to accord 
with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding 
conception)’ (Rawls 1999, 43). Nonetheless, Rawls’ discussion of moral theory and how 
our considered judgements are formed tends to focus on moral principles rather than 
ends and their causal power. From an Aristotelian perspective, the end which our 
judgement pertains to influences the considered judgment that we make. Rawls claims 
that the principles of justice are those most likely to be chosen in the original position 
compared with other traditional conceptions of justice provided by utilitarian or 
perfectionist accounts, and that the principles will accord more with our considered 
judgements on reflection than those other accounts.  
 Rawls’ argument entails that the family is just when the basic structure of society is just 
and that the principles of justice will be transmitted through parenting in just families.  It 
may be that social arrangements have to be reformed and that ‘rules should be set up so 
that men are led by their predominant interests to act in ways which further socially 
desirable ends’ (Rawls 1999, 49). Thus the rules governing the family might be reformed 
to improve social justice and increase fair opportunity.  
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In fact Rawls goes so far as to raise the issue of whether or not the family ought to be 
abolished on the grounds that the family, in its partiality to its own members, might be 
problematic for the principles of justice which includes fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 
1999, 64, 265). Rawls points out that 
The consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity requires us to 
view persons independently from the influences of their social position. But 
how far should this tendency be carried? It seems that even when fair 
opportunity (as it has been defined) is satisfied, the family will lead to unequal 
chances between individuals (Rawls 1999, 447–8). 
Rawls claims that the logical implication of the fact that the family always leads to 
unequal chances between individuals is to abolish the institution of the family, but 
concedes that this is counterintuitive. He argues instead that the difference principle and 
the principles of fraternity and redress are to be given appropriate weight. For Rawls, the 
difference principle captures the ‘natural meaning of fraternity: namely to the ideal of not 
wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less 
well off’ (Rawls 1999, 90). The ideal family ‘is one place where the principle of maximizing 
the sum of advantages is rejected’ (Rawls 1999, 90). In other words, members of a family 
do not seek their own advantage unless it benefits the rest of the family. And while this 
ideal family is based on natural ties of sentiment, the difference principle is a moral 
principle which operates in the same way.  Indeed, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift 
similarly argue that, ‘Parents may, indeed should, treat their children differently from 
other people’s children, and in ways that tend to confer significant benefits and to 
generate significant inequalities between them and those others’ (2009, 44).  They argue, 
in support of Rawls’ intuition, that one version of a non-parent-centred argument for 
parental rights is one which ‘claims that the family is causally necessary for, if not itself 
constitutive of, a just society’ (Brighouse and Swift 2006, 85). However, Brighouse and 
Swift’s argument goes further than Rawls to say that not only is the family necessary for a 
just society – which makes familial partiality instrumental to a societal good – but it is also 
necessary for individual human flourishing. Thus the family, if realised in accordance with 
the principles of justice, is for Rawls an association which furthers socially desirable ends, 
transmitting a sense of justice which accords with the principles of justice from one 
generation to the next and internally benefitting individuals only insofar as that benefits 
the whole family. Rawls says nothing on unjust familial relations because he believes that 
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if the basic structure of society is made to be just then the family itself will be realised as 
a just institution.  
 
3.3 Liberalism as a tradition 
To talk of Rawls’ approach as forming part of a tradition of liberal thinking seems to be 
counterintuitive when Rawls and other liberals hoped to free public life, and therefore 
our political commitments, from tradition. MacIntyre argues that  
the project of founding a form of social order in which individuals could 
emancipate themselves from the contingency and particularity of tradition by 
appealing to genuinely universal, tradition-independent norms was and is . . .   
the project of modern liberal, individualist society (MacIntyre 1988, 335).  
However, for MacIntyre, any hope we may have for such a tradition-independent rational 
universality is an illusion.  Liberalism itself, he argues, was transformed into a tradition of 
its own, by proscribing from the public sphere conceptions of the good that believe it is 
the duty of government to morally educate its citizens, and confining those conceptions 
to private belief. In doing so, liberalism necessarily endorses its own broad conception of 
the good. MacIntyre’s characterisation of the individual who lives in such a liberal society 
is of a person who expresses their preferences publicly and has the means to bargain for 
the satisfaction of their own preferences. As there is no one overriding good, the 
individual pursues a range of goods in different compartmentalised spheres: ‘political, 
economic, familial, artistic, athletic, scientific’ and ‘the preferences which he or she 
expresses will express this variety of social relationships’ (1988, 337). Furthermore, as he 
demonstrates in After Virtue these different and disparate spheres of life form no 
coherent narrative unity through the cultivation of moral virtues. Instead, each sphere 
demands different capacities in order for the individual to do well in that sphere. Thus our 
work life is not informed by the virtues we cultivate in family life and instead we are 
praised for our efficiency, ruthlessness or conformity depending on what the activity 
demands and what the interests of our employers are.  
Interestingly, MacIntyre also notes that Rawls equates the human self with the liberal 
self, claiming that to subordinate all of our aims to one overriding good strikes us as 
irrational or more likely mad. In doing so Rawls seems to contradict his own neutralism 
because his argument entails that the liberal self, pursuing different goods in different 
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spheres, regardless of any specific ordering of those goods, is the ideal self. The principles 
of justice, particularly those of distributive justice, MacIntyre claims, are simply rules for 
bargaining to satisfy our preferences. These rules ‘set constraints on the bargaining 
process, so as to ensure access to it by those otherwise disadvantaged, and to protect 
individuals so that they may have freedom to express, and within limits, to implement 
their preferences’ (1988, 337). Crucially, the concept of desert is irrelevant to justice, 
except in those associations that pursue their own private conception of the good, and, as 
such, the liberal account of justice is incompatible with Aristotelian accounts (1988, 338). 
Whereas, in Aristotelian thinking, one has to be just in order to be rational, MacIntyre 
claims that for the contemporary liberal individual, on the other hand, one has to first be 
rational so that ‘the rules of justice may be justified by appeal to rationality’ (1988, 342). 
Finally, therefore, MacIntyre concludes that  
The principles which inform such practical reasoning and the theory and 
practice of justice within such a polity are not neutral with respect to rival and 
conflicting theories of the good . . .  they impose a particular conception of the 
good life . . .  upon those who willingly or unwillingly accept the liberal 
procedures and the liberal terms of debate (1988, 345). 
The problem MacIntyre identifies with liberalism’s overriding conception of the good is 
that ‘it can provide no compelling arguments in favour of its conception of the human 
good except by appeal to premises which collectively already presuppose that theory’ 
(1988, 345). Rather than having a neutral starting point, liberal theory always begins with 
liberal premises and is best understood as ‘an articulation of an historically developed 
and developing set of social institutions and forms of activity, that is, as the voice of a 
tradition’ (1988, 345). Brian Barry also reaches a similar conclusion: ‘that the only people 
who can be relied on to defend liberal institutions are liberals’ (Barry 1990, 44).  Barry 
means here that the arguments currently available to us to persuade people who are not 
liberals that they ought to subscribe to liberal institutions are flawed. As such, there can 
be little fruitful dialogue between the tradition of liberal thinking and other intellectual 
traditions.   
 
3.4 Liberalism and the good 
As stated in the introduction, not all liberals adopt neutralism when discussing 
conceptions of the good. Keat argues that, as well guaranteeing the conditions for 
66 
 
autonomy, ‘political communities should also secure the institutional conditions for an 
extensive (but necessarily limited) range of valuable goods to be available to individuals’ 
(Keat 2008, 251). Barry argues that this is how a liberal outlook might be fostered in a 
given society. For example,  
the kind of critical inquiring spirit valued by liberals will be aided by such 
things as subsidizing the dissemination of social scientific research that 
challenges existing prejudices and stereotypes by underwriting the costs of 
publishing books and the costs of producing plays that present new ways of 
looking at things (Barry 1990, 46).  
However, for some liberals the grounds for determining which goods are valuable will not 
be liberal ones. Keat’s conception applies the constraints of the principles of political 
liberalism to the way the state acts and, therefore, what possibilities they provide 
individuals with for living their lives. On the other hand, Richard Kraut accepts the need 
for moral pluralism which a liberal society affords, yet argues that we ought to defend a 
general but comprehensive conception of the good life (Kraut 1999).  
Liberal perfectionists like Raz (1988) and Steven Wall (2006) agree that we should not be 
neutral between different conceptions of the good and that some goods which we see as 
valuable should be pursued and secured by the state. One example given by Raz is of 
marriage. He states:  
Perfectionist political action may be taken in support of social institutions 
which enjoy unanimous support in the community, in order to give them 
formal recognition, bring legal and administrative arrangements into line 
with them, facilitate their use by members of the community who wish to do 
so, and encourage the transmission of belief in their value to future 
generations. In many countries this is the significance of the legal 
recognition of monogamous marriage and prohibition of polygamy (Raz 
1988, 161). 
As such, perfectionist political action is not necessarily designed to impose one group’s 
conception of the good on another but to secure valuable social institutions for the good 
of the whole community. Securing valuable social institutions, he argues, does not entail 
forcing a particular way of life on another person or group but rather making it available 
to them should they choose to avail themselves of it. As stated in the introduction to this 
chapter, autonomy is about securing a range of acceptable options; ‘A person who has 
never had any significant choice, or was not aware of it, or never exercised choice in 
significant matters but simply drifted through life is not an autonomous person’ (Raz 
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1988, 204). Raz claims that perfectionism is not incompatible with moral pluralism, 
arguing that a range of valuable forms of life, which may be incompatible with each other, 
can all be supported by perfectionist action through the state, while discouraging forms 
of life which might be damaging or harmful to society. The kind of support given to 
monogamous marriage does not mean that everyone should get married but rather that 
it is considered to be a valuable social institution which supports family life. It is what Raz 
calls a public or collective good because a person cannot get married on her own; she 
needs someone to marry and a culture and institutions which recognise marriage and 
consider it to be worthwhile. Furthermore, despite increasing numbers of people 
choosing not to get married, and cohabiting instead, such relationships tend to reflect or 
aspire to the values associated with marriage such as monogamy, commitment, trust and 
fidelity. By the state promoting marriage then, even though many couples may not avail 
themselves of the formal recognition (and many still do), a certain way of life is culturally 
recognised and endorsed.  
Some contemporary liberal theorists are beginning to engage more directly in discussions 
of the family and are attempting to apply liberal principles to the intimate relations within 
the family, which Rawls supposes are natural ties of sentiment. The family is becoming 
central to moral and political debates rather than being an incidental feature of other 
discussions. A liberal perfectionist perspective, as opposed to neutralism, seems to be 
compatible with Brighouse and Swift’s liberal view of the family. Their argument 
presupposes a view of the human good and the particular relationships which contribute 
to a flourishing life. One of these relationships is the relationship a parent has with her 
own child. As such, they provide a parent-centred justification for parental rights, to 
complement a child-centred justification (whereby a child has the right to be parented), in 
order to protect a relationship which they consider to be valuable to human beings as 
such, and, therefore, one which the state should not prevent unless the potential parent 
is likely to harm the child; for example, if they are a known paedophile or child-abuser. 
The state should, as a result, enable parental autonomy to act as the child’s guardian, 
within obvious constraints (Brighouse and Swift 2006). What liberals arguing in this vein 
are doing is accepting liberalism as a tradition and arguing that liberal principles are 
worth defending. These principles, such as rights, duties and social justice, are the same 
principles that Rawls argues for but the perfectionist liberals tell a different justificatory 
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story, in which rights are instrumental to securing what liberals believe to be valuable for 
a human life, for society and its culture. 
Furthermore, these post-Rawlsian liberals are questioning assumptions about the form of 
families and whether or not there is an ideal structure. In The Family: A Liberal Defence 
Archard provides an excellent summary of the principal changes to the family in modern 
times, which have dramatically transformed its character. He argues that one cannot 
deny these changes, whether or not one believes the family is in demise: 
The social position of women has changed: more women work and are thus 
not obviously restricted to the performance of a traditional domestic role; 
divorce has become easier at law; there has been a steady rise in the 
percentage of marriages that eventually break down, contributing to an 
increased number of lone parents and step-parents; the state has 
progressively assumed responsibility for the discharge of welfare and support 
services that would previously have fallen exclusively upon the family; the 
influence of religion upon society has weakened and in consequence, so has 
its influence upon such matters as the choice of sexual partners, marriage, 
and family structure; economic and other changes have reinforced the 
unwillingness of grown children to stay with their parents even after marriage 
(Archard 2010, xii). 
Many of these changes, whether deemed good or bad, result from broadly liberal 
policies. Archard’s assessment of the changing nature of the family looks specifically at 
the Western family since the industrial revolution. The idea that women traditionally 
occupied a domestic, caring role while men were breadwinners is a relatively recent 
development in Western conceptions of the family which emerged in the post-war 
period. The claim that the modern, nuclear, heterosexual family is natural, and therefore 
universal and timeless, is a fallacy. In pre-industrial society, before the formation of the 
middle classes, women were co-producers with their husbands and other family 
members. Even after industrialisation, working class women worked in factories alongside 
men and young children (Casey 1989; Coontz 1993; Coontz 2005). Nonetheless, the 
existence of family life in different guises has endured throughout history from wider 
kinship groups to the nuclear privatised family. It is precisely this instability in the social 
understanding of what a family is, which Veronique Munoz-Darde argues is evidence that 
the family is an enduring and meaningful social institution. In other words, ‘the family 
strikes us as an immutable institution because it changes constantly’ (1999, 55). The 
changes described by Archard do broadly represent real changes which have occurred in 
recent decades and they do potentially present challenges to not only how we 
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conceptualise family life but also to the stability of family life itself. Yet it is the family’s 
adaptability to such changes throughout history, which makes it so enduring. 
Whereas Rawls’ description of a well-functioning family served to demonstrate the origins 
of legitimate authority, Archard’s focus is on the family itself and what constitutes its 
good functioning. Archard argues explicitly that ‘it helps to think of the family in 
functional terms: what it does rather than what it is’ (2010, 9). He identifies the primary 
function of the family as the care, guidance and protection of children. A childless couple, 
therefore, do not amount to a family, even though they do constitute the foundations for 
family life: 
In the light of this essential functional role the family can be minimally defined 
as a multigenerational group, normally stably co-habiting, whose adults take 
primary custodial responsibility for the dependent children (2010, 10) [original 
emphasis]. 
While this minimal definition might have wider application than the nuclear family, it still 
rules out certain groups from the possibility of being considered a family, in particular 
married or co-habiting couples without children. Archard goes on to argue that we can 
then evaluate the plurality of family forms which exist within this definition in terms of 
how they succeed or fail in achieving the function of caring for, guiding and protecting 
children. Archard’s use of the term function might sound Aristotelian, and to some extent 
it is in that it defines a good at which family life is directed. He also argues that the 
intrinsic goods attached to familial relationships outweigh the unequal distribution of 
material benefits and burdens between families because the family ‘does such a decent 
job of transmitting adult morals, knowledge, aptitudes, and skills’ (2010, 100). However, 
Archard believes this good can be secured with rights and liberties. The other problem 
with Archard’s approach is that he reduces the family’s function to child-rearing. In fact, 
what we end up with is a view of family life which only considers one stage – that of 
rearing children, and one set of relationships – the parent-child one. Similarly, Brighouse 
and Swift focus on the rights of parents and children and the value of this relationship 
without looking at the family as a whole and the value of familial relationships which 
extend over a lifetime. Discussion of the other functions of family life and the different 
relationships which constitute it would help us to see why families endure beyond 
children reaching maturity.  
70 
 
However, the strength of Archard’s argument is that he claims that this way of defining 
the family avoids conflating a definition of the family with an ideal of the family.  We 
might assume, however, that a good or ideal family would be one which carries out this 
function well. Thus, what Archard’s definition actually seems to offer, is an ideal of the 
family that focuses on the good of family life, rather than prioritising considerations about 
family structure. Archard’s argument might be translated into Aristotelian terms: that the 
function of the family is the care, guidance and protection of children and that in order 
for the family to contribute to a good life for human beings it must carry out this function 
well, that is, in accordance with the virtues and practical wisdom. While this function 
might well be fulfilled satisfactorily by a family with unjust or uncaring marital relations, 
the whole family is not likely to flourish under these circumstances and that will inevitably 
affect the proper care and protection of children. Therefore, when we talk about the 
flourishing of the family, we must consider more than this basic function. 
What this wider view of the good of the family entails is that, in order to function well as 
a family member and to know what it means to be a good family member, one must 
acknowledge a common good of family life which informs one’s own individual good. Yet 
as Brighouse and Swift note: ‘Liberalism takes individuals to be the fundamental objects 
of moral concern and takes the primary attributions of rights to be to individuals over 
themselves’ (Brighouse and Swift 2006, 81–2). For a liberal such as Archard to then 
suggest that there is a primary function to family life, and that if that function is not 
fulfilled then we can judge a family to be a bad one, is rather surprising. It is surprising 
because it appears to be offering a conception of the good of family life. This 
interpretation may be mistaken, however. If Archard follows Rawls, which he does to 
some extent, then moral rules act to restrain our individual interests and generate 
obligations on all those who benefit from the practice. Providing care, guidance and 
protection to children whom we are legally responsible for might simply require rules 
which we must follow in order to benefit as individuals from the practice of family life. Yet 
this claim suggests that we get something out of raising children that contributes to our 
own self-interested desires. Self-interestedness with regards to parenting may apply to 
some parents who take advantage of their children but in most cases it is in contributing 
to the good of the child, rather than our own good (in that we may put personal projects 
which previously satisfied us on hold) from which we derive fulfilment. Sacrificing our 
own projects for the good of another helpless human being also implies that there is a 
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greater good, which other goods are ordered towards. Brighouse and Swift  argue that in 
order to justify the rights of parents and of children, one first has to substantively 
investigate the goods involved in the parent-child relationship and the family generally 
which make it so worthwhile and in need of protection with rights (2006; 2009). As such, 
rights become not ends in themselves but instrumental powers for the achievement of 
the good life of the family.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
For the liberal, the fundamental object of moral concern is the individual and how 
individuals can live together cooperatively to achieve their own interests. Of course, there 
is not just one form of liberalism but many ‘liberalisms’ within the tradition which have 
conflicting and sometimes incommensurable ideas about the basis of morality (should it 
be right-based or obligation-based, for example). In this chapter, I have been concerned 
with the liberal neutralism espoused by Rawls and the liberal perfectionism put forward 
by Raz, Keat, Barry, Brighouse and Swift, among others. Both doctrines seem to be 
incommensurable with each other. However, if the individual is the fundamental object of 
moral concern, then we would expect most liberals, when it comes to the family, to be 
concerned with how the institution of the family enables its members to achieve their 
own individual interests. Furthermore, we should also be concerned about how the family 
distributes advantages in such a way that injustices are created. 
For Rawls, we should not make any judgements about those interests. The liberal state 
ought only to ensure that the family operates within the constraints of the principles of 
justice and is able to transmit those principles from one generation to the next through 
the moral authority of the parents. However, for liberal perfectionists, some interests are 
more worthwhile than others and the liberal state ought to promote those collective 
goods which support worthwhile interests. Hence Raz’s argument for state support of 
marriage, while at the same time not forcing couples to marry and allowing marriage to 
be dissolved if required. Some goods, however, are seen as so fundamental to everyone’s 
interests that they are justifiably enforced by the liberal state, such as a free public 
education or a decent upbringing. For example, Archard argues that the primary function 
of the family is the care, guidance and protection of children. His concern is for the 
wellbeing of the child, to ensure that each child is provided with the minimum of what 
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he/she needs and has a decent range of acceptable options in order to pursue his/her 
interests as an adult. In other words, Archard sees the family as enabling children to grow 
into autonomous adults who are partial authors of their own lives. Brighouse and Swift, 
furthermore, argue that the relationship between the parent and child is worth 
protecting in itself because it contributes to the wellbeing of both. 
Essentially though, both Rawlsian neutralists and liberal perfectionists are still primarily 
concerned with the individual and one’s ability to pursue one’s own individual interests – 
even though perfectionists might make a more Millian distinction between worthwhile 
and less worthwhile goods. Perfectionist liberalism acknowledges MacIntyre’s claim that 
liberalism is a tradition with its own conception of the good life. However, that life is a 
compartmentalised one with different skills and character traits being valued in different 
spheres in which the individual operates. The compartmentalised individual might be an 
excellent pianist, a ruthless banker and a domineering father. For Rawls, a moral theory 
which informs political life must not pass judgement on this man’s interests, as long as he 
operates within institutions that conform to the principles of justice. If they do then Rawls 
believes that the institutions themselves, including the family, will become just (though 
many liberal feminists, as we shall see in the next chapter, dispute this and argue that the 
family must first become just before the rest of society can). 
For the perfectionist liberal, institutions should be arranged so as to promote the 
individual’s best interests. Nonetheless, if the banker, who is also a father and a pianist, 
acts lawfully his ruthless pursuit of profit might be considered to be how this particular 
individual flourishes – because he is good at what he does and enjoys it. Is it relevant that 
his actions might be damaging to the common good? What about how his character in 
that role affects his character as a father? In the compartmentalised life of the modern 
individual, one can apparently change one’s character from one sphere of life to the next, 
thus the latter question is not relevant to the liberal. As for the common good (and here 
is the crux of the argument), the good of the banker must be weighed against the public 
good. The common or public good for liberal perfectionism, as opposed to the kind of 
Aristotelianism defended in this thesis, can only be understood in terms of the 
aggregation of each individual interest. The public good, or the interests of wider society, 
weighed against the banker’s interest is understood in terms of whether in pursuing his 
interests, he damages the ability of others to pursue their interests. In pursuing his 
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interests he might damage the public goods of autonomy or liberty. As such, there may 
be an argument for reforming the culture of banking. However, this view of the common 
good differs significantly from the Aristotelian view put forward in this thesis. For the 
Aristotelian, the common good is not the aggregation of individual interests. Nor can the 
common good be secured through the provision of rights via the institutions of the state. 
The common good informs the individual good and is found in common activity. What my 
interests are is educated by my socialisation into various social practices which begins 
with my family life. The common good is greater than its component parts and gives 
purpose and meaning to our activities. Thus, ensuring the continued good functioning of 
the family is not just important for the sake of equipping children to pursue their own 
individual interests as adults. It also introduces them to pursuing goods in common, to 
contributing to a sustaining network of giving and receiving and to the virtues of 
character required to live a good life in common with others, through all of our activities. 
However, there is one aspect of liberal perfectionist thought, in particular that of Raz, 
which is worth further exploration from an Aristotelian perspective, and that is the 
concept of autonomy. For Raz, autonomy is the power of partial authorship over one’s 
own life. This, he argues, does not necessarily entail individualism. To be autonomous is 
to be free from subjection, subordination and servitude. It therefore entails being an 
active participant in communal life, rather than a slave, a servant or someone who lives 
for another. The relevance of autonomy to our discussion of the family is clear; the 
flourishing family should not require any family member to live in servitude or to live for 
another – whether that other is a dependent child or an adult who requires care. For Raz 
we cannot have a right to autonomy because this would place too great a burden on 
others members of the society by holding them duty-bound to provide the necessary 
social environment for the right-holder to have a chance of an autonomous 
life.  However, we can have rights to collective goods which contribute to an ideal of 
autonomy. I should want to argue that Raz is mistaken in holding that an autonomous life 
is the ultimate goal of human flourishing. Yet, the conditions for autonomy, in Raz’s 
sense, might be necessary in order to secure the chance for practitioners to fully take part 
in social practices, rather than being subordinated or subjected to the power of others.    
While the language of liberalism is concerned with concepts such as rights, duties, 
autonomy and liberty and it appeals to abstract principles as the basis of morality, the 
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language of MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism offers a clear alternative to approach questions 
regarding the family and wider matters of social justice. Instead of rights as abstract 
concepts, MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism allows us to think about rights as external goods, as 
powers which are instrumental to the achievement of intrinsically worthwhile human 
goods. For example, marriage rights for women to divorce and to hold on to their own 
property redistributes power within marital relations. Therefore, it will be argued that all 
families need some external goods such as power, money and status, not because of an 
appeal to an abstract principle created behind a veil of ignorance, but because without 
the right amount of external goods, families cannot flourish. Partial authorship over one’s 
own life is therefore not good in itself, it cannot produce a flourishing life, but it can be 
instrumental to participation in a range of practices and is a form of power which can 




4. Liberal Feminism and the Family 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Liberal or rights-based feminism, which grew out of the work of early liberal theorists 
such as John Stuart Mill and Mary Wollstonecraft, builds on the premises of the liberal 
tradition but at the same time subverts many of the claims of liberalism. Furthermore, 
following the lead of Mill and Wollstonecraft, it addresses the family directly, through 
questioning the gendered division of labour and the public-private divide between politics 
and home life. Though it may be the case, as Susan Wendell notes, that ‘it is somewhat 
artificial to be talking about liberal feminism’ (1987, 65) because feminism has become 
increasingly pluralised in the questions it poses and the solutions it offers, it is also true 
that liberal feminism is an important foundational tradition in feminist thought. Feminism 
in general can be said to have gone beyond liberal feminism, and diversified, but it is 
nonetheless an important tradition for our discussion because it not only draws on but 
also critiques the liberal ideas explored in the previous chapter, and it raises questions 
about what genuinely flourishing families might look like if women were not 
subordinated. 
Liberal feminism is not, as contemporary liberalism often is, committed to distinctions 
between the public and private or valuing the rational over the emotional. Liberal 
feminists recognise that the inequalities of the private sphere affect the status and power 
of women in the public sphere. While liberal feminism does take some important 
philosophical and political commitments from mainstream liberalism, such as equality of 
opportunity, liberty and personal autonomy as starting points, it attempts to apply these 
commitments as rigorously to the private sphere of family life. In this chapter I will 
examine whether liberal feminism is successful in its critique of mainstream 
contemporary liberal thinking, and whether or not it offers a viable alternative for 
understanding what a well-functioning family life entails. Liberal feminism, or feminist 
liberalism, attempts to use the tools and contested concepts of liberalism, such as justice 
and rights, to argue for greater equality between the sexes and more state support with 
regards to domestic responsibilities, child care and the right to work outside of the home. 
As such, it often seems to endorse a more perfectionist view of liberalism with feminist 
values at its core.   
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While it makes improvements to liberal thinking, I will argue that liberal feminism is still 
individualistic. This individualism and the striving for female liberation and autonomy was 
a necessary stage in Western feminist thought. In order to break down the barriers to 
female flourishing, women had to seize the concepts of rights and autonomy created by 
men for themselves. Arguably there is still a great deal of work to do and that it is only 
middle class white women who are truly ‘liberated’. However, it cannot be the end point 
of feminism and this may explain the diversification of feminist thought and the fact that 
many have rejected liberal ideals. The focus on the individual woman and her ability to 
make free choices ignores the social embeddedness of the person and how her choices 
are shaped by reasoning within social contexts.  
 
4.2 The problem with men’s moral theories 
Feminist readings of the Western canon pay attention to the particular experiences of 
women and reveal that the supposed gender-blindness of liberal theory in fact disguises 
and glosses over the actual problems and injustices faced by women, particularly with 
regards to family life. For example, Annette Baier identifies an interesting dilemma in 
what she terms ‘men’s moral theories’ (though she specifically addresses contemporary 
liberal theories) with regards to parental obligation. She takes Rawls’ Theory of Justice as 
an exemplary model of recent men’s theories and argues that obligation is at the heart of 
most liberal moral theory. Baier describes Rawls’ account of the conditions for the 
development of a sense of justice in children as sensitive, but she argues that he takes 
parental love as a given rather than a moral obligation. Thus while parents may have a 
moral obligation to teach their children truth-telling or promise-keeping, there is no 
mention of the obligation to be a loving parent. Baier thus takes this thought to its logical 
conclusion. She states that ‘The virtue of being a loving parent must supplement the 
natural duties and the obligations of justice, if the just society is to last beyond the first 
generation’ (Baier 1995, 6) thus parents tend to be good parents if they themselves had 
good parenting. If one does not think they can meet the obligation to be a loving parent 
then the troubling solution Baier arrives at is to avoid becoming a parent altogether 
either through contraception, sterilisation, or when contraception fails, abortion. 
However, Baier recognises that no liberal moral theory is advocating obligatory 
sterilisation or abortion on the grounds of potentially failing to meet the obligation to be 
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a loving parent. Rather, her point illustrates the fact that liberal theories only escape this 
conclusion because they avoid the issue completely ‘of what is to ensure that new 
members of a moral community do get the loving care they need to become morally 
competent persons’ (1995, 7). Instead liberal theories rely on the assumptions of 
culturally encouraged norms about the natural maternal instinct and/or docility of 
women. Moral injunctions on the one hand are characterised as overcoming our nature, 
derived through an abstract practical reasoning, while on the other hand, the love of a 
parent (in particular, a mother) and how that love is directed at children is thought to be 
natural, requiring emotion and instinct, not reason. Baier argues that the ‘liberal system 
would receive a nasty spanner in the works should women use their freedom of choice as 
regards abortion to choose not to abort, and then leave their newborn children on their 
fathers’ doorsteps’ claiming that this ‘would test liberal morality’s ability to provide for its 
own survival’ (1995, 7). However, she notes that it may be argued in response that every 
moral theory must rely on some assumptions about human nature, as liberal theory does 
about self-interest, without this needing to be turned into moral obligation.  
Baier cannot fully respond to this claim but goes on to argue that because liberal theory 
offers no moral guidance on issues which are clearly not matters of moral indifference 
such as ‘whether to fight or not to fight [in the case of war], to have or not to have an 
abortion, or to be or not to be an unpaid maternal drudge’, they are instead ‘left to 
individual conscience’ (1995, 8). Yet, the rational guidance of conscience is, surely, the 
object of ethics. Liberal morality relies on a constant supply of people who will choose to 
be self-sacrificial in the right way and fails to consider this kind of activity in a moral light. 
The idea that issues of whether or not to become a parent, when one is not even certain 
one can be a good parent, or whether or not to bear arms, when one is not sure whether 
the fight is for a just cause, are not moral issues, is problematic for liberal theories, which 
assume there is a constant supply of willing and self-sacrificing people, whatever the end. 
Baier is not a conventional liberal feminist but her point raises the question of whether or 
not liberal feminism can offer the necessary insight lacking in mainstream liberalism, 






4.3 Feminist reconstructions of liberal ideals 
Some feminists believe it is difficult to categorise feminism politically because, as Wendell 
argues,  
feminism has out-grown the political traditions from which it emerged, and . . 
. traditional political categories are no longer very useful for understanding 
the similarities and differences among feminist analyses, strategies and goals 
(1987, 65) 
Despite these transformations, we do have a general idea about what is meant by liberal 
feminism and what it stands for. Generally speaking liberal feminism is concerned with 
women’s rights and liberties, equality of opportunity, ending sex discrimination and 
asserting ‘that the value of women as human beings is not instrumental to the welfare of 
men and children’ (1987, 66). As such, many liberal feminists would accept the Kantian 
principle that every human being is an end in herself, not a means to another’s ends. Thus 
liberal feminism strives for female moral and physical autonomy.  These ideals are not 
confined to liberal feminism but they are essential to it.  
Feminist thought has also drawn attention to the fact that the vast majority of caring 
labour throughout history has been done by women and that this work has often been 
exploitative. Caring and domestic labour has also been disregarded from moral thinking 
as a woman’s natural duty or instinct and therefore outside of the concern of ethics and 
politics. Scott Coltrane notes that many studies of household labour separate that labour 
from its context and from parenting, household structure and market economies 
(Coltrane 2000; Coltrane 2010). Liberal feminists are not insensitive to this; though they 
tend to focus more on liberating women from domestic and caring labour and the legal 
changes that are needed to do this, than the moral value of such work. Nonetheless, 
some feminists such as Virginia Held, who emphasise the importance of social justice and 
the value of rights, have begun to focus more on the importance of care for social and 
political life. One purpose of focusing on liberal feminism in this chapter is to 
demonstrate how it differs from feminist care ethics, which is discussed in the next 
chapter.  
Wendell also points out that the goals of liberal feminists are not incompatible with other 
forms of feminism such as socialist and radical feminism; for example, the redistribution 
of resources and equality of legal rights. However, this chapter deals primarily with 
feminists who bring together feminist and liberal ideas in order to transform liberalism so 
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that it responds to the issues that women face in the modern world, in particular their 
role in the family. Perhaps it is because of the fact that liberal feminism has already 
achieved many of its goals, in terms of changes to the law, which explains why feminism 
has outgrown its liberal roots. It now seeks more radical challenges to mainstream moral 
and political thinking, without completely abandoning its political aims for greater gender 
equality. Moreover, many women in developing world countries are now taking up some 
of the battles that liberal feminists have faced already in the West, such as women’s entry 
into public life (Barlow and Akbarzadeh 2008).  
4.3.1 Women’s labour 
Zillah Eisenstein argues that many people mistakenly believe that liberal feminism is 
feminism when actually it is one feminism among many; that it should be identified as a 
specific theory in order to avoid rendering other forms of feminism – socialist, lesbian, 
black, anarchist, etc. – as non-existent. Liberal, according to Eisenstein, refers to the 
historical sense: ‘the specific set of ideas that developed with the bourgeois revolution 
asserting the importance and autonomy of the individual’ (Eisenstein 1981, 4). These 
values which have their origins in the eighteenth century are now part of the dominant 
political ideology of Western society. She argues that although the liberal underpinnings 
of feminist theory are essential to the development of feminism, the patriarchal 
underpinnings of liberal theory are ‘indispensable to liberalism’ (1981, 5). It is this 
contradiction within liberal feminism that Eisenstein attempts to address. Despite the 
massive gains made by women into the public sphere and the fact that women now work 
outside of the home, Eisenstein argues that most married women who work, have to 
work a double-day (1981, 202; 1982, 568). Not only do they work in the labour market 
but they are also generally responsible for domestic labour and caregiving as well.  As 
such, the public/private divide has not been brought down but rather women now 
inhabit, and juggle the demands of, both. She predicted that it would be the working 
woman’s recognition of this sexual bias that would lead women to make feminist 
demands for ‘affirmative action programs, equal pay, pregnancy disability payments, and 
abortion rights’ (1982, 568–9). Despite rejecting many liberal assumptions Eisenstein still 
uses the language of liberalism in asserting feminist aims. 




Insofar as women's identities and interests are subordinated to the family and 
their relationships with men, men are able (and encouraged) to avoid taking 
equal responsibility for childcare, housework and other forms of service work, 
and for maintaining emotional relationships (Wendell 1987, 76). 
It is not that feminists like Wendell and Eisenstein want to argue that most contemporary 
women reject these other-regarding roles and want to adopt more selfish, ‘male’ roles. It 
is rather that women are happy to do their fair share of domestic and caring labour as 
long as men are willing to undertake this activity as well (Prohaska and Zipp 2011). Thus it 
is the unequal distribution of unpaid labour in the family which seems unjust to feminists; 
particularly as many women actually work outside the home, as well as continuing to take 
most, if not all, of the responsibility for domestic labour and caregiving. For Eisenstein, 
the patriarchal bias of liberalism is that it defines women by their reproductive 
characteristics and that ‘this reduction of woman to her biology is at the core of Western 
liberal ideology’ (Eisenstein 1981, 14).  
Feminists like Eisenstein, and also Anne Phillips, are particularly concerned with power 
structures and the artificial construction of public and private spheres. Phillips points out 
that the boundary between public and private is continually contested. Feminists and 
activists in the women’s movement have drawn attention to issues as wide-ranging as 
domestic violence, the sexual division of housework, the objectification of women, and 
women in the workplace. Phillips argues, echoing the demands of the women’s 
movement, that: 
The sexual division of labour and the sexual distribution of power are as much 
a part of politics as relations between classes or negotiations between 
nations, and what goes on in the kitchen and the bedroom cries out for 
political change (Phillips 1991, 92). 
The focus on power relations is important; for one thing, domestic violence and rape are 
manifestations of male power over women (though there are of course exceptions which 
include female violence against men and rape of men by men, but these are less common 
in the West15). However, power does not always operate as one person exerting 
oppressive power over another. The role of the mother is historically a powerless role 
compared to that of the father. Even now, if a woman gives up work to look after her 
children, she is likely to become economically dependent on the father despite now 
                                                          
15 Official statistics in the UK suggest that the victims of the most serious offences of rape and 
sexual assault by penetration number around 85,000 women per year and 12,000 men (Office for 
National Statistics 2013, 6) 
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having property and voting rights. It is also more likely that she will give up work, or work 
part-time, because not only do men tend to earn more than women16 but it is also not as 
socially acceptable for a mother to not be the primary caregiver. What this emphasises is 
the structural nature of patriarchal power in society.  
Eisenstein borrows the concept of institutional motherhood from Adrienne Rich arguing 
that it reflects a political need of patriarchy to control and limit the choices of women. 
This is done through the power of political institutions, which control women’s labour and 
reproductive capacities, through society’s definition of women as mothers first and 
foremost. Eisenstein argues that patriarchal motherhood is a myth portrayed as a 
biological truth so that woman is transformed ‘from a biological being (child-bearer) to a 
political being (child-rearer)’ (Eisenstein 1981, 15). She argues that this patriarchal 
domination of women comes about from the necessity of society to reproduce itself. 
Since the women’s movement began, more and more women have entered the 
workplace and some have even made it into the higher echelons of politics and 
boardrooms. Despite this, the dominant cultural norm is still that women are the natural 
caregivers and any woman who rejects motherhood in favour of political, social or 
economic wellbeing is often perceived to be abnormal in some way; as somehow 
deficient. On the other hand, if a man gives up work to become a stay-at-home father he 
is praised, for what is merely expected of women. Yet capitalism needs women in the 
workplace, seeing as they constitute half of the population, and the more people that 
work the more wealth is generated. However, as Eisenstein points out, this usually leads 
to women working the ‘double-day’ and taking on part-time or lower paid work so that 
they can also look after children and attend to other domestic duties. Some liberal 
feminist philosophers, such as Susan Moller Okin, have attempted to address the issue of 
gender injustice within the family by improving on Rawls’ theory of justice, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 
                                                          
16 ONS data shows that between 1997 and 2013 the gap between the full time earnings of men 
and women has remained relatively consistent (at around £100 a week difference), though the 
gap has been closing in percentage terms due to a faster increase for women than men over this 
period (Bovill and Office for National Statistics 2014, 3–4). The data also shows that more women 
than men work part time, though the gap here is also closing (2014, 5). 
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4.4 Social justice in liberal feminist thought 
As a result of the feminist critique of mainstream liberalism and Western normative 
assumptions in general, as well as the continued inequality of women in the home and 
the workplace, some feminists focus their attention on revising liberal thought to take 
account of gender inequality and make the family more just. The reason liberalism is 
revised rather than rejected is that these feminists believe liberalism still offers the best 
resources for feminism against theories which apparently, more robustly, subordinate 
women through appeals to a conservative conception of tradition. Okin focuses on 
adapting Rawlsian social justice to feminist thought in order to critique what she 
considers to be antiliberal theories that pose a threat to women’s rights and autonomy. 
Her target is therefore not liberalism, though she is keen to modify modern liberal 
approaches, but rather pre-liberal and communitarian approaches to morality.  
She argues that the unequal distribution of domestic labour and caregiving in 
contemporary life is not just detrimental to women but also to children, as well as social 
justice in general (Okin 1989a, 25). Okin’s analysis of the treatment of the family in 
Western political thought, finds that standards of justice are deemed irrelevant to the 
sphere of family life, by many thinkers. Despite these thinkers providing differing 
justifications, she finds this trend of disregarding justice in the family in the work of 
Rousseau and Hume, as well as more contemporary antiliberal thinkers like Michael 
Sandel and Allan Bloom. Instead, for these thinkers, what she terms the ‘nobler virtues’ of 
love, affection, generosity and friendship, thought to be more natural bonds than justice, 
hold families together disregarding the need to guard against when these bonds fail. On 
the other hand, Okin defends Rawls as a liberal thinker who at least assumes, rather than 
explicitly argues, that the family in some form is just and that due to the fact he includes 
the family in the basic structure, ‘he does not consider the family to be outside the 
circumstances of justice’ (Okin, 1989a, 27) – though Archard argues that it is exactly this 
assumption by Rawls which side-steps the issue of the justice in the family. 
Okin, following Rawls, argues that justice is the first virtue of social institutions because it 
is the most essential virtue, rather than because it is the most noble or elevated virtue. 
Justice in the liberal sense is thus a virtue of institutions rather than of moral character. 
Furthermore, she also accuses the aforementioned antiliberal thinkers, who focus on the 
higher moral virtues, of idealising the family. Okin, therefore, assumes that without a 
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conception of just relations underpinning the relationship between family members, 
families are not guaranteed to turn out in the idealised form where love and affection 
prevail. As such, I take her view to entail that a substantive conception of justice within 
the family, is required to protect against abuses of power and undo the damage caused 
by centuries of institutionalised patriarchal power.  
Okin admits that in small communities or associations the moral virtues that often prevail 
are those of affection, generosity and others, which are superior to justice, and that 
narrow, individual self-interest often gives way to concern for common ends or the ends 
of those for whom we care deeply. Nevertheless, she claims, a foundation of justice is 
needed in case the nobler virtues do not prevail, and one person or more seeks their own 
ends at the expense of those others in the community.  How does Okin envisage this 
foundation of justice within the family? Is it to be regulated by the state or some other 
public institution? If there is a particular injustice within a particular family or widespread 
injustice within the family more broadly conceived, how does society bring about justice? 
For Okin it is brought about through laws, through promoting and enforcing women’s 
rights and through the fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of family life. She 
argues that to leave it to the nobler virtues is unrealistic and that, for example,  
even if wives never had occasion to ask for their just share of the family 
property, due to the generosity and spontaneous affection of their husbands, 
we would be unable to assess the families in which they lived from a moral 
point of view unless we knew whether, if they did ask for it, they would be 
considered entitled to it (1989a, 30-1). 
Here she echoes Mill’s claim that although many men do not treat their wives as property 
and may even treat them as equals, perhaps out of spontaneous affection, without 
changes to equalise women’s rights with men’s, there will always be men who do not 
treat their wives as equals. Okin does not accept that natural justice may be brought 
about through the reliance on nobler virtues; through friendship and generosity between 
members of the same family. Rather, there needs to be evidence that the principles of 
justice will apply if friendship and generosity are lacking. Reliance on the nobler virtues 
and enlarged affections between family members infers a highly idealised view of the 
contemporary family, according to Okin, which completely ignores the extent of violence 
perpetrated within the family. It also ignores the importance of family as a sphere of 
distribution. In truth, Okin believes that systematic injustice can occur in the family due to 
the fact that ‘the socialization and role expectations of women mean that they are 
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generally more inclined than men . . .  to order their priorities in accordance with the 
needs of their families’ (1989a, 31). However, from the Aristotelian perspective proposed 
in this thesis, if a small community or association such as the family does not cultivate 
these virtues, and if its members do not treat each other with justice, then it is not a 
flourishing social practice and therefore we should not try to artificially prop it up with 
abstract principles which restrain individual interests. If the other virtues are non-existent 
then surely the practice is unsustainable and ought to be transformed or dissolved? Laws 
can be put in place to protect the civil rights of family members, such that they do not 
find themselves trapped or subordinated, without appealing to abstract principles of 
justice. When the ‘nobler virtues’ are non-existent then all that is left is the pursuit of 
external goods like power and status. Laws protecting civil rights redistribute power so 
that people can escape becoming subordinated or trapped in small oppressive 
communities or associations. The failure of the virtues within the family and the resulting 
familial dysfunction will be discussed in a later chapter. 
Okin is not only critical of the reliance on the ‘nobler virtues’; she also specifically targets 
MacIntyre for his appeals to tradition. She erroneously interprets these appeals to 
tradition as though MacIntyre is some sort of Burkean conservative traditionalist by 
equating his use of the term with adverts in Good Housekeeping glorifying the traditional 
woman and political campaigns which appeal to ‘traditional values’ (1989a, 41). Okin 
argues that the approach of appealing to traditions or ‘shared understandings’ is 
‘incapable of dealing with the problem of the effects of social domination on beliefs and 
understandings’ (1989a, 43) [original emphasis]. As a result, Okin warns feminists who 
see communitarians as allies ‘in their struggle against what they see as a masculinist 
abstraction and emphasis on justice, impartiality, and universality’ (1989a, 43) against 
such alliances. Despite her in depth analysis of both After Virtue and Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? Okin still does not seem to recognise MacIntyre’s radically different 
use of the term tradition and the conceptual tools he provides in After Virtue for dealing 
with the problem of the effects of social domination on beliefs and understanding. She 
accuses him of elitism for appealing to Aristotle without acknowledging how he develops 
and sociologises the Aristotelian tradition to include a range of non-elitist productive and 
practical activities which contribute to a flourishing human life.  
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On the other hand, in her critique of Rawls, Okin insightfully points out that Rawls’ entire 
theory rests on the belief that the family, which is crucial to individual moral 
development, will teach us to have a sense of justice and simply assumes that families are 
just. For Rawls, it is through the family that the principles of justice are transmitted. He 
does not, however, discuss what happens when families are unjust. He simply takes it as a 
given that they are, if the wider society is justly ordered. Of course, Rawls only claims to 
provide a partial theory of justice, which applies to the basic structure of society, but 
given that the family is an institution considered by Rawls to be a part of that basic 
structure, it would surely follow that it is subjected to moral scrutiny in the same way as 
other institutions; perhaps more so given that it is not voluntary for all members of the 
family. Okin thus asks Rawls:  
Unless they are parented equally by adults of both sexes, how will children of 
both sexes come to develop a sufficiently similar and well-rounded moral 
psychology as to enable them to engage in the kind of deliberation about 
justice that is exemplified in the original position? (Okin 1989b, 237). 
In other words, Okin believes that the unequal division of labour along gendered lines 
within the family will distort the views of children as they develop into adults, making it 
difficult for them to reason well about the concerns of justice.  
Iris Marion Young, though not a liberal feminist as such, is similarly critical of the 
assumption in liberal thought that the family is just. She points out that some liberal 
thinkers such as William Galston (part of the New Familialists) argue explicitly that the 
two-parent family should be privileged by the state because the breakdown of this stable 
family structure leads to social ills such as increased poverty, crime, high-school dropouts 
and drug-taking (Young 1995). Despite the fact that Galston claims he is in favour of 
gender equality and women’s rights, Young believes that his lack of analysis of gender 
inequality and male domination within the family leads to him advocating the 
subordination of wives to their husbands, for the sake of nurturing independence in their 
children; independence being the paragon virtue of liberal society and its nurturing only 
achievable by two parent families (Galston 1993). Young states, 
Galston  would  surely  deny  that  he  intends  that  mothers  should  
subordinate  themselves  to men.  But  in the  absence  of  explicit  
consideration  of  gender  inequalities  in earning  power  and household  
division  of  labour,  preferring  stable marriage  over  divorce  and single  
motherhood  amounts  to calling for mothers to depend  on men to keep  
86 
 
them  out  of  poverty,  and this entails subordination  in many  cases (1995, 
545). 
As both Young and Okin attempt to show, contemporary liberal thinkers make 
assumptions about the family as a just institution without further explanation and 
antiliberal thinkers assume that the higher virtues will exist in loving relationships 
bringing about natural justice. They do not, according to these feminists, address the 
potential for exploitation in families, due to unequal structural power relations, or 
question the dominant ideal of the nuclear family, which leaves women vulnerable to 
dependency and exploitation.  
 
4.5 Re-constructing Rawlsian social justice through the capabilities 
approach 
Martha Nussbaum, like Okin, is highly critical of both Rawls’ assumptions about justice in 
the family and of the privileging of any type of family structure over another. Similarly to 
Archard, she argues that the conventional family of a particular culture may not be the 
best model of family for promoting the capabilities one needs to lead a good life.  Also, 
like Archard and some other liberal thinkers discussed in the previous chapter, thanks to 
her earlier Aristotelianism (Nussbaum 1992), she is in many ways a perfectionist liberal, 
though she argues she does not provide a comprehensive conception of the good 
because she is committed to political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism (2000, 180).  
Nussbaum contends that Rawls assumes that the family is prepolitical and, therefore, 
‘natural’, which is problematic for his theory of justice.  For Rawls the family forms part of 
the basic structure of society and this much Nussbaum, along with Okin, agrees with 
Rawls on. Yet in A Theory of Justice heads of households are envisioned in the Original 
Position behind the veil of ignorance, which suggests that households exist prior to the 
construction of society; despite the fact that the veil of ignorance is supposed to prevent 
hypothetical members of a given society from knowing their position in that society 
(Rawls 1999).  According to Nussbaum, Rawls and others in Western philosophy rely on 
underlying assumptions about what the best or typical family might be in a given society, 
without questioning these assumptions.  As the Original Position is ahistorical, Nussbaum 
argues, we are led to assume that a particularly conventional form of the family (in Rawls’ 
case a private patriarchal nuclear family because heads of households are usually men) is 
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biologically natural rather than a socially constructed institution. Okin’s solution to this is 
to  
discard the "heads of families" assumption in Rawls’ thesis, take seriously the 
notion that those in the original position are ignorant of their sex as well as 
their other individual characteristics, and apply the principles of justice to the 
gender structure and the family arrangements of our society (Okin 1989b, 
235).  
However, this would radically alter Rawls’ theory, which in general neglects the issue of 
gender. Furthermore, keeping the rest of Rawls’ assumptions intact does not provide a 
critique of the assumption that the private nuclear family is best. 
In her work Sex and Social Justice Nussbaum puts forward a social constructionist 
argument that gender roles and the private nuclear family are in many respects artefacts 
of human arrangements rather than ‘natural’ as they are often taken to be (Nussbaum 
1999).  As such, she erects a somewhat artificial line between nature and custom, which 
ought to be rejected from an Aristotelian perspective. However, Nussbaum argues that 
ideas about natural female traits, for example that women are naturally dependent and 
are meant to serve the interests of men, or that they are naturally suited to caring roles 
because they are more empathetic and maternal, are ideas that are common historically 
but also change from one cultural context to another.  Therefore, when one invokes 
nature to justify the place of women in a given society, Nussbaum argues that it is usually 
in order to justify a custom within a tradition or a societal norm, and often is not reliably 
grounded in biological facts. Echoing Mill’s sentiments about custom and convention, she 
argues that ‘clearly the longevity of a custom does not show that it is right’ (Nussbaum 
2000, 254).  Equally, the mere fact of a biological tendency, the idea that it is rooted in 
human nature, for Nussbaum does not lead to its rightness or inevitability. Her claim here 
is particularly strong when we consider that it is a general consensus in modern liberal 
thought that we are rational beings who are able to take control of our biological nature. 
If liberals accept that, then why do they rely on claims of naturalness to justify continuing 
gendered social relations? 
Nussbaum argues that it is utterly implausible to even think that the family has a fixed 
customary nature, let alone a biological one, maintaining that the norms of family 
structures change historically and culturally. In some cultures, for example, families 
consist of large kinship groups living together, or are ruled over by matriarchs. Though 
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Nussbaum admits that these arguments are not new to feminism, she argues that they 
have not been addressed in any significant way by theories of justice in the liberal 
tradition (Nussbaum 2000, 252).   
Family life and emotional wellbeing are clearly important in Nussbaum’s Capabilities 
Approach as Nussbaum considers both ‘emotions’ and ‘affiliation’ to be capacities which 
must be secured in order for a human life to have the overall capability to function 
(Nussbaum 2000; Nussbaum 2011). Therefore, her argument is not to liberate women 
from the family or to eradicate the family but to defend an almost indefinite plurality of 
family forms and oppose the claim that any given form of family life is natural. In doing so 
she asserts that the normative family of liberal political theory is constructed by customs 
and institutions and is not in any way natural.   
However, her social constructionist critique of liberal theories and institutions appears to 
be at odds with her capabilities approach which sees the family as a home for love and 
care which nurtures our capacities for emotion and affiliation. Her approach rests on the 
assumption that the family has a natural basis, at least in part, because it contributes to 
human flourishing.  Is she able to resolve this tension? Nussbaum recognises that there 
may be some biological tendencies such as the need for emotional support which might 
only be satisfied through affiliative groupings (Nussbaum 2000, 261).   She also puts 
forward a normative view of the family which sees families as homes for love and care 
that are part of the human capabilities, but she argues that ‘they are also shaped at a very 
deep level by our conceptions of sex roles, sexual desirability, and the aims of sexual 
activity’ (Nussbaum 1999, 272).  She also takes it that culture has a role to play in 
constructing what it is to be male or female and what it is to experience different 
emotions, such as love and grief, so it naturally follows from her argument that ‘what we 
naively refer to as “the family” is a highly various group of social constructs’ (1999, 272). 
These social constructs are a result of the natural desire for love and care, which in turn 
are shaped by social expectation, and the need to nurture the young and dependent. The 
divide between custom and nature suddenly seems less distinct when the capabilities 
approach is introduced. Nussbaum’s positive conclusion, then, is that there is no ideal 
type of family. Her definition of family amounts to little more than small affiliative 
groupings including women’s collectives or other forms of communal living which do not 
conform to the Western norm of a family. Nussbaum almost seems to be advocating 
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something akin to Mill’s ‘experiments in living’ but with more attention to developing 
caring and loving affiliations rather than purely individual self-development. 
Nussbaum’s critique of the state in Western society is that it only gives recognition and 
protection to the contemporary private nuclear family without questioning whether other 
affiliative groupings require such protection.  While Nussbaum accuses Rawls of assuming 
that the nuclear family is biologically naturally, she also claims that Rawls treats the family 
as if it is a voluntary grouping comparable to universities and churches, which, he argues, 
should not be interfered with internally but simply restrained externally by the principles 
of justice, in order to protect individual liberty.  Yet the family, Nussbaum argues, is far 
from voluntary for children and often is not for women either, particularly when some 
women are economically dependent on men and have no choice but to stay in the family 
unit (Nussbaum 2000, 276).   Nussbaum, in contrast to Rawls, wants to protect not only 
individual liberty but also the range of capabilities she believes make us fully human.  She 
concludes that the family can both foster and undermine the capabilities so it is up to the 
law to make sure it does more fostering (2000, 270).  Following Rawls, she argues that the 
basic structure is essentially how the major institutions of a society work together to 
assign rights and obligations and distribute goods of advantage that come about through 
social cooperation.  However, for Nussbaum they should do more than distribute material 
goods; they should also protect individual capabilities for flourishing. If the family, as one 
of the major institutions in Nussbaum’s conception, inhibits rather than promotes an 
individual’s capabilities and thus prevents her from flourishing, then the state should take 
an interest in this and look to what it can do to address it.  On the other hand, it would 
not be up to the state to force an individual to exercise their capabilities in order to make 
them flourish as this would sacrifice individual liberty.  Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
does assume a conception of the good life for human beings in a similar way to other 
liberal perfectionists. We may recall that Raz argues we should make available those 
institutions and practices which contribute to human flourishing, such as marriage 
because it can create a more stable family life, without forcing any individual to avail 
themselves of it. In doing so Nussbaum makes assumptions about what is good for human 
beings and thus about their nature. Again there seems to be a conflict between her 
capabilities approach and her social constructionism. 
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For Nussbaum, the Rawlsian belief that the state only regulates the family from the 
outside as it does other institutions, such as churches and universities, through its legal 
definition of marital union and various protections it gives to certain familial groupings, is 
also flawed. There are many ways in which the liberal state interferes with the internal 
life of the family through an array of institutions. For example, social services and child 
protection authorities in the UK take children into care when they deem parents not 
capable of providing adequate care themselves.  Nussbaum’s approach, in contrast, 
makes central to her thesis the difference between universities and religious institutions, 
on the one hand, and family, on the other.  What family we are part of is certainly not 
voluntary, at least until we choose our partner. Rather than giving priority to one 
affiliative grouping such as the Western ideal of the private nuclear family unit, Nussbaum 
wants to begin with each individual’s capabilities and liberties with the aim of seeing how 
different groupings of persons succeed or fail in promoting these capabilities (Nussbaum 
2000, 276–7).  This approach also parallels Archard’s methodology which, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, aims to evaluate different familial arrangements on how it succeeds 
or fails in fulfilling the function of family life. Both approaches aim at a minimal definition 
of the family so that different family forms can be evaluated according to certain criteria. 
Through her empirical research in Kerala, India, Nussbaum concluded that women’s 
collectives might be more successful at promoting the capabilities for women than the 
traditional form of familial groupings found in those societies. In the traditional form of 
Indian family, for example, Nussbaum found that women were exploited and treated as 
possessions through the custom of dowry (despite dowry being illegal) and that many 
suffered domestic abuse.  For these women, the family in these societies was certainly 
not a voluntary association. She emphasises that certain capabilities need special 
attention within a family such as the need for love and care, reproduction, support and 
education. As well as these capabilities which need special attention within the family, it 
must also support a wide range of ‘associational liberties’ such as the capability to 
exercise choice and the liberty of self-definition.  These particular capabilities, however, 
must only be promoted within the constraints of the central capabilities which she argues 
should be built into whatever legal structure regulates the family.  So love and care, 
Nussbaum argues, should not come at the expense of personal liberty.  Nussbaum then 
wants to look at different affiliative groupings which might resemble family i.e. they 
promote the capabilities of love and care but not at the expense of individual rights, and 
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then give those groupings the same state protection afforded traditional family 
groupings.  She is not, therefore, arguing for the withdrawal of state interference in 
family life but instead seems to argue for increasing its activity, as well as recognition in 
theories of justice that the state does and should interfere with family life on a more 
inclusive basis. Nussbaum’s claims rest on the premise that the family is part of the basic 
structure of society, as Rawls asserts, but goes further than Rawls to say that because of 
this fact, it is among those institutions that the basic principles of justice are designed to 
regulate internally.  The family is part of the basic structure because of the profound 
influence it has on the individual’s development and life chances from the start of a 
human life.  Yet she still insists that the values of personal choice may end up being 
sacrificed if the family were to be completely regulated by a theory of political justice, 
hence the need for some recognition of individual sovereignty.   
Like other liberals, and other liberal feminists, Nussbaum understands the family as a 
sphere of human life which satisfies certain aspects of human need, and she therefore 
shies away from a more comprehensive and cohesive view of flourishing in which family 
life is fully integrated into our conception of the good life. Family appears to be a means 
to individual flourishing (even if it is intrinsically worthwhile) rather than a form of 
community or a practice whose common good informs our own conception of the good 
life. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is based on intuition in that the list of capabilities is 
supposedly intuited rather than enjoining a particular view of the person or of human 
nature.  Without a particular view of human nature then it is difficult to say where these 
intuitions about the capabilities we need to flourish come from or even what our 
biological tendencies as human animals are.  It is difficult to universalise human 
capabilities if there is no agreement on human nature and what constitutes a good life. 
Nussbaum’s claim that the capabilities are intuited seems implausible therefore because 
they do indeed presuppose a view of the person. The fact she denies this seems to be 
simply because it would invalidate her commitment to political rather than 
comprehensive liberalism. She therefore seems to take Rawls’ emphasis on a certain 







Liberal feminist thought, or feminist reconstructions of liberal ideas, highlight the barriers 
to social justice and equality in liberal conceptions of the family. These feminists point out 
the inherent problem with how much of liberal thought makes assumptions about the 
family, either with regards to it being just or with regards to its naturalness. Using liberal 
concepts such as justice, rights and autonomy against liberal assumptions about the 
family, feminists highlight the endemic injustice of familial relations throughout history 
and still apparent today. What they show us is that certain types of family structure are 
unjust and inimical to the flourishing of women, and often children, because of the fact 
that this injustice is transmitted to the next generation through families. Furthermore, 
these family structures are often valorised by theorists as natural and therefore the best 
forms of the family. Reliance on the spontaneous affections of spouses and the noble 
virtues of generosity and friendship, it is argued, is not sufficient to protect women from 
abuses of power when family life is so often characterised by unequal power relations.  
Nussbaum rightly highlights the role culture and society play in shaping gender roles, the 
meaning and significance of emotions, and the norms of family organisation (1999; 2000).  
Aristotle does not seem to recognise this when he claims that women, workers and slaves 
are naturally inferior to the male citizens of the polis. MacIntyre looks to Aristotle as a 
philosopher who recognised our vulnerability and animality.  Yet even MacIntyre argues 
that Aristotle did not give weight to the experience of those most likely to have to deal 
with the facts of affliction and dependence such as ‘women, slaves, and servants, those 
engaged in the productive labour of farmers, fishing crews, and manufacture’ (MacIntyre 
1999, 6).  Aristotle’s own failure to recognise the extent of human dependence and 
vulnerability, particularly of these groups, may go some way to explaining why he 
excludes these groups from shared deliberation on important matters.  Those who 
participated in such deliberation were men of the leisured, higher echelons of society 
who were economically independent. Women, slaves and workers however were 
economically dependent, entirely subservient or dependent on one another.  Moreover, 
Aristotle’s virtuous man is magnanimous and likes to be recognised for what he has given 
but does not want to be reminded of his need for aid from others. He is not someone 
who asks for help. This is something which feminist theory can rectify without too much 
damage to Aristotelian premises.  
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However, Okin’s critical discussion of the virtues is problematic. She argues that the 
nobler virtues of love, affection, generosity and friendship are considered to be natural by 
their proponents and therefore provide a stronger basis on which to build family life. 
However, no virtue is natural to a human being (and it is debatable that love is a virtue, as 
opposed to a passion or emotion). We may have natural capacities but virtues of 
character need to be cultivated through moral education and habituation. Similarly, 
justice does not come about naturally (except perhaps within a flourishing friendship) but 
must be cultivated and enforced by laws or the rules of a practice. The rules of a practice, 
for example, provide the standards of excellence against which we can compare our own 
actions. However, rules are not abstract but directed towards the common good of the 
practice, which in itself is ordered towards the human good of eudaimonia. If half of the 
human population are prevented from proper flourishing as a partial result of the way in 
which a particular practice is ordered, then that practice must be dysfunctional. The way 
the practice is ordered must promote and cultivate justice, as well as the other virtues. 
Thus a widely dysfunctional practice needs to be radically transformed. Women in the 
past century and even earlier began this process through the questioning of conventional 
familial arrangements through cultural and political engagement, through participation in 
the women’s liberation movement, among other radical activities. In doing so they raised 
questions in the political sphere from the perspective of women in the private sphere, 
which had previously been considered outside of political concern, such as what a 
genuinely flourishing family life might look like. 
One further issue raised by feminists that the Aristotelian approach adopted in this thesis 
needs to accommodate is that, due to the role expectations placed on women, they are 
generally more inclined than men to order their priorities in accordance with the needs of 
their family; either due to the demands of family life and women’s socialisation into 
gendered norms or due to their experiences of the workplace, in that women’s work life 
is more negatively impacted by family life than is men’s (Dodd-McCue and Wright 1996; 
Keene and Reynolds 2005). Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that in dual-
career families, there is little difference between the genders in terms of prioritising the 
family over career goals (Schnittger and Bird 1990). As such, when we talk about being 
able to hierarchically order goods in accordance with practical reason, we must not ignore 
gendered role expectations and the demands of parenthood or the differing effects on 
the genders in work life. To do so would be to divorce practical reasoning from the social 
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and cultural contexts which shape that reasoning. Furthermore, one of the coping 
mechanisms of parents who work is to compartmentalise the different parts of their lives. 
As such the goods of each sphere are not clearly ordered in relation to each other. 
Despite women’s immense advances in the public sphere from the time when John Stuart 
Mill, Mary Wollstonecraft and the women’s suffrage movement began to advocate for 
women’s rights, the majority of caring and domestic work is still done by women who 
often work a ‘double-day’ in order to juggle the demands of both, while men have made 
few advances in the private sphere in terms of sharing the burden of domestic and caring 
work. Furthermore, liberal feminism has, as Hagar Kotef points out, been criticised by 
scholars such as bell hooks (1982) and Hazel Carby (1987) for its attempt to universalise 
the particular; the particular of the white middle-class woman (Kotef 2009, 495). The 
abstractness that liberal feminism necessarily embraces, Kotef argues, was an attempt to 
stabilise the category of woman. The more concrete ‘woman’ becomes, the more 
unstable because of the intersectionality of oppression – there becomes no stable 
universal category of woman, only different groups of women (Kotef, 2009, p 518-9).  
Care ethics, which I will explore in the next chapter, attempts to reject the abstract and 
focus on the particularity of embodied care; though it will become clear that some who 
write about care ethics still seek to universalise norms and rules of care, drawing on the 
liberal analytic approach to ethics. 
Liberal feminist theory poses the question of how women would fare in genuinely 
flourishing families and lays some groundwork for how that might be brought about 
through further state interference in family life. It does not, however, tell us what a 
flourishing family life entails. Nussbaum does begin to address this with her capabilities 
approach by suggesting that families must foster certain capacities and that the society 
must ensure that families do foster these capacities, without forcing individuals to realise 
them. However, her minimal yet all-encompassing definition of what a family is, which 
includes other forms of communal living, may not be as helpful to the aims of this thesis 
as it first appears. It seems to me that her example of women’s collectives in India is a 
much needed response to the failure and breakdown of family life in India, rather than 
just another form of the family. Dysfunctional families might be able to learn something 
from these collectives and affiliative groupings; however, the collectives themselves do 
not fulfil all of the functions of a flourishing family life.  
95 
 
5. Care Ethics and the Family 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, many feminist theorists, particularly liberal 
feminists, have been critical of mainstream liberal assumptions about the family, 
challenging liberal theory to extend its own principles to women, instead of disguising 
inequality with gender-neutral language. These feminists have argued for a number of 
women’s rights in relation to the family, such as flexible working and an equitable division 
of domestic labour and care. Nonetheless, there is still variation and disagreement within 
feminist theory about what is good for women and for families and if the two can ever be 
reconciled. Feminist care ethics, a more recent development in feminist thinking, focuses 
less on women’s rights and autonomy and more on recognition of the ethical and social 
importance of caring labour, usually done by women, to wider society. Feminist care 
ethics emphasises human vulnerability and dependency and claims that care is at least as 
important for moral theory as social justice. However, theorists disagree on whether or 
not care ethics constitutes a standalone theory or requires the wider framework of other 
moral theories such as liberalism or virtue ethics (Held 2005; Slote 2007). They also argue 
about the extent to which caring work should be the responsibility of families or the state 
(Bubeck 2002; Bubeck 1995). In this chapter I will explore some of these debates and 
their relevance to the question of what a flourishing family is. In the following chapter, I 
will argue for a synthesis of the Aristotelian approach defended in this thesis with 
feminists care ethics in order to provide a comprehensive view of what constitutes a 
flourishing family life.  
Many care ethics feminists have gone further than Okin and Nussbaum’s critique of 
liberal assumptions about the family, to largely reject many aspects of liberal theory 
because of its dependence on abstract justice reasoning and the ideal of the self-
sufficient individual. They argue that a liberal approach to moral thinking ignores the 
extensive power of caring relationships, particularly in the family, in shaping the 
individual. They argue that the individual should not be understood as self-sufficient but 
rather as dependent on others and as depended on by others. Instead of reforming liberal 
theory, care ethics has attempted to expound a different theoretical approach derived 
from the traditional, particular experiences of women and focused on the ethics of 
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caregiving.  Furthermore, much of care ethics theory is premised on the idea that the 
mother-child relationship, or the relationship between a carer and cared-for, is a 
paradigm for all moral relationships. What constitutes a flourishing family life, therefore, 
has to be important for understanding moral relationships in general.  
Care ethics theory is now only a few decades old and, as such, many of its advocates 
argue that it is not yet a fully formed moral or political theory which stands on its own. In 
fact, as Virginia Held points out,  
Some advocates of the ethics of care resist generalizing this approach into 
something that can be fitted into the form of a moral theory. They see it as a 
mosaic of insights and value the way it is sensitive to contextual nuance and 
particular narratives rather than making the abstract and universal claims of 
more familiar moral theories (2005, 9). 
On the other hand, many ethics of care theorists still rely on some of the premises of 
liberal theory, such as the need for basic social justice and rights. More central to the idea 
of an ethics of care, though, is meeting the needs of dependent others for whom we find 
ourselves responsible as parents, aunts, uncles, siblings, friends and strangers. This focus 
on caring work and the needs of others has led to other feminists criticising certain care 
ethicists for gender essentialism and reinforcing traditional sexist roles (see Card 1990; 
Hoagland 1990; Houston 1990; Tronto 1993). In this chapter I will explore the scope and 
limitations of care ethics for answering the question posed in this thesis. Its insights can 
help us to reconstruct our approach to ethics and develop a perspective on the good of 
family life which recognises the inherent moral problems of caring relationships. Though 
care ethics now extends well beyond the spheres of friendship and family, to law, politics, 
society and international relations (for example, see, DesAutels and Whisnant 2010; Held 
2005; Tronto 1993), for the purposes of this thesis I will focus primarily on its applications 
to family life.  
 
5.2 The care perspective in moral development 
Carol Gilligan, a former collaborator of the moral psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, is one 
of the originators of the care ethics perspective. Kohlberg’s research focussed on moral 
development from childhood to adulthood. However, as Gilligan points out, in the study, 
which he used to determine the six stages humans go through in the development of 
their moral judgement, Kohlberg failed to include girls. When he then tried to locate 
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women on the scale of moral development he found that they exemplified the third stage 
of development, not the most advanced stage. According to Gilligan, ‘at this stage 
morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and goodness is equated with helping and 
pleasing others’ (1993, 18). Kohlberg considered this conception of goodness to be 
functional in mature women’s lives and that 
only if women enter the traditional arena of male activity will they recognize 
the inadequacy of this moral perspective and progress like men towards 
higher stages where relationships are subordinated to rules (stage four) and 
rules to universal principles of justice (stages five and six) (Gilligan 1993, 18).  
There are a number of glaring deficiencies, which Gilligan notes, both in Kohlberg’s 
method and the conclusions he draws. Kohlberg concludes that female morality is lacking, 
even though his claims to universalisability are undermined by the study’s omission of 
girls. He also fails to consider the possibility that this so-called female morality might be 
superior, or at least complementary, to so-called male morality. Nor does he consider 
that another explanation might be that men, on the whole, reject the kind of morality 
which privileges relationships over rules because they do not generally share with women 
in the care of dependents, and have thus adopted the language of rights and rule-
following, which dominates public life. While the experience of men is arguably changing 
so that there are increasing numbers of male carers and fathers who take an active role in 
caregiving (particularly in dual-earner families and families where economic instability has 
pushed men into ‘at-home fatherhood’ (Chesley 2011)), the fact that public life is still 
dominated by men and that many women work a ‘double-day’ (as argued in the previous 
chapter) suggests that it is still the case that most men are not involved in direct 
caregiving. If the difference in moral reasoning is a reflection of the particular gendered 
experiences of men and women, then it is clear that Kohlberg does not see traditional 
women’s work as of equal moral value to traditional men’s work. The contradiction of this 
claim lies at the core of the care ethics critique.  
Owen Flanagan and Kathryn Jackson argue that Kohlberg envisaged the morally good 
person as ‘simply one who reasons with, and acts on the basis of, principles of justice as 
fairness’ (1987, 623), the core concept of John Rawls’ moral philosophy. However, Gilligan 
rejects Kohlberg’s approach to moral psychology with its exclusive focus on justice 
reasoning. Instead she expounds the idea that,  
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Whereas justice as fairness involves seeing others thinly, as worthy of respect 
purely by virtue of common humanity, morally good caring requires seeing 
others thickly, as constituted by their particular human face, their particular 
psychological and social self. It also involves taking seriously, or at least being 
moved by, one's particular connection to the other (1987, 623). 
According to Gilligan women tend to find their moral obligations in the needs of particular 
others – children, or sick or elderly relatives – for whom they find themselves responsible. 
This is not a biologically deterministic claim, as some feminist critics of Gilligan argue (See 
Greeno and Maccoby 1986), but rather a claim about the kind of work women tend to do 
as a result of social expectations, norms and inequalities. In her defence, Lawrence Blum 
states that Gilligan’s work ‘claims empirical support for the existence  of a moral outlook 
or  orientation  distinct  from  one  based  on  impartiality,  impersonality, justice,  formal  
rationality,  and  universal  principle’ (Blum 1988, 472). By examining the different 
responses of male and female children to the moral problems originally designed by 
Kohlberg, Gilligan concluded that women tend to develop differently from men. She 
argues that women see themselves relationally, whereas men tend to see themselves 
separately, from the other. Even the moral problems themselves are designed, according 
to Gilligan, with this male approach to moral reasoning in mind. Thus the female response 
is misunderstood by the interviewer and deemed to be a case of lower moral maturity 
rather than there being a problem with what is deemed by the interviewer to be the 
morally mature answer. 
Gilligan’s studies seem to show a difference in male and female moral reasoning. While 
Gilligan can be criticised for her study samples not being representative, and for it not 
being clear that care is gendered when we take into account larger more diverse samples, 
authors like Marilyn Friedman argue that even if care ethics is not a distinctly female 
orientation, it is symbolically female (Friedman 1995). What it highlights is the disparity 
between two different types of reasoning and how they might be related to how we 
experience the world. Traditionally, and often still, women are the primary caregivers, not 
only in family life, but also in caring professions, as argued in the previous chapter. The 
moral psychology of Gilligan’s ethics is thus: the way women often experience the world 
is in terms of their relationship with others and in particular those closest to them, such 
as children and other dependent relatives or friends. Men on the other hand have 
traditionally experienced the world in terms of their own individual path – and this 
remains commonplace. While they have families, their role may be limited to financial 
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provider and as such they have tended to concentrate on their job and their status. The 
realm of men for most of human history has been the public sphere and, in the modern 
West, where the public and private are so explicitly separated, it is in terms of one 
individual’s claims against another that male moral theories have determined societal 
relations. This distinction between male and female reasoning is a very crude one, of 
course, and is simply designed to illustrate the social tendency of men and women to 
inhabit different roles, which may influence their moral reasoning because of the 
particular standards and expectations of those roles. Of course there will be exceptions to 
the generalisation and differences according to class, race and sexuality: men who work 
in the caring profession, people in same sex relationships and women who have chosen 
to pursue a career instead of have children. Again, these differences are more than likely 
to depend on the demands of the roles they inhabit.  The main point Gilligan is trying to 
argue is that the dominant conception of moral maturity needs to be reconceived by 
moral philosophers and psychologists if certain roles, certain types of work or practices, 
are not to be denigrated as lacking in moral reasoning. The further implication might also 
be that our public social relations are lacking in genuine moral reasoning because it is the 
appeal to abstract principles of justice which is flawed, not the rarely-heard appeal to our 
embeddedness within particular social relations and practices. 
One explanation Gilligan offers for the gendered differences in moral development is that 
in the early years of childhood development, boys and girls have different experiences of 
relationships.  The boy’s experience of relationship is defined by differentiation and 
separation from the primary caretaker, usually female, in the early years of his 
development.  The girl on the other hand recognises continuity with the caretaker(s) and 
experiences attachment; ‘female identity formation takes place in a context of ongoing 
relationship’ (Gilligan 1993, 7).  So in identifying as female, she sees herself in relation to 
other females – mothers, aunts, pre-school teachers etc. – as most primary caretakers 
tend to be female.  Boys on the other hand go through a process of separation in 
developing a masculine gender identity.  According to the Kohlbergian view of moral 
development, this process makes them more advanced than girls in terms of rational 
objective thinking and individuation, because they do not see themselves as embedded in 
social relationships.  The problem Gilligan identifies is that mainstream psychological 
development theories see women’s lack of differentiation and their embeddedness in 
relationships as a developmental deficiency.  The fact that women emerge from their 
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childhood with a better sense of empathy and of experiencing other people’s needs and 
emotions as their own, does not entail that women are naturally more empathetic and 
less rational. Rather it shows that supposed objectivity and individuation are more valued 
and perceived to be the correct way in which we should develop, according to theories of 
moral development such as Kohlberg’s.  It also shows that girls and boys generally 
experience development in different ways and this may be because caregivers are usually 
female.  
In order for boys and girls to experience development more equally, so that boys also 
develop the capacity for empathy and recognise their embeddedness in relationships, 
without this being seen as a moral deficiency, adult male parents also need to more 
visibly engage in caregiving. In order to do that they need to be given the same 
opportunities to actively parent as mothers are and there would need to be a cultural 
change in working practices, which took the demands of family life as seriously for men as 
it does for women. If boys see their male role models only in terms of authority figures 
who earn wages for the family and if they see their mothers primarily in terms of 
caregiving and domestic labour, even if mothers work outside the home as well (working 
the double-day), then they are less likely to see caregiving as something morally and 
socially worthwhile. Equally, girls need to see that mothers are not expected to do all the 
caregiving and domestic labour, but are able to share that work with fathers who actively 
seek it as a worthwhile social activity.  While this explanation may seem like an 
oversimplification, and one which pays attention only to conventional heterosexual 
familial arrangements, it nonetheless demonstrates that traditionally gendered roles 
within the family have a clearly gendering and unjust effect on the upbringing of children, 
such that the capacities required for caregiving are somewhat denigrated in the eyes of 
children, especially boys.  
It is difficult to deny that caring is central to the wellbeing of a family and its members. 
Therefore, Kohlberg’s focus on Rawlsian justice reasoning alone seems ill-fitted to 
furthering our understanding of what it is for a family to flourish even if issues of justice 
are still relevant to familial relations, as the previous chapter demonstrated. Kohlberg’s 
approach, despite his ignorance and denigration of the private sphere in understanding 
advanced moral development, did use caring, familial relations to illustrate his moral 
dilemma. Yet, the acceptable response to Kohlberg’s dilemma ignores any particularities 
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of the relationship between husband and wife. The general point which we can draw 
from Gilligan’s analysis is that an ethics of care approach is more suited to understanding 
the particularities and relationships of family life than one of justice reasoning alone 
which tries to remove contextual details and apply rules derived from abstract or pure 
reason. 
 
5.3 Is there a place for justice in care ethics? 
The previous section raises the question of the extent to which justice is relevant to the 
care ethics approach. Flanagan and Jackson point out that different moral problems draw 
out different kinds of moral response so it may be that we need different dispositions 
depending on the particular moral situation we are faced with (1987, 625). This argument 
seems to imply that we need to be both just and caring in order to deal with moral 
problems appropriately and to know which disposition is required for each situation. They 
also argue, following Gilligan’s claims, that ‘for most individuals one way of seeing moral 
problems dominates the other way of seeing to some degree, and that the direction of 
dominance is correlated with gender’ (1987, 625). However, they suggest that how we 
construe moral problems, which are less monumental in scale than those of abortion or 
matters of life and death, is generally a matter of ‘preference’ rather than gender and 
that while we may be able to switch to a different moral orientation when asked if there 
is another way of construing a moral problem, we generally believe our preferred mode 
to provide the most defensible solution (1987, 625-6). The question raised by Flanagan 
and Jackson’s argument is whether or not it is simply a matter of choice between the 
perspective of justice reasoning and care ethics when we are confronted with moral 
problems. The difficulty with claiming that moral standpoints are a matter of preference 
is that this leads to the emotivist claim that moral judgements lack truth value and are 
purely emotional attitudes which cannot be rationally evaluated.17 Instead, it might be 
more fruitful to say that having a different disposition depending on the moral problem 
one is faced with does not necessarily entail trying to change one’s entire moral attitude. 
Rather, care ethics advocates that we look at the particularities of a situation in order to 
determine what it is one should do, rather than appealing to an abstract set of moral 
injunctions every time. Furthermore, from a MacIntyrean perspective, different practices 
                                                          
17 See MacIntyre’s critique of emotivism in After Virtue (1985). 
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cultivate different virtues, which are required to participate in and achieve the goods of 
the activity. It is with reference to the virtues and the goods of the activity and how they 
are order towards human flourishing that we can determine what we should do. 
Virginia Held discusses the possibilities of meshing together the two perspectives of 
justice and care. She criticises Gilligan’s early approach to justice and care, arguing that 
seeing justice and care as alternatives does not help us decide which we should favour 
when their recommendations conflict with one another (Held 2005). Held is equally 
critical of Nel Noddings, whose approach rejects abstract rationality (which prioritises 
justice) completely, and instead argues that care should be made central to any moral 
theory. However, Held contends that care alone would struggle to deal with ‘the 
structural inequalities and discriminations of gender, race, class and sexual orientation’ 
(2005, 62).  Instead she argues that justice and care should be meshed together. In 
discussing justice she automatically includes the terms of rights, equality and liberty 
whilst in talking about care she includes notions of relatedness, empathy and trust. In 
defending the ethic of care, Held argues that,  
The charge that a feminist ethic of care is particularistic, limited to the 
contexts of family and friends, or merely descriptive of the kinds of restricted 
lives of caring for others to which women have traditionally been confined, is 
based . . .  on a misunderstanding of this ethic (2005, 65).  
As for the possibilities of an ethic of care making fundamental structural changes to 
society that would normally be ascribed to principles of justice she states: 
Instead of seeing law and government or the economy as the central and 
appropriate determinants of society, an ethic of care might see bringing up 
children and fostering trust between members of the society as the most 
important concerns of all. Other arrangements might then be evaluated in 
terms of how well or badly they contribute to the flourishing of children and 
the health of social relations (2005, 64). 
Held thus sees the potential for care ethics to provide a moral framework which can have 
application beyond intimate relations and which also addresses the concerns of justice. 
Rather than male dominated ‘public institutions’ determining the health of a society, Held 
argues that we look at the health of what are thought to be private social relations to see 
how well or badly society contributes to their wellbeing. While this thesis is concerned 
with similar goals, the Aristotelian approach defended does not require that paying 
attention to the concerns of both justice and care entails having to integrate two 
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opposing or conflicting moral standpoints. Some ethics of care theorists are, as we have 
already stated, rightly critical of pure justice reasoning but it does not mean that justice is 
irrelevant to or has no place in a more particularistic ethics; though many argue care 
should take priority. There seems to be a danger of conflating having to choose between 
opposing moral standpoints (i.e. the abstract rationality of liberalism and the moral 
particularity of care ethics) with paying attention to two different moral concerns or 
virtues (i.e. justice and care), which are not necessarily mutually opposed. Thus being 
both just and caring should not lead to the blocking of moral clarity about what should be 
done, as Flanagan and Jackson suggest might sometimes be the case. To understand 
justice, in the Aristotelian sense, one does not need to appeal to abstract principles but 
rather to what is owed to people in virtue of how they contribute to the achievement and 
sharing of common goods.  
 
5.4 Care ethics as a comprehensive abstract moral theory 
In contrast to Gilligan and Noddings who emphasise the particularity of care ethics 
Diemut Bubeck attempts to transform the disparate concepts and theories of care ethics 
into a comprehensive, Rawlsian-style, abstract moral theory. She defines care as ‘a 
response to a particular subset of basic human needs, in other words, those that make us 
dependent on others’ (Bubeck 2002, 165).  She distinguishes care from ‘activities or acts 
that are expressions of love, friendship, or consideration’ in order to further qualify her 
definition of care, though she recognises that care and love may often coincide.  The 
reason for this particular qualification, Bubeck argues, is firstly that an emotional bond 
need not exist in order for someone to give care to another. Secondly, acts which express 
an emotional bond such as that of friendship or love are not always care.  A caring act 
satisfies the needs or wants of the other that the other could not satisfy herself.   
The first problem with this argument is that while it may be the case that the act of caring 
does not require an emotional bond, without some attachment between the giver and 
receiver of care, or some motivation drawn from the particular character of the carer, bad 
caregiving may result. I will return to this claim later. Moreover it is usually through 
intimate social relations that we can cultivate the disposition to give care ungrudgingly.  
In other words, such a disposition to care about, as well as for, another is first cultivated 
within family life and early education.  
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The second problem with Bubeck’s argument is that many of our needs and wants which 
are not urgent, such as the need for friendship, also cannot be satisfied by the agent 
alone; one needs another person with whom one can be friends. This argument is 
significant for a discussion of the family because the relationship between parents or a 
couple, and between a parent and a child, can be characterised as particular forms of 
friendship (they certainly are for Aristotle). A friend may be able to give many other 
things that a person cannot achieve alone, such as emotional support.  If one is suffering 
with grief, a friend or family member may be able to share that grief and provide the kind 
of care and support that one could not possibly obtain alone.  One cannot talk things 
through with oneself very easily.  Being able to talk a problem through entails someone 
else being able to cast a different perspective on the problem. In fact, Bubeck does 
recognise that one cannot talk a problem through with oneself, yet she does not 
recognise friendship as a similar response to care.  Instead, she distinguishes the act of 
talking things through as a form of caregiving from actual friendship.  This may be the 
case with a therapist with whom one talks about one’s problems. However, in friendship 
one does not stop being a friend and become a carer to meet a certain need, such as 
talking through a problem, and then go back to being a friend when the need has passed.  
If one is a true friend, one meets the needs of the friend because she becomes a part of 
oneself, to the extent that the harms she suffers provokes one’s own suffering, rather 
than because of an abstract appeal to an ‘ethic of care’.  A friend in an Aristotelian sense 
also goes beyond meeting basic needs and has concern for the flourishing of her friend. A 
parent, for example, should be concerned with not only the basic needs of his child such 
as providing nutrition, health and shelter, but also with the child’s character formation 
and moral development. This understanding of friendship thus provides a motivation for 
acting to meet a need.   
In Bubeck’s argument the agent’s motivation for action is appeal to an abstract ethic of 
care, that it is one’s duty to give care, and this may or may not coincide with an intimate 
relationship of love or friendship. The agent does not appeal to love or friendship but 
rather what the ethic of care tells him he should do. Bubeck thus attempts to universalise 
norms and rules of care.  Yet, if we do not distinguish between acts of care and other acts, 
we can see that a similar disposition or virtue of character is required of a friend, a carer 
or a therapist which is then applied and acted on in different ways according to the social 
context. Furthermore, if we develop and encourage certain characteristics which are 
105 
 
empathetic, open and responsive to need and which are generous and open-handed as 
well as just, then these good characteristics can be applied beyond the intimate relations 
in which they are fostered to situations with strangers and other citizens; which is 
certainly the aim of, at least some, care ethicists. 
Bubeck’s definition of care refers to basic human needs but I maintain that friendship and 
love are basic human needs because we are naturally social animals.  What Bubeck seems 
to mean, with this conception of need, are more physical and material needs such as 
nutrition, the provision of mobility, the administering of medicines, and perhaps the 
provision of mental stimulation such as music, conversation etc. which an elderly person 
or a young child might not be able to obtain for themselves through friendship or 
socialising.  These are the sorts of needs which can be met by professional carers when 
one does not have family members or friends to provide them. They are also the sorts of 
needs which characterise someone who is in a long term state of dependency. However, 
dependency is not an all or nothing state of being – we are not either dependent or 
independent consistently for periods of time.  For example, we may become temporarily 
ill and only be able to do certain things for ourselves or we may become emotionally 
needy through loss or when things do not go well in our lives. In these situations we often 
need friends or family to sustain us, to reason with us and to listen to us. We may also be 
dependent on someone for only one thing.   
The point is we are not only dependent when we cannot do basic tasks for ourselves; 
dependency can be understood in a much more nuanced way. The specialisation of care 
as something only certain people with certain material or physical needs require, also 
seems to continue the ‘Othering’ of dependency. We all may encounter dependency 
intermittently on a daily basis but the degree to which we experience dependency will no 
doubt vary throughout our lives and from person to person.  Bubeck rightly points out  
that throughout the lives of all human beings there are times when we do 
need others to care for us in various ways, especially at the beginning and end 
of our lives, but also whenever we are faced with needs that we cannot 
possibly meet ourselves (Bubeck 2002, 165).   
Therefore, at times she does recognise that dependency is not a special case for certain 
persons but something which is experienced universally, if in different ways.  However, 
Bubeck argues that care has been mystified in so many ways so that even many women 
believe that those they provide care to could not do certain things without their care, 
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when in fact they could. So in the case of a wife cooking her husband’s dinner, assuming 
he is able-bodied he would be able to do this for himself.  However, Bubeck argues that a 
woman may confuse her act of love, or the service she provides, for care because she 
thinks her husband would not eat properly if she did not cook for him.  Bubeck thus 
delineates care from other activities in order to firmly situate it in the realm of socially 
necessary labour.  With Bubeck’s definition, one can then supposedly distinguish between 
care and a service or act of love by whether it meets a certain type of need, rather than 
judging by the activity itself.  Hence cooking a meal for someone who is disabled in such a 
way that they are incapable of cooking a meal for themselves is understood as care, as 
distinguished from a wife cooking her able-bodied husband a meal because she sees that 
as part of her role as a loving wife.   
Bubeck’s intent is obvious and admirable; that women can only be liberated from 
subservient roles when socially necessary labour is distinguished from acts of love and 
kindness and perhaps even remunerated. However, while this delineation provides a 
critical tool against confusing care with subservience it also confines caregiving to acts 
that simply meet the needs of those who cannot act for themselves or, in other words, 
those who are entirely dependent. In doing so it rules out the idea of caregiving as 
something which we might do for anyone, regardless of their need, out of a caring 
disposition. In order to deal with this problem but maintain Bubeck’s goal of separating 
care from subservience, it might be more useful to distinguish between different reasons 
for action rather than the types of actions themselves. Instead of appealing to an abstract 
ethic of care, we should appeal to practical reason. Why do we act in such a way for this 
person? What are their needs and what are our needs? What motivates us? Do we guide 
our emotions with reason or has our reason been clouded by our desire to please? 
Bubeck goes on to argue that we need an ethics of justice as well as an ethics of care – in 
other words, a just distribution of the burden of care. In doing so she seeks to bring care 
to a more abstract level and distribute it as a responsibility of everyone. Unlike other care 
ethics feminists, she rejects the over-personalisation of care – that the paradigm case is 
an intimate relationship – because she believes this is an over-sentimentalised view which 
mythologises the mother or caregiver. She argues that private caregiving must be 
supplemented with a gender-neutral public ‘caring service’ in order to provide a just 
distribution of care to all individuals that need it; though she does not reject private 
107 
 
caregiving altogether perhaps because she recognises that love and friendship do often 
coincide with care. Bubeck contends that the ethics of care alone is morally incomplete 
because it does not solve the ‘exploitation dilemma’.  Thus, in order to shield caregivers 
from exploitation, she believes we need to endorse an independent but complementary 
ethic of justice.   
Diana T. Meyers, on the other hand, argues that though considerations of justice are 
important in an ethic of care, it is feasible to advocate a ‘caring service’ on the basis of an 
ethic of care alone.  For example, one might act on one’s own caring principles (or a 
citizens obligation to care), as someone who is not overburdened with caring 
responsibilities, by lobbying the government to create such a caring service in order to 
help those women who are exploited as caregivers (Meyers 1998, 248).  In other words, 
one may seek to care for carers.  She argues that, since Bubeck states that the ethic of 
care is not confined to intimate relations, there would be no obstacle to a citizen acting in 
such a way.  A caring service might assist families, usually female family members, who 
provide full-time care to a dependent family member thus relieving some of the burden 
that full-time caring places on women and others who give care. This, however, would not 
be going far enough for Bubeck who sees care labour as the responsibility of all and not 
just caring citizens. However, both Meyers and Bubeck seem to be guilty of what Gilligan 
objects to in her critique of abstract reasoning; that it attempts to appeal to universal 
principles and misses the particularity that attention to experiences gives us.  They both 
argue for a morality based on an abstract ethic of care, which parallels liberalism’s 
abstract ethic of justice.  The idea that we act on a set of caring principles which we can 
apply in any situation where there is need, neglects the need to give care in the right way.  
How a doctor gives care, and why she does, is different to why and how a parent gives 
care.  Even how a parent gives care differs from how a friend would give care to another 
friend.  Though care is particular it is also something we owe to everyone, and thus it 
seems to also be a matter for justice, but that does not mean it is something abstract. In 
fact, though we give care in different ways and for different reasons, we may still embody 
the same sorts of characteristics in each situation; characteristics like empathy, 
responsiveness to need, trust and sensitivity. Moreover, having fostered these 




In defining care ethics as a set of abstract principles, as Bubeck tries to do, it becomes 
difficult to see how it can contribute to a better understanding of what a good family is or 
how wider society can be reoriented towards valuing care and the various characteristics 
which can be embodied in caregiving. Even if it results in society valuing caring labour, 
even remunerating it, nevertheless it fences off caregiving as another form of labour 
which does not require an emotional attachment and does not encourage caring 
characteristics outside of the activity of caring labour. If care becomes a formal obligation 
and the necessary virtues of caregiving are not fostered, then it is likely many people will 
become resentful of the obligation and good caregiving will not result. Furthermore, a 
universal caring service depersonalises care which can only have a damaging effect on 
family life, participation in which is a deeply personal experience. The strength of the care 
ethics approach is that its attention to particularity allows a nuanced understanding of 
different caring situations. Because all families are different, they have to respond to 
need and dependency in different ways. Thus the ethics of care helps us to analyse the 
problems and tensions in family life and work out how to avoid exploitation of carers, or 
the meeting of one person’s needs at the expense of another’s. Bubeck’s version of care 
ethics, while drawing attention to exploitation, loses the attention to particularity which 
is the strength of care ethics.  
A further, and final, problem Meyers identifies with Bubeck’s thesis is her narrow 
definition of care and broad definition of justice (1998, 249).  With her narrow definition 
of care, Bubeck confines the dilemma of exploitation to only a small group of unpaid 
caregivers who are mothers of very young children or daughters or partners of seriously 
ill or disabled adults.  With her broad definition of justice, if a carer is treated unjustly, 
including exploitation, this does not necessarily entail being harmed (though this depends 
on how one defines harm).  Her approach ignores the problem that Eva Feder Kittay 
points to when she says that all caregivers are vulnerable to exploitation:  
Because of the special demands of caregiving and because of the traditional 
assignment of this work to women or servants, dependency workers are more 
subject to exploitation than most. When paid, dependency work is rarely well 
paid. When done by family members, it is, as a rule, unpaid (Kittay 2002, 260).   
This potential for exploitation, Kittay argues, is relevant for all kinds of social care 
including childcare; not just the care of the sick, elderly and disabled and not just the care 
of mothers for young children.  She defines care in a much more multifaceted way than 
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Bubeck.  Arguably, Kittay provides a more nuanced view of care ethics which has greater 
implications for our understanding of family life, perhaps because of her particular 
perspective as a mother of a child with a severe cognitive disability. 
 
5.5 Care ethics as a practical particularistic ethics 
For Kittay, care ‘is a labour, an attitude, and a virtue’ (2002, 259).  As a labour it is 
attending to someone who is in a condition of need. As an attitude, caring is a positive 
affective bond which requires investment in another’s wellbeing.  One can do the labour 
without the attitude according to Bubeck’s thesis but Kittay argues that one cannot give 
good care without a caring attitude or ‘positive affective bond and investment in 
another’s wellbeing’ (Kittay 2002, 259). This argument begins to address the problem 
identified earlier that while it may be the case that an individual act of caring does not 
require an emotional bond, without attachment between the giver and receiver of care 
over time, bad caregiving may result. What the caring attitude provides is an open 
responsiveness to another which allows the carer to understand the cared-for’s needs, 
thus, Kittay argues, it is essential to performing the labour of caregiving.  She also claims 
that we must not only advocate for the needy, sick and otherwise disabled but we must 
also advocate for their carers who are similarly in a vulnerable position.  To not do so is, 
according to Kittay, unjust and uncaring.  While the cared-for may be totally dependent 
on the carer, the carer may also be vulnerable; to those in whose interest it is to have the 
needy person cared for, and to the actions of the cared-for.  In terms of the family, 
feminists have long argued that women have been exploited as caregivers because it is in 
the interests of men to have their children cared for by the children’s mothers enabling 
men to continue to pursue other projects in public life.   
Equally, however, the cared-for are often in a position where they too can be exploited by 
the carer.  The more severe their need the more vulnerable they are to exploitation.  A 
great deal of trust is bestowed on the carer that she will not abuse her power over the 
cared-for.  The greater the lack of voice the dependent has, the more opportunity there is 
to violate that trust.  Again, with regards to the family, children are in a particularly 
vulnerable position when parents have absolute authority over their children and children 
have no independent voice of their own, particularly young children. However, if some 
kind of emotional bond forms between the carer and the dependent, Kittay argues, then 
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it is more likely that the carer will meet the moral obligation to provide for the 
dependent’s needs, ‘The caregiver who has cultivated the virtue of care comes to view 
the interest of the charge as part of her own wellbeing’ (Kittay 2002, 261). A model of 
parental care that focussed purely on the basic needs of the child, through appeal to an 
abstract set of norms and rules of caregiving, does not seem like an ideal model of 
parenting. Nor can we assume that parents and other family members automatically have 
the necessary dispositions to give good care to children and other dependents, simply 
because they love each other. When we remember the care given to us by our parents 
when we were children, it is not being fed and clothed and provided with shelter that we 
remember as caregiving (though obviously this is essential for our growth and health); it is 
rather the attention paid to us when we hurt ourselves, when we suffer with grief, and 
the sharing of that pain with our parents that we remember as caring. Furthermore, 
developing the capacity to care for other human beings begins with the particular 
relationships which children first encounter. As Noddings argues ‘how good I can be 
depends at least in part on how you treat me’ (2002, 210). Evidently caregiving is other-
directed and so the virtuous carer is not accommodated in the liberal picture of the 
rationally self-interested actor.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter began with the work of Carol Gilligan and her claim that what moral 
psychologists consider to be normal moral development is in fact how boys generally 
develop, and that girls are not morally inferior or less well developed but often develop 
differently. For Gilligan, while boys develop through a process of separation, girls develop 
relationally and see themselves as embedded in particular relationships. While Gilligan 
sees care and justice as different approaches to reasoning through moral problems, she 
does recognise the need for both justice and care in a mature moral standpoint.  
This chapter then went on to explore what place the concept of justice has in the care 
ethics approach. It turns out the answer to this question is not straightforward. For some, 
like Held, both justice and care are important but care should take priority over concerns 
about justice. For others, like Noddings, care ethics is an alternative perspective to justice 
reasoning and universalisability ought to be rejected ‘except in the universal accessibility 
of the caring attitude’ (Card 1990, 101). Alternatively, Flanagan and Jackson argued that 
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the demands of care and the demands of justice might require different dispositions but 
that most people endorse one or the other perspective according to their own 
preference, rather than their gender. They also posed the possibility that people can 
switch between perspectives depending on what the situation called for. The suggestion 
is that one cannot simultaneously endorse the claims of justice and the claims of care but 
must choose between them. An Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective however is capable 
of responding to the claims of both. How it is able to do so is explored in the next chapter.  
The remainder of this chapter then looked at two different ways in which care ethics has 
been taken by different theorists. One approach, as endorsed by Diemut Bubeck, is to 
universalise the norms and rules of care, to reason from abstract principles that all 
members of a society have a duty to care. Bubeck also argues, however, that an ethic of 
care needs a complementary ethic of justice in order to produce a just distribution of care 
through a universal caring service. The foundation of Bubeck’s argument is to 
differentiate care as a duty or labour from other ‘services’ we might provide to loved ones 
or friends. The second approach, as endorsed by Kittay, sees care ethics as a practical 
particularistic ethics. For Kittay care is a labour, attitude and a virtue. One needs the 
attitude in order to be motivated to carry out the labour, and the virtue to carry it out 
well. Kittay recognises the potential for exploitation in both the giver and the receiver of 
care. As such, the institutions we design must be sensitive to both kinds of exploitation.  
Despite the range of debates taking place within care ethics, this relatively new 
development in feminist thought and moral theory provides some interesting insights. 
Because moral development begins when we are children who are raised within families, 
how we parent and how we socialise children will clearly effect their development into 
adults who can reason for themselves. Care ethics seems to complement virtue ethics in 
that it adds to the list of classical virtues of independence, a set of virtues required for us 
to be caring persons who are embedded in complex networks of particular relationships.  
At the end of the liberalism chapter I argued that the continued good functioning of the 
family is not just important for the sake of enabling children to become adults who can 
pursue their own individual interests. Feminist care ethics, with its mosaic of insights, 
demonstrates how human beings are interconnected and socially constituted. This is 
compatible with my Aristotelian claim that the common good, of a community of practice 
or a community of locality, constitutes and informs our own individual good, rather than 
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being the simple aggregation of individual interests. Care ethics also recognises our 
inherent vulnerability and our dependence on others to become the kinds of human 
beings who are able to reason about moral dilemmas. The next chapter considers how 
contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics can be synthesised with care ethics to provide the 
foundations for an account of what constitutes familial flourishing.   
113 
 




Both care ethics and virtue ethics have been strongly critical of contemporary liberal 
thinking, such as rights-based theories and abstract universalism, and, in particular, the 
focus on the individual at the expense of relationships and community. In this chapter I 
will be arguing that, although care ethics has done much to draw attention to the facts of 
dependency and human vulnerability, as well as criticise traditional liberal theory for its 
ignorance and denigration of care and dependency, it still often embeds itself within that 
very same liberal tradition. I propose instead that the resources of the tradition of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics are much more fruitful for care ethics to engage with. The 
general purpose of the chapter is therefore, to ascertain how, if at all, the insights of care 
ethics into family life can be integrated with Aristotelian virtue ethics in order to further 
develop an account of what constitutes a flourishing family life.   
While it is clear that Aristotle is no feminist ally, there does seem to be a great deal in 
Aristotelian thought which is compatible with feminist care ethics. An account of 
caregiving is missing from Aristotle’s work because he only recognised dependency as 
something belonging to others, in particular those whose experiences he gave little 
weight to such as women, slaves, servants and those engaged in productive labour 
(MacIntyre 1999, 6), rather than something which all human beings encounter. 
Furthermore, Aristotle’s conception of masculine virtue acts as a barrier to the 
acknowledgment of the facts of human dependence. The magnanimous man, who is ‘a 
paragon of the virtues, dislikes any recognition of his need for aid from and consolation 
by others’ (MacIntyre 1999, 7). Shared suffering must be avoided, according to Aristotle, 
because we should not want to see our friends in pain. In the Nicomachean Ethics he 
argues, ‘we should call on our friends for help most of all when they are in a position to 
do us great service at the cost of little disturbance to themselves’ (NE IX 1171b 19-20). Yet 
caregiving usually requires a great deal of disturbance to the caregiver and seems to 
require the caregiver to share at least some of the cared-for’s pain in order to attend to 
their needs adequately. This chapter will discuss whether care is a virtue, a feeling or an 
action. In order to provide an answer to this question, the work of other contemporary 
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Aristotelians, as well as feminist theorists of care ethics who have carried out a sustained 
and fruitful dialogue with virtue ethics, will be drawn on. In essence, I will argue that 
caregiving or ‘caring for’ is an activity and ‘caring about’ is a passion or capacity, which 
can be rationally and empathetically directed towards good caregiving through the 
exercise of particular virtues. 
 
6.2 On what grounds is Aristotelian virtue ethics compatible with 
care ethics? 
Aristotle praises beneficence or generosity towards significant others, though he is critical 
of sharing one’s pain with one’s friends. As Alasdair MacIntyre points out:  
We are able to draw upon Aristotelianism to characterize the kind of 
friendship that we need, but we need more than Aristotle himself provides, 
because of Aristotle’s reluctance to admit the extent to which our need for 
friendship is bound up with the sharing of our vulnerability and our wounds 
(MacIntyre 1999, 164).  
Thus while Aristotle downplays the universal significance of dependency, his approach to 
ethics is grounded in the kind of anthropology that is uniquely suited to discuss issues of 
taking care of each other’s bodies. Ethics is linked to our embodiment such that we 
cannot talk about ‘good’ or ‘bad’ action except in relation to our ability to live a particular 
kind of animal life—that is one of passions/emotions and bodily infirmity. Human beings 
are a certain kind of animal, which is admissible because we are our bodies, ‘whose 
movements afford expression to intentions and purposes  . . .  [and] cannot be adequately 
understood except in terms of the social contexts in which it engages with others and 
others with it’ (MacIntyre 2006b, 86). This recognition of our animality provides an 
anthropological grounding for an Aristotelian ethics which is compatible with many of the 
claims of feminist care ethics.  
Firstly, from the standpoint of Aristotelian virtue ethics, the good of the family cannot 
simply be a private concern but rather is an issue for the whole of society, even those 
who do not have families. For Aristotle, it is important that family life prepares children to 
be citizens of the polis who participate in public political life. What is most valuable about 
family life then is the making and sustaining of highly particular relationships and through 
these relationships cultivating good character and a common conception of the good. 
Moreover, the family is where one begins to learn how to reason independently and to 
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stand back from one’s desires so as to order them towards the good. Secondly, from the 
standpoint of care ethics, what is central to a good family is the proper care and 
avoidance of exploitation of dependents including children, the elderly, and the otherwise 
disabled; because we all encounter dependency throughout our lives and because when 
we are dependent we cannot act self-sufficiently. Furthermore, we should also be 
concerned with caregivers themselves because they too are dependent either on other 
family members for financial and emotional support, or on the state for welfare. Thus the 
cultivation of a more caring society, rather than an individualistic rights-based society, 
might be a starting point for Western citizens to learn to share common goods and 
participate in ongoing relationships with each other, and this might best be achieved 
through helping to cultivate families that function well.  
A caring attitude is also necessary to provide the foundations for developing a bond 
between citizens – what we might call civic friendship, a concept more fully developed by 
Schwarzenbach (2009), where the good of our fellow citizens is understood as a part of 
our own good and the common goods of a community. Empathy and compassion are 
often called for when tensions are high between different social or cultural groups within 
a society. The concept of care and its associated virtues should not, therefore, be 
considered as a special case relevant only to those individuals who find themselves 
responsible for a dependent other. Cultivation of caring virtues such as charity, patience, 
generosity, and friendship is necessary for human flourishing because we do not always 
know when, and for whom, we may be called upon to give care. It may be a family 
member or it may be a stranger and both will require different kinds of responses. 
However, while others have also argued that care ethics can be seen as a form of virtue 
ethics,18 many others have argued that the two are incompatible. Held states that, ‘The 
ethics of care is sometimes seen as a potential moral theory to be substituted for such 
dominant moral theories as Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, or Aristotelian virtue ethics’ and 
‘is sometimes seen as a form of virtue ethics’ (2005, 9). However, she concludes that 
many who write on care ethics conceive of care as of equal conceptual importance to 
justice, rights and utility or preference satisfaction, seeking to integrate, and sometimes 
reconceptualise, these other aspects of moral theory with care ethics.  Michael Slote, on 
the other hand, believes that care ethics does not currently provide a total and systematic 
                                                          




account of morality, which it needs to do because of its deep inconsistencies ‘with 
traditional and, especially, rationalist/liberal views about ethics’ (2010, 5). Yet he also has 
reservations about the compatibility of care ethics with what he calls ‘neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethics’. Slote claims that many care ethicists object to virtue ethics on the grounds 
that it sees moral value as residing in individual traits or virtues rather than in 
relationships (2007, 86).  
Yet this objection to virtue ethics seems contentious. The Aristotelian tradition of virtue 
ethics sees relationships with others as essential to fostering and exercising virtues. While 
virtues are attributes or character traits of a human being which are not reducible to their 
actualisation, a human being is not born virtuous. Everyone has the potentiality to 
become virtuous but only by repetition of virtuous activity until one is habituated to that 
activity. A potentiality that is not fostered and exercised is of little moral value. However, 
we must also be more specific about what we mean by ‘moral value’.  If we mean 
something which contributes to the flourishing life, then there is moral value in friendship 
(philia), which Aristotle applies to the parent-child relationship as well as relations 
between citizens.  According to Aristotle happiness or flourishing consists in activity, thus 
if one is unconscious all of the time one cannot flourish.19 Moreover, activity is difficult 
for one who does not have friends: ‘for an isolated person life is difficult, for being 
continuously active is not easy by oneself, but is easier in the company of people different 
from oneself, and in relation to others’ (NE IX 1170a5-7). Therefore, it is through activity 
in different kinds of friendship with others that one finds fulfilment. Moral value, in the 
sense which Slote seems to mean, is certainly found in human relationships for virtue 
ethics, because relationships are constitutive of a good life, not simply a means to some 
further end. 
 
6.3 Caregiving as an activity; ‘caring about’ as a motivation to act 
In this section, I argue that care is an activity, not a virtue, and moreover that care qua 
activity is distinct from caring about someone. Caring about someone may provide the 
motivation for caregiving activity or it may provide the motivation for some other kind of 
activity such as providing economically for the cared-for. For the purposes of this thesis, I 
                                                          
19 Even contemplation, rational thinking and co-operative deliberation are forms of activity in 
Aristotelian thought so physical incapacity does not necessarily bar us from flourishing. 
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am only concerned with caring for and about other people as opposed to caring about 
non-human animals, a particular issue (such as climate change) or an inanimate object 
(such as a much-loved vintage car). Nonetheless, some of what I say may have application 
to non-human animals and social issues which concern the wellbeing of humans and 
other animals. 
Maureen Sander-Staudt claims that a gender-sensitive distinction must be made between 
the specific activity of caregiving and other forms of virtuous activity which result from 
‘caring about’ someone because ‘Typically, male virtue is associated with care as a 
motivation, or “caring about”, while female virtue is associated with caring completion, or 
“caring for”’(Sander-Staudt 2006, 23–24). This is so because women traditionally tend to 
do the actual labour of caregiving whereas men’s ‘caring about’ attitude, perhaps as a 
father, can result in an array of different activities which usually does not include hands-
on physical caregiving. Consequently, this discussion will presuppose caregiving as an 
activity that entails hands-on care of the kind which supports someone, who is dependent 
in some capacity, to achieve ends which they would not otherwise be able to achieve on 
their own. Caregiving includes but is not limited to activities such as feeding, bathing, 
clothing, administering medicines, aiding movement, et cetera.  Recognising this gender-
sensitive distinction between caregiving activity and caring about someone is an 
important step for feminists who seek to reconfigure gender-based understandings of 
care. One might argue that this tension can be resolved by stipulating that practical 
activity is a necessary dimension of caregiving but, as Sander-Staudt notes, this does not 
remedy the problem ‘since the motive of care can support practices other than caring for 
actual people in a hands-on way’ (Sander-Staudt 2006, 24). Thus caring about someone 
can be embodied in practical actions other than physical caregiving. 
While Sander-Staudt makes an important point about gender differences she is mistaken 
in defining care as a virtue. She points to Raja Halwani and Margaret McLaren’s claim that 
‘care as a virtue should be defined as both a motive and a practical competence’ (2006, 
23), to support her definition of care as a virtue, in that it provides one with the right 
intent, but also requires competency and completion in the practice of care. Sander-
Staudt’s problem with Halwani and MacLaren’s claim, however, is that it is gender-neutral 
and does not recognise the tension stated above. But this description of care as a virtue is 
to misunderstand what a virtue is. Practical competence is an assessment of skill, not 
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virtue, and virtues cannot be reduced to skills. Skills may be directed towards good or bad 
ends, virtues cannot. But is that actually true of virtue? Can it not be the case that one 
can be a courageous terrorist or prudent for the sake of looking after number one in a 
ruthless way, as Rosalind Hursthouse puts it? She responds by arguing 
I know that ‘courageous’ and ‘prudent’ have this use in ordinary language and 
it would be foolish to say that it is wrong. But . . .  when used in this way (and 
in such turns of phrase as ‘too honest’, and ‘generous to a fault’), the terms of 
the virtues are not operating as virtue terms—not picking out character traits 
that make their possessor good and issue in good conduct (Hursthouse 2002, 
43).  
MacIntyre makes a similar distinction, this time between virtues, skills and neutral 
powers: 
Virtues differ from both skills and from character traits, such as reliability and 
perseverance, precisely in that they are habits directed towards goods. They 
are not neutral powers, equally available for the pursuit of either good or bad 
ends (MacIntyre 2007, 153).  
Remember that the virtues, for Aristotle, are the mean between extremes of passions. 
Someone who is too honest has gone too far to one extreme and does not hit the mean. 
Someone who is prudent in a ruthless way is miserly and cruel and thus also misses the 
mean. This is not using virtue for bad ends but missing virtue completely as Hursthouse 
demonstrates. One may exercise a skill or capacity well, however, for selfish or 
destructive ends. It is only when directed by virtue that skills or capacities become 
morally good. One liberal concept, discussed in chapter 3, which might be considered a 
neutral power, is that of autonomy or of having partial authorship over one’s own life. For 
Raz, autonomy is an intrinsic good which ought to be pursued for its own sake and 
guaranteed by the state. However, once someone has the power of autonomy, they may 
use that power for good or bad ends. If the autonomous person is not guided by practical 
reason and does not have ends which are worth pursuing then autonomy may be of little 
use to her. Thus the capacity for autonomy can be seen as a neutral power which requires 
not only that acceptable options are available, but also that one is able to reason well 
about one’s good. For this, one requires the virtues of independent practical reasoning 
(MacIntyre 1999). 
The activity of caregiving also requires caring skills and the capacity to care about others. 
It might seem counterintuitive to suggest that caregiving skills or the capacity to care 
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about someone are neutral powers and can be destructive. However, a caregiver might 
be incompetent in the activity, she might care about the wrong person or she might let 
her caregiving consume her. In order for a caregiver not to become consumed by her 
caregiving activity, such that she seems to live for the cared-for person, she needs to 
remain the partial author of her own life. The caregiver cannot achieve this power 
independently, however. She also needs to have the opportunity to access a range of 
acceptable options. Thus caregiving should not entail that she give up all of her projects 
that made her life worthwhile and some of these projects might still be made accessible 
to her through help with her caregiving. A caregiver who is not living for the cared-for 
person is also more likely to be able to give care well, as long as she is able to reason well 
about how her own good is partly constituted by common goods.  
The motivation for learning and practicing the skills, required of the activity of caregiving, 
may also not be good. For instance, I may give care simply to look good or to receive the 
rewards of praise or money and as such I may not give care in the right way or at the right 
time or I may abandon my charge when it suits me. Even if one has the right motivation, 
one may still not have the requisite virtues to carry out the activity of caregiving well. 
Nevertheless, having the right motivation for action is a better place to begin cultivating 
the virtues than being motivated by external goods of money or social standing. This does 
not mean that care, when it is remunerated, should not be more highly valued by society 
and better remunerated. The motivation for doing so would not be to attract better 
caregivers to the profession but rather because caregiving requires extensive resources, 
consumes the caregiver’s energy and can be damaging to the caregiver’s health. As such, 
the caregiver ought to have good working conditions, substantial time off, a pension and 
a living wage. This would only be to give the caregiver what she deserves, on an 
Aristotelian conception of justice, in that, as MacIntyre states, ‘To deserve well is to have 
contributed in some substantial way to the achievement of those goods, the sharing of 
which and the common pursuit of which provide foundations for human community' 
(MacIntyre 1985, 202). However, if a caregiver is skilled but lacks the virtues or the right 
motivation, then the caregiver may begin to abuse her position of power.20  
                                                          
20 Caregiving is uniquely susceptible to abuse – from elder care (see Roger Clough, The Abuse of 
Care in Residential Institutions (1996)), to care of the young  (see Mike Stein ‘Missing Years of 
Abuse in Children’s Homes’ (2006)). 
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Perhaps this contrast – between the specific activity (or labour) of caregiving and other 
activities that may be a response to caring about someone – is too sharp. A caregiver 
might not only tend to the particular bodily needs of a human being dependent on their 
care, but might also help her in other particular ways such as arranging her finances or 
acting courageously when she is in danger. However, if we distinguish between the 
activity of caregiving, which requires certain skills, and the motivation for action, which is 
caring about someone, we can still recognise the gendered tension brought out by 
Sander-Staudt without calling care a virtue. Harry Frankfurt argues that caring about 
something is not within the scope of ethics but instead ‘is constituted by a complex set of 
cognitive, affective and volitional dispositions and states’ (1982, 262). Furthermore, he 
claims, the fact that someone cares about something, rather than simply desires it or 
believes in it, demonstrates a steadiness and persistence which is distinguishable from 
mere impulse. Caring guides or directs the actions of the one caring. However, as it is an 
affective state it is also not a virtue. This does not mean it is beyond the concerns of 
ethics as Frankfurt claims but rather that it does not constitute an ethical decision or 
action, nor is it the result of ethical thinking or activity. As Frankfurt also points out, a 
person may not be able to help who or what he cares about.  
What is required to complete the link between what moves us (caring about someone or 
human beings in general) and doing care well (caring for someone), is the virtues. To put 
this in more Aristotelian terms, caring about a particular other’s flourishing provides the 
end for the sake of which one acts as a caregiver. One is able to pursue and achieve that 
end insofar as one has the requisite virtues. For instance, if I as a caregiver am not patient 
with my mother who has dementia then I may become frustrated and angry with her. 
Such a response will obviously not help me to look after her wellbeing and will adversely 
affect my ability to cope with the situation thus damaging my own and her wellbeing. This 
response does not mean that I do not care about my mother or that I lack caregiving skills 
but it does mean I am not in command of my character. Of course it is common to feel 
frustrated and angry, particularly if one does not recognise the person one is caring for 
anymore, but this must not regularly manifest itself in one’s caregiving actions. Instead, 
virtue must be habituated in order to do care well. This is not just for the sake of the one 
cared for but also for the one caring. If I am angry all of the time and let this emotion 
control me or if I fail to take good care of the person I care about, then I cannot flourish 
either. Thus caregiving—as an activity conducive to human flourishing—cannot be 
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achieved without the possession of the virtues, which moderate our passions in such a 
way that we are able to overcome the emotional difficulties that caregiving (as a 
distinctive activity) necessarily entails.  
Care itself is thus not a virtue as Halwani (2003) and Michael Slote (2007), among others, 
argue it is. I may care about someone but if I have not cultivated the virtues—if I am not 
in control of my character, directing it towards good ends—I may not know how to act to 
help that someone when they are in need. Clearly there is also an important distinction to 
be made between the skills and the virtues of caregiving. One may not know how to 
deliver care and that is one kind of problem (of skill). But, in addition to that kind of 
knowledge, one needs to have acquired the kind of good habits necessary to deliver care 
in the face of the affective difficulties inherent in caregiving. 
Not all caring relations are intrinsically good either. I may care about the wrong person; 
someone who hurts me or has no interest in my wellbeing (for example, someone who is 
using me as a means to their own ends).  Furthermore, my caring attitude, or capacity to 
care, does not necessarily lead to the activity of good caregiving. I may, for instance, 
smother the one I care about with too much affection or be overly generous to the point 
of hindering her wellbeing, as with, for example, a parent who attends to all of her child’s 
wants and whims. I may even come across as patronising by not recognising the cared-
for’s abilities and capacities.  At the other extreme, in caring about someone, I may think 
that the best course of action is to do nothing because I may believe that the one I care 
about needs to help herself—become self-sufficient. Such a course of action may or may 
not have good outcomes depending on the context. If the one I care about is disabled, to 
the point of not being able to do day-to-day activities for herself, then actively leaving her 
with no care, in the belief that she needs to help herself, would damage her wellbeing. 
Thus the regulation of the passions in accordance with reason should properly direct 
one’s ‘caring about’. It seems likely that the misdirection of our affections, such as the 
love an abused person has for the abuser, is itself related to non-voluntary habits that 
need to be brought under the direction of reason. It also seems plausible to argue that we 
sometimes need the direction of another’s reason in order to see how our non-voluntary 
habits are misdirecting our passions. Re-directing and restraining one’s love or affection 
through reason from the standpoint of an abused person or from the standpoint of a 
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doting parent is of course not an easy thing to do hence it may be necessary to deliberate 
with others who have a different perspective on the relationship. 
Caring about someone is, therefore, not virtuous on its own because the activity that the 
caring about results in also needs to be good. However, care theorists might object that 
the range of virtues do not do the moral work which the concept of care alone can do—in 
other words care itself should be classed as a virtue—and as such theorists like Held and 
Slote make care central to their ethical approach. For them, and others, the virtues are all 
just part of the bigger story; they derive from care or they do not encapsulate all that the 
concept of ‘care’ does. But this is exactly the point; a virtuous person might be motivated 
to act by caring about the wellbeing of her daughter, her family or her community and 
sees her own good as inextricably linked to the common goods she shares with them.  As 
such, the good person has cultivated a range of virtues which allow her to act practically 
in the achievement of these goods. She is able to do the right thing, in the right way, for 
the right person at the right time. The concept of care thus works with the virtues, is 
directed by the virtues but is not in itself a virtue. 
The mark of a virtue, according to MacIntyre, is ‘a disposition to act in accordance with 
the judgments of reason, that is to act so as to achieve that immediate end or good which 
in this or that situation is ordered to our ultimate good’ (2007, 153). Furthermore, a truly 
virtuous person not only acts from a sense of duty but also acts spontaneously. Duty and 
spontaneity are not incompatible. Instead, MacIntyre argues, we act out of duty for the 
sake of another and we do so ‘at our best, spontaneously’ (2007, 158). Passion and 
reason are then not mutually opposed but rather complementary. Our passions and 
dispositions need training and,  
of themselves they never provide us with a sufficient reason for action. We 
have to become the kinds of agents whose desires are disciplined and 
ordered, so that we are directed towards our good and take pleasure in 
performing those types of actions that have as their end that good (2007, 
151). 
The use of practical reason is required in order to discipline the passions and so be able to 
order them towards what is truly good; that which is in accordance with reason. 
According to Rosalind Hursthouse ‘Having a virtue . . .  includes having certain motivations 
or reasons for one’s actions’ (Hursthouse 2002, 48). Thus the person who has the virtue 
of compassion is ‘moved by the suffering of others’ and treats their suffering as ‘a reason 
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for acting and not acting in certain ways’ (2002, 48). The compassionate person is not 
limited to acting only for those she is intimately connected to and cares about but is also 
able to care for the stranger in need. How the virtuous person acts depends on what is 
called for in a particular situation. Deciding how to act and being able to give justifiable 
reasons requires practical reasoning. Rationality in this sense is not some overly-
intellectualised, higher state of being where one abstracts oneself from the particular 
situation and appeals to some set of universalistic rules. Nor is it a form of market 
rationality or cost-benefit analysis. Instead, the practically wise person makes choices 
which are informed by affective dispositions and which are directed towards the good 
both here and now and in general, according to reason. The affective state of caring 
about someone may come from being intimately connected to the one in need of care or 
it may come from an aversion to the suffering of another human being (or non-human 
animal). Experiencing such affective states and acting according to reason will likely 
develop virtuous dispositions, such as compassion, which can then be drawn upon in any 
situation involving a human being or non-human animal in need. 
Caring for someone is often rooted in emotion or passion, much like love or sorrow, 
which can be transformed into compassion, patience, generosity and friendliness in terms 
of virtue or descend into jealousy, possessiveness, condescension (in the sense of 
superiority), or even (perhaps unintentional) neglect in terms of vice. Thus what we think 
of as classic virtues are required for completing the activities of care such as feeding, 
bathing, dressing, administering medicine, et cetera. If we are possessive or 
condescending we may bar the one being cared for from learning to do these things for 
themselves either as children or as someone recovering from a serious illness or accident. 
A situation may call for the caring person to act courageously because the one who she 
cares about is in danger or faces a life-threatening illness (each would entail a different 
kind of courage). On the other hand, the situation may call for her to act prudently on 
behalf of the one she cares about because she has financial problems. In another 
situation, when the basic activities of physical caregiving are called for,  we require the 
virtues of kindness, compassion, patience and friendliness among others. Primarily it 
requires the trust of the cared-for, something which may come more naturally and 
spontaneously within the familial context but which has to be earned or proven in other 
social contexts.  
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How is this feeling of caring about someone transformed? For Aristotle the virtues 
depend on practical reasoning, but is the exercise of reason enough to cultivate good 
caregiving? Reason may tell us what to do for our own ends or common ends but what 
about when we are acting for the good of another, particularly if they are unable to tell us 
exactly what they need? I would suggest that we also need to use empathy in a practical 
way. In order to act compassionately and help to alleviate the suffering of another we 
need to be able to feel with the one who is suffering. Understood in this way, empathy 
can be a tool, like reason, which guides our desires. Slote takes a similar approach in 
arguing that ‘empathy is the primary mechanism of caring, benevolence, compassion, 
etc.’ (Slote 2007, 4). Empathy requires us to feel with particular others and to recognise 
their emotions and what they are experiencing. Such a feeling-with seems to be essential 
if we are to act for the sake of, or on behalf of, another person in need. Empathy is closely 
related to sympathy and pity and is often used interchangeably with the former. 
However, I follow Slote in distinguishing sympathy from empathy in that sympathy does 
not require the sharing of another’s perspective in order to understand their happiness or 
suffering. Likewise, MacIntyre tries to show, through an analysis of Edith Stein’s 
phenomenology, how empathy opens us up to understand how others see us and to see 
the world beyond ‘how it appears to me’ (MacIntyre 2006c, 75–87). On the other hand, 
sympathy requires a concern for the wellbeing of another and can, therefore, be 
understood in a similar way as caring about someone, though is perhaps less personal. 
Pity, meanwhile, has developed the connotations of condescension or superiority but 
generally means feeling sorry for. It differs from empathy in that it does not require 
understanding of the suffering of the one who is pitied. Pity can also be easily misplaced if 
one (wrongly) assumes that one’s own situation is better off than the one who is being 
pitied.  
Slote argues that empathy is taught to children by adults in order for them to learn to 
understand how another feels and that they may have responsibility for the pain of the 
other person. This is an essential part of moral education, he argues. Noddings, however, 
adds that ‘Attachment may be a foundation for the learning of empathy’ (Noddings 2010, 
8). In other words, the child may not learn empathy effectively from someone she does 
not love or admire. Furthermore, (as quoted in chapter 1) Mann argues that ‘friends are 
most valuable because they form an important structure in which we learn other-
regarding thought and action, and they also become the enabling conditions for our own 
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acting and doing well, for living virtuously’ (Mann 2012, 198). Thus empathy is not just 
taught to young children but is also continually being learned and expanded through 
friendships in the Aristotelian sense, which includes family members. These friendships 
help us to recognise the perspective of another independently of our own and also to 
understand ourselves better from another’s perspective. This understanding is, for 
Aristotle, essential to flourishing as MacIntyre notes ‘It is by having our reasoning put to 
the question by others, by being called to account for ourselves and our actions by others, 
that we learn how to scrutinize ourselves’ (MacIntyre 1999, 148). Thus true friends are 
more than a comfort to us or a source of pleasure; they also provide the contexts in which 
we learn how to act virtuously.  
Empathy, which can be understood as an affective disposition rather than a virtue, does 
not take priority over the virtues. Empathy can only be cultivated and sustained in a 
virtuous person because a harmony needs to be maintained between the passions and 
reason. Empathy can easily lead to one being consumed by shared pain and suffering. The 
danger here is that the caregiver might be manipulated by the person being cared for 
because the caregiver is unable to bring her empathy under the control of reason with 
the result that neither the caregiver nor the cared for are able to achieve authentic 
human flourishing. Thus reason always needs to operate alongside empathy. 
 
6.4 Cultivating a caring moral character 
The view of the virtues which has so far been expounded in this chapter seemingly places 
all responsibility for the cultivation of moral character on the individual. If that is the case, 
my argument is problematic from a feminist perspective because it places all 
responsibility on the caregiver for becoming a good carer in a world where care work is 
undervalued and hardly recognised for its moral worth. Yet my claim is also that 
caregivers, whether family members or paid carers, need resources to sustain their 
caregiving and also need the support of others. A society which does not support its 
caregivers and caring practices (like the family) cannot expect good virtuous caregiving to 
be everywhere present. Even the most virtuous and caring person would struggle to give 
the best kind of care to someone who was solely dependent on her if she lacked external 
goods and the support of others. Furthermore, individuals who find themselves 
responsible for a dependent other are not solely responsible for cultivating their own 
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caring virtues. What most people know about caregiving activity comes from family life 
and one’s own experience of being cared for.  Developing the capacity to care for other 
human beings begins with the particular relationships which children first encounter.  
However, does this mean that one who is not cared for well, who does not have the 
relevant virtues nurtured by caregiving adults, is not able to become a good caregiving 
adult? Certainly, when children receive poor care it must have an impact on those 
children and their ability to form caring relationships as adults. However, I do not want to 
claim that it is not possible for such children to become caring adults. People, who did not 
begin to cultivate caring virtues as children, are still capable of cultivating virtues in 
adulthood needed for caregiving activity and for responding in the right way when feeling 
affectionate towards someone they care about. What is more, who I am called upon to 
care for may well be different to who cared for me. As MacIntyre argues, the deprivations 
to which caring virtues are the appropriate response ‘are characteristically not only 
deprivations of physical care and intellectual instruction, but also and most of all 
deprivation of the attentive and affectionate regard of others’ (MacIntyre 1999, 122). 
Thus, those who have been deprived of care may also have been deprived of affection 
and love which brings us back to the distinction between caring about someone and 
caregiving activity. If a child’s family has failed her, let her down, neglected her or 
deprived her of affection, that child may be unable to trust and develop bonds with 
others whom she encounters in adult life. Furthermore, she may not see the point in 
caring about others or she may not know what caregiving activity entails. Those who she 
does encounter will have to gain her trust and the virtues of character, in particular those 
which guide both our emotions and our activity in relation to care, will play a big part in 
that.  
Cultivating good character, learning how to care for people in the right way, giving what is 
needed by someone I care for at the right time and ungrudgingly, recognising our own 
enjoyment and satisfaction in giving what is needed and showing appreciation for that (as 
Noddings suggests) all require the education of affections, sympathies and inclinations. 
Furthermore, MacIntyre suggests that we can also cultivate our dispositions to feel as 
well as to act with and from certain feeling (MacIntyre 1999, 122). Even where caregiving 
is good and caregivers actually care about the children they are responsible for, children 
will still learn imperfectly.  
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Raja Halwani, in response to the care ethics criticisms of virtue ethics, referred to at the 
beginning of this chapter, argues that just because the flourishing life is ‘ethically basic’ 
(from this I understand him to mean the telos or final end of human life) it does not give 
the virtuous agent ‘moral licence to violate the claims of others, be these strangers or 
intimates, when the agent’s flourishing is at stake’ (Halwani 2003, 169). As he points out 
(and as illustrated in chapter 1), the virtues are not instrumental to the flourishing life 
which the agent adopts when it suits the agent’s needs. Rather being virtuous means one 
knows what is good and worthwhile and consistently exercises the virtues because that is 
what a flourishing life entails. Exercise of the virtues therefore involves, for example, 
acting courageously when a good is worth fighting for, rather than failing to act because 
one’s own life or interests are at risk. Without exercising the virtues, one cannot claim to 
be living a flourishing life; the virtues are constitutive of such a life.  
 
6.5 Is care ethics problematic for virtue ethics? 
In his analysis of care ethics, in which he focuses on Nel Noddings, Halwani identifies 
certain key characteristics of care ethics which might be problematic for Aristotelian 
virtue ethics. One of these characteristics is what Noddings calls ‘motivational 
displacement’ (1984, 33). This ‘motivational displacement’ means that ‘my motive energy 
flows towards the other and perhaps, although not necessarily, towards his ends’ (1984, 
33).  The shift in one’s motives as the ‘one-caring’ does not entail that one relinquishes 
oneself to the other; on the contrary, Noddings compares such relinquishment of self to 
when parents talk of ‘living-for’ their children. Such relinquishment could mean losing 
oneself. The question that Halwani poses in response to the idea of motivational 
displacement is this:  
Is it sufficient that the goals of the cared-for be believed by her (the cared-for) 
to be good in order for her friend, the one-caring, to promote them? Or 
should the goals be genuinely good? (2003, 165).  
Halwani believes that from a virtue ethics standpoint, the goals must be genuinely good, 
such that it is morally permissible for the one-caring to frustrate the goals of the cared-for 
if they are not conducive to her wellbeing. Thus a certain amount of motivational 
displacement may occur in that the friend, or one-caring, considers the good of their 
friend, or cared-for, to be part of her own good, but if the ends that the cared-for pursues 
are bad or damaging to her wellbeing or the wellbeing of others in some way, then it 
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would not be good for the one-caring to adopt them. Instead, the one-caring ought to try 
to convince the cared-for that this course of action will not lead to a worthwhile good, 
nor is it good in itself. What Halwani argues virtue ethics provides is ‘an ethical scrutiny of 
caring relationships, so that one does not end up caring for another no matter what the 
other’s goals are’ (2003, 166).  
A deficiency of Aristotle’s understanding of character friendship is that he leaves out the 
possibility of friends who are equal in virtue but who are not fully virtuous. This deficiency 
of virtue does not, however, negate the possibility of true friendship. Moreover, those 
who make mistakes, who lack virtue, need good friends to guide them and need to guide 
their friends in turn. In the case of family life, there is a often a bond of unconditionality 
which is stronger depending on the intimacy of the relationship such that when we make 
mistakes the good family will accept our flaws and attempt to guide us back towards the 
good. In doing so they might then be able to correct or at least temper the deficiencies in 
each other’s character. One who does not at least aim at virtue and the exercise of 
practical reasoning will not be able to begin to judge whether this or that end is good in 
itself or worth pursuing for some higher good. Aristotle does, however, recognise that the 
parent-child relationship is a special form of friendship; one which is naturally unequal. 
For example, a parent should encourage their child to pursue worthwhile ends. If the 
child becomes self-destructive as he grows up into an adult, it would be a failure of 
parenting to simply adopt his ends and help him to achieve them. Furthermore, as 
Schwarzenbach argues, while Aristotle appears to assume that there cannot be an equal 
character friendship between parent and child, a case can be made on Aristotelian 
grounds for ‘reciprocal (moral) equality’ being a ‘critical ideal or goal in the best parent-
child relationships, whatever the ages and circumstances, at least today’ and that ‘The 
mother who wishes continued dependency and subordination for her child is hardly 
worthy of the name’ (Schwarzenbach 2009, 47).  
On the other hand, Noddings’ account takes caring for another, no matter what their 
ends are, and adopting those ends oneself, as the basic premise of ethical relationships. 
In raising children, however, it is not just the case that the ends of the child need to be 
genuinely good but also that the parents have a role in shaping those ends and teaching 
children what goods are worth pursuing in themselves, or as a means to some further 
end. If one simply adopts the goals of a child, whatever those goals are, one fails to teach 
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the child how to live well. For example, if a young child’s goals consist in eating as much 
chocolate as possible or acquiring toys and other material goods, then in supporting those 
goals the child will make herself sick or become greedy and selfish. It is the parent’s role 
to teach the child that while these goods may satisfy immediate pleasures, or may have 
some worth in themselves because they can provide pleasure or satisfy certain needs, 
there are higher goods which are worth pursuing at the expense of these lower goods and 
that living well involves activity beyond the acquisition of things. It is also not enough to 
simply teach this; it also requires leading by example. Parents, on an Aristotelian account, 
cannot teach what they do not experience themselves. In order for children to have 
standards of excellence to which they can appeal, parents must not only set rules for 
children to follow but must also demonstrate the standards of excellence in their own 
activity. It is through habituation that one develops virtue and changes one’s character:  
For excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of 
pleasure that we do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from 
doing fine things. This is why we must have been brought up a certain way 
from childhood onwards, as Plato says, so as to delight in and be distressed by 
the things we should; this is what the correct education is (NE II 1104b9-13).  
What Aristotle appears to mean is that a person whose disposition shies away from acts 
which are just, courageous or temperate, for example, is one who has not been educated 
well; who has habituated bad characteristics in order to avert pain. However, one who is 
disposed towards such acts is one who has educated her desires to find pleasure in 
virtuous acts and pain in being, for example, unjust, cowardly or intemperate. The crucial 
point to this argument is that in order to lead a good life one must try to do good things 
first in order to learn what it means to be good.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
As I have argued, the family is the kind of enabling practice which can bring about good 
character in a child. Our socialisation into family life is where we first see the sort of 
action which we begin to emulate. As children we are apprentices – our parents and 
other older family members such as siblings and aunts are our teachers and guides. To 
put it simply, if we see people who tend to our needs acting with justice and kindness 
towards others and towards ourselves then we will copy these acts, even if we do not yet 
know what justice and kindness means. We do this initially to please those that care for 
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us in order to satisfy our wants. But we would equally emulate acts of injustice and 
unkindness if it led to satisfaction of our immediate wants as well. Therefore, it is not 
rationality which guides us as infants but the satisfaction of desires.  
By combining the Aristotelian virtue ethics account with the insights of care ethics as 
demonstrated in this chapter, however, we have a much richer view of family life and the 
good which it pursues. Good caregiving does not come about simply from natural love. It 
requires some sort of attachment but it also requires an open-responsiveness to need 
and the habituation of rational caring virtues. Good caregiving is an ethical activity which 
requires certain dispositions and is constitutive of a flourishing family life by educating 
children into the virtues and contributing to the flourishing of those others who are either 
caregivers or dependent adults.  Additionally, however, it does not entail the uncritical 
adoption of another’s ends, particularly if those ends are potentially damaging. Rather it 
is about helping the other to pursue goals which are worthwhile, that are good in 
themselves or lead to a higher good and that contribute to the flourishing of those who 
are cared-for. In the case of the friend or partner it may be that all we need to do is 
persuade them that their end is not rationally defensible. In the case of the child, 
however, it may take years of training and habituation to transform their ends from the 
satisfaction of felt needs to the pursuit of worthwhile goods. Whichever situation it is, it 
appears that care is an important term and one which is missing from Aristotle’s account 
of family and friendship. In fact, the idea of caring virtues, which seem to be required in 
these particular situations, are themselves missing from Aristotle’s account.   
MacIntyre’s account of the virtues of acknowledged dependence is also influenced by the 
ethics of care and its attention to human dependency.  In attaining a state of relative 
independence, as we reach adulthood, MacIntyre argues that we must at the same time 
acknowledge our dependence on others in reaching that state, recognising that our 
independence may well be fleeting or interrupted by states of varying degrees of 
dependence, if we are to live a flourishing life (MacIntyre 1999). Moreover, the idea that 
family life not only provides for our own care and teaches us to acknowledge dependence 
but also teaches us to be caring individuals towards others is an important aspect of 
family life which the ethics of care brings to the discussion of a flourishing family. The 
wellbeing of unpaid caregivers such as parents, grandparents, adult children and young 
carers who provide care for no other end than the good of those in their charge should be 
131 
 
recognised for the important good they contribute to society through educating citizens 
and providing for the needs of the sick, vulnerable and disabled. Caregivers should 
therefore be supported in carrying out this important work to the best of their ability 
without this damaging their own wellbeing.  
Thus far I have claimed that the virtues are necessary for the achievement of good 
caregiving. But it is also true that caregiving is a means internal to the flourishing of family 
life, which, qua practice, necessarily requires external goods in order achieve its internal 
goods—the effective delivery of care and the flourishing of the family as a whole. My 
argument, therefore, is that caregivers, whether family members or paid caregivers, need 
(a) the resources necessary to sustain their caregiving, (b) the support of other persons 
and institutions, and (c) to grow in the virtues which perfect one’s caregiving. While it is 
tempting to claim that virtue is the answer to the problem of caregiving, we should not 
assume that individual virtue alone can perfect the practice of caregiving, whether in the 
family or in an institutional context. Only by sustaining each of the aforementioned 
components can we expect caregiving to be a site of flourishing for both caregiver and 
the cared for.  In other words, a society which does not support its caregivers cannot 
expect good caregiving to be everywhere present. The following chapter explores what, 




7. What are the Goods of a Flourishing Family Life? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 1 I argued that some version of Aristotelianism is relevant to considering what 
a well functioning family might involve because Aristotelian thought is concerned with 
what constitutes human flourishing. The highest good at which human beings aim is 
eudaimonia and constitutive of the achievement of this good is a life of virtue. MacIntyre 
extends this understanding much further by providing an account of the way in which 
virtue is developed through participation in a plurality of practices that are 
characteristically human, which can contribute to the good life for human beings. Within 
each practice, practitioners rank order goods. In chapter 2 I argued that family life is a 
practice. It has goods internal to the practice (common goods) which are constitutive of 
the good of each family member. In chapter 6 I argued that Aristotelian virtue ethics 
needs to be synthesised with feminist care ethics in order to give a well-rounded account 
of familial flourishing. Care ethics is able to recognise the ethical importance of physical 
caregiving both for the giver and receiver of care. Moreover, this synthesis helps us to 
develop an account of caring virtues. MacIntyre generally avoids specifying the goods 
internal to practices or the highest good of an activity because he argues that it is only 
through participation in that activity that its goods can be understood and ordered. 
However, most of us are or have been part of a family at some point in our lives and, 
therefore, have a general understanding of what makes family life worthwhile. 
Furthermore, the attention in care ethics to the particularities of caring activities provides 
insight into the particular goods of family life.  
In this chapter I argue that the highest good of the family is the sustaining of good familial 
functioning such that all family members feel part of the life of the family and are 
afforded the security to act outside of the family. Flourishing families provide support for 
projects outside of the family within a range of other practices. In order for the practice of 
family life to function well, it requires family members to exercise practical reason and to 
deliberate with one another in decision-making and deciding what is best for the family, 
and each of its members. The flourishing family also cultivates the moral virtues in its 
members, in particular, through the interactions and special relationships of family life. 
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This chapter is not intended to prescribe the ordering of goods families should aim at as 
each family will be different and will prioritise different ends, depending on the life stages 
of its members. For example, a family which consists of a married or cohabiting couple 
whose children have become adults and left home but have not yet had any children will 
have different goods which it aims at than a family which consists of a young couple with 
a baby and extended family members. Furthermore, the prioritisation of different ends 
will change through the lifecycle of the family. The aim of this chapter then is to identify 
characteristically human activity which is particular to family life, and how the goods 
which that activity aims at are ordered in different ways according to the particularities of 
social context. One characteristic activity of family life might be raising children. Most 
family members would accept this activity to be central to the wellbeing of the family. 
How children are raised varies a great deal even within one particular society. Instead of 
providing fixed rules as to how children should be raised, or defining one particular family 
structure as the ideal type for raising children, the Aristotelian approach defended in this 
thesis gives us the tools to identify what the goods for families in various contexts might 
be and how those goods might be achieved. So the approach to raising children which a 
family with divorced parents takes will need to be different to the approach a married or 
cohabiting couple takes. How these goods are achieved will inevitably vary and their 
achievement will rely not only on the particular standards of excellence employed and 
the character of family members but also on the availability of instrumental, external 
goods. As MacIntyre tells us in Dependent Rational Animals ‘all happy families are not 
alike and only a very great novelist could have got away with telling us otherwise’ (1999, 
134). In other words, families flourish or fail to flourish in a plurality of ways depending on 
how they respond to the facts of their particular situation. Some of the causes of families 
failing to function well will be discussed in the following chapter. This chapter will discuss 
what a flourishing family life might involve.  
The first section argues that, for a family to flourish, children must be cared for well. This 
care involves children being both physically cared for and morally educated through 
participatory activities which aim at common goods. It is argued here that play, trust and 
care are necessary goods which are constitutive of the good of raising children well.  
The second section explores the value of healthy couple relations and what that entails. I 
argue that a healthy couple relationship requires the goods of a solid foundation of equal 
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friendship, which entails trust and reciprocal love, the capacity to grow together and 
adapt to changes in one another, and to rationally deliberate with one another about 
problems which might be encountered and about the shared goals of the family. What 
makes the conjugal relationship distinctive from friendship is discussed here. This section 
also looks at the capacity for single-parent families to flourish. It is argued that single 
parents who successfully raise children do so with greater barriers in their way than those 
who do so with a supportive partner. On the other hand, single-parenthood might be far 
more suitable than marriage if any of the goods of a healthy couple relationship are 
absent and cannot be retrieved. Therefore, single-parents need even greater support 
from extended family than do two-parent families.  
Finally, the third section develops some of the ideas explored in chapter 6 about care of 
the elderly, sick and otherwise disabled. Here I argue that the importance of involving 
families in the care of dependent adults cannot be underestimated, especially when so 
many caregiving institutions are underfunded, with over-worked and under-valued staff 
only being able to provide very basic care. However, families cannot be expected to be 
sole providers of care because of the strain it can exert on family life, in particular on 
women who more often shoulder this burden, due to an aging population. One of the 
priorities of caregiving institutions and policy makers should be to facilitate family 
involvement in care wherever possible. For example, when people have to enter a care 
home and leave their own home or their family’s home, they should be placed as close to 
their family as is reasonably possible.  
Throughout this chapter the idea that families must always be understood within their 
social context is emphasised. The rise of the concept of the nuclear family ignores the 
continuing role of extended family as well as the participation of families in community 
life, whether in a rural village, suburban town or an inner-city estate. Children and adults 
engage in practices outside of the family, work and school which socialise children into 
the pursuit of goods of excellence and develop and sustain the identity of adults beyond 
parent and worker. For children, being a part of a family can facilitate engagement in 
these morally, intellectually and physically engaging activities thus developing their skills 
and character and teaching them to pursue goods in common with others. If children are 
encouraged to participate in activities beyond the confines of the home, they have more 
opportunities to develop their moral and intellectual capacities. Furthermore, it is 
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psychologically important for children to see parents as having an independent identity 
and as able to sustain relationships outside of family life that enable the achievement of a 
range of other goods. Equally, when their children leave home, parents might feel empty 
and without purpose if they do not have other projects which motivate them. Therefore, 
this chapter also provides foundations for an argument against the desirability of the 
nuclear family as ‘a haven in a heartless world’.  
 
7.2 The good of raising children well 
There is a vast amount of research and literature on child development which I will not 
attempt to summarise here. The purpose of this section is to draw on some of this 
literature (in moral and evolutionary psychology, social work and education studies) in 
order to develop my argument. In doing so I provide an Aristotelian framing of the 
literature, even though most of the research discussed is not written from an Aristotelian 
perspective. Raising children well, such that they develop their moral, intellectual and 
creative capacities to their full potential can be one of the most rewarding goods internal 
to family life for both adults and children. Part of that good is a number of constitutive 
goods which include a number of activities and behaviours. This section will identify some 
of these goods.  
Play is one of the goods constitutive of raising children well. It is an activity which is good 
in itself and which is pursued for the sake of the good of children, the development of 
their powers and the development of bonds between children, their peers and adults. 
Therefore, children ought to be, wherever possible, encouraged to, and facilitated in, play 
by themselves, with other family members and with other children of varying ages 
(Feldman and Gray 1999). While play may begin as a family activity, families also need to 
provide the security a child needs to play with children outside of the family in order to 
develop their own reasoning, empathy and other social skills. However, as bio-
psychologist Peter Gray points out, play should be directed and structured by children 
themselves, with adults providing the secure but not restrictive environment that 
children need in order to play at their full potential (Gray 2011). 
Play is a practical activity which is a good in itself because it can develop a child’s skills 
and powers, and foster virtues; in particular practical reasoning, empathy and, if a child is 
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playing with others, the virtues of justice, patience and generosity. D. W. Winnicott, a 
child psychoanalyst who analyses play and its role in psychotherapy, argues that: 
To get the idea of playing it is helpful to think of the preoccupation that 
characterizes the playing of a young child. The content does not matter. What 
matters is the near-withdrawal state, akin to the concentration of older 
children and adults (Winnicott 1980, 60).  
Winnicott implies that the activity of playing is good in itself because it absorbs the child 
and develops her powers of concentration. Though the young child cannot know what 
this good is, the parent does and actively encourages it. Winnicott also uses the concept 
of ‘transitional phenomena’ to describe how the infant develops a relationship to external 
reality, i.e. that he is able to differentiate between himself and the external world and 
distinguish the parent as separate from him. Winnicott states that there is ‘a direct 
development from transitional phenomena to playing, and from playing to shared 
playing, and from this to cultural experiences’ (1980, 60). Thus play helps to develop the 
child’s identity as something separate from the parent. 
Winnicott claims in the above quote that the content of play does not matter; rather it is 
the state of preoccupation and concentration which really characterises play. However, 
the content of play is important for legitimate feminist concerns about socialisation into 
rigid gender roles. Children’s toys are often gendered so that girls are encouraged to play 
with toys which socialise them into caring, maternal and domestic roles, playing with dolls 
and kitchen sets, while boys are encouraged to be adventurers, scientists and soldiers. 
Thus boys are expected to become masculine and independent and girls are expected to 
become nurturing, domesticated and somewhat dependent, whilst also taking care of 
dependent others. Traditional women’s work is still not valued and as such society still 
does not encourage men to take on caregiving roles and to adopt the so-called feminine 
virtues, or what MacIntyre calls the virtues of acknowledged dependence. In fact, 
MacIntyre touches on this problem, though only briefly, when he argues that ‘what we 
should have learned from the virtues of acknowledged dependence is that this is a 
respect in which men need to become more like women’ (MacIntyre 1999, 164). It is not 
just the case that boys should be encouraged to play with dolls but that men and boys 
actually need to be encouraged to cultivate more caring virtues in order to live flourishing 
lives. Encouraging them to play with dolls may help to remove some of the stigma 
attached to caring virtues. Equally, however, girls should be encouraged (and increasingly 
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many are, at least in schools) to foster the virtues of independent reasoning and some of 
the so-called masculine virtues, spelled out by Aristotle as those of courage, temperance, 
open-handedness or generosity, magnanimity and justice. These virtues of independence 
should not however be confused with the pseudo-virtues of individualism, such as 
competitiveness and ruthlessness. 
As children grow, play becomes more socially complex and the content of the play 
becomes more significant. Play introduces and habituates children to rule-governed 
behaviour. It makes the activity rewarding if one follows the rules and wins the prize or 
avoids the sanction. From board games with sets of rules, to playground games with rules 
that are passed on from one set of children to another, to sports games with universally 
recognised rules, children are constantly learning how to participate in communal and 
collective activities through the learning of rules. From a MacIntyrean perspective, the 
rules are not learned simply for the sake of being a good rule-follower either. Rather, they 
help the child to actualise the goods of the game.  
Sometimes children play for themselves, developing their independent reasoning powers 
as in games such as chess, other times they play as part of a team, developing their social 
skills and learning to subordinate their own good to shared goods, through collaborative 
effort. Other forms of play might be more narrative-based such as when one plays with 
dolls and other character toys or pretends to be a character either from a well-known 
story or one made up by the children playing. Such pretend playing, or play-acting, might 
not be as obviously rule-governed (though if they involve other children they might entail 
the sharing of toys and props or not leaving anyone in the group out) but rather develop a 
child’s sense of narrative, which they pick up from reading and being read stories, and the 
child’s capacity for empathy by exploring different characters. In fact, some evolutionary 
psychologists argue that pretend play is essential for the development of human culture: 
In order to pretend children must imagine something that is currently not true 
then behave as if it were (e.g., by “drinking hot tea” from an empty cup). 
When placed in the context of an extended scenario (e.g., having a “tea party 
with friends”) the imagined world, along with the possible consequences of 
any behaviour, has to be considered and maintained. If a cup is tipped over 
whatever is “spilled” should be “cleaned up.” By pretending children thus 
develop a capacity to generate and reason with novel suppositions and 
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imaginary scenarios, and in so doing may get to practice the creative process 
that underpins innovation in adulthood (Nielsen 2012, 176).21 
Thus pretend play also develops children’s capacity for innovation and creativity.  
Being inducted into any of the types of play mentioned above, for a child, is analogous to 
being inducted into a practice. Being inducted into the practice of family life requires the 
child to learn and follow rules to govern their behaviour until that behaviour becomes 
habituated. Rules exist to protect children’s safety and direct their activity towards 
worthwhile ends. As such, rules set by adults should not be arbitrary. An example of an 
arbitrary rule might be the kind of rule set by a domineering father who prevents his 
children from playing out with their friends and gives no good reason. Such a father 
exercises power for its own sake and is blinded by that power rather than using it for the 
good of his children. As children develop their own reasoning abilities and begin to 
understand the purpose of the rules, they should therefore learn to question rules if 
those rules do not seem to have worthwhile ends.  
A second good which is constitutive of raising children well is trust. Trust is not an activity 
like play but it is gained and lost through actions. In this section I focus on the trust 
between parents and their children; though the discussion will be relevant to the trust 
needed within couple relations, between parents and extended family members and 
between family carers and dependent adults. Trust is an important good for the parent-
child relationship because young children are entirely dependent on parents such that the 
child’s trust is initially instinctive and later becomes learned or unlearned. As MacIntyre 
notes, ‘Initially as small children we trust others, exhibiting what Løgstrup calls “natural 
trust” and Aquinas the “natural friendship” of human beings for each other. But even at 
this early stage the capacity for trust can be either enlarged or damaged by the actions of 
parents’ (2007, 154). As children grow they are warned by adults about trusting strangers 
and parents also begin to trust children with various responsibilities. There are also many 
opportunities for adults to abuse their child’s faith in them and make her lose her natural 
trust. Thus MacIntyre argues that as ‘adolescents and even as adults we therefore have to 
learn to trust all over again’ (2007, 155) and, I would add, that we also have to learn to 
                                                          
21 Nielsen makes the claim that pretend play is essential for the rapid development of human 
culture partially on the basis that our closest living relatives, the great apes who have only a 
rudimentary culture, do not have a prolonged childhood stage but move from a longer stage of 
infancy, to a juvenile growth period, where they have to forage for food for themselves, to 
adulthood (Nielsen, 2012, p. 174). 
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become trustworthy. Becoming trustworthy requires adults to be trustworthy in the first 
place so that children understand the importance of being able to trust. According to 
MacIntyre, learning to trust again, after losing trust in someone, requires practical reason 
and the virtue of courage. We use our reasoning to see what reasons we have for trusting 
someone, or at least for not distrusting them and to examine reasons we may have for 
distrusting them, if they have demonstrated untrustworthiness in previous action. The 
virtue of courage, MacIntyre argues, is necessary because we are always taking a risk 
when we trust someone and ‘the risks are as considerable as they are because of the 
uncalculating opening up of ourselves to others that… is involved in all trust’ (2007, 155). 
The risks of natural trust, exhibited by young children, then, are the most considerable of 
them all because the child is unable to consider whether they have good reasons to trust 
this person. As a result their trust is the most vulnerable to abuse. If children’s natural 
trust in their parents or other caregivers is continuously abused then those children will 
grow into adolescents who have little reason to trust anyone or be trustworthy 
themselves.  
For the relationship of trust to be maintained and for the child to develop good reasons 
to trust her parents, they have to be what Winnicott terms ‘good-enough’ (Winnicott 
1980). Parents should not try to be perfect. The good-enough parent will gradually allow 
the child to do more for herself so that she does not continue to depend on the parent for 
all of her needs, while at the same time not destroying the trust the child places in the 
parent. Weaning the child from breast milk to solid food is a very basic element of this 
process. The child may naturally trust that the breast or the bottle will always be there 
when she cries and the parent has to gradually remove this dependence from the child. 
The child then has to adapt to the change of being fed to feeding herself. The child will 
likely develop good reasons to believe that the parent can be trusted to provide the child 
with food because the parent demonstrates concern and affection for the child, not 
because the food just appears when the child cries. If, therefore, the parent regularly, or 
even from time to time, leaves the child to fend for herself before she is ready to do so, 
then the parent could damage the child’s ability to trust. Adapting to the child’s 
developmental needs without betraying her trust is then a complex and nuanced process 
which may require initially disappointing the child and then building her trust in a more 
rational way. This is necessary because, as MacIntyre points out, 
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one outcome of the failure to transform the attitudes and relationships of 
early childhood is an inability to achieve the kind of independence that is able 
to acknowledge truthfully and realistically it’s dependencies and attachments, 
so leaving us in captivity to those dependencies, attachments, and conflicts 
(MacIntyre 1999, 85). 
Thus if the child is kept entirely dependent by the parents, then the child cannot become 
an independent practical reasoner who is able to recognise the dependencies that 
enabled her independent powers to develop. Parents are often accused of over-
protecting or mollycoddling their children, stunting and suffocating their emotional, 
mental and physical growth.  Many parents fear that their children might be snatched 
from the street by a passing stranger and so prevent them from playing outside or leaving 
their sight. Other parents fear their children getting hurt if they climb trees or ride bikes. 
Because when a child hurts herself she cries, the parent wants to prevent that from 
happening again because she does not want her child to feel pain. However, minor pain 
and injuries are ways for children to test their limits and discover what is safe and what is 
not. On the other hand, leaving children to run wild and free with no boundaries or rules 
means that they often do not respect the authority of adults who are better equipped to 
recognise dangers and who generally know what is best for the child better than the child 
does. 
Finally, one of the key goods constitutive of raising children is caregiving. As with trust, I 
focus here on the care needed for raising children well; however, some of the argument 
will have relevance for the discussion of care in relation to other familial goods such as 
the care between a couple and the care between members of extended family.  
Caregiving is an activity which is good in itself for both the child and the parent. Not only 
does it provide for the basic needs of the child but if it is guided by reason and empathy, 
and if it is exercised in accordance with the relevant virtues, then it will develop the bond 
between parent and child. Noddings’ example of bathing or feeding her child, referred to 
in chapter 2 in which the demands of care are not felt as burdens but rather consist of 
occasions that make life worth living, demonstrates how care can be pleasurable and 
fulfilling. Of course, care can be burdensome if, for example, it consumes one’s whole life, 
and what mother hasn’t felt that burden from time to time in the first couple of years of 
her child’s life. Care can be monotonous and physically demanding. But care can also be 
rewarding for both the parent and the child as long as it does not damage the health of 
the parent or smother the development of the child. The importance of a supportive 
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partner who equally engages in caregiving, of extended family, or even of reliable and 
trustworthy neighbours, for alleviating the burdens of care, will be discussed in the 
following sections.  
Furthermore, in order for a parent to be a good caregiver, the parent needs goods of 
effectiveness. One of these goods is the skill of caregiving. However, many new parents 
have never had to physically care for someone before. As such, they must learn these 
skills as they go. There are many books and internet resources now for families in the 
West, often giving conflicting advice. Online communities, like www.mumsnet.com, offer 
a forum in which mothers who do not know each other personally may connect and share 
advice and approaches to parenting. Parents also might learn parenting skills from their 
own parents, though this also provides potential for conflict if grandparents seem to be 
stepping on the toes of their children, telling them how to parent well. As discussed in 
chapter 5 and 6, caregiving skill often entails feeding, bathing, clothing, administering 
medicines, aiding movement, et cetera. This may be the case for care of infants or 
dependent adults. However, the motivation for this kind of activity, for developing these 
skills and others, is caring about the cared-for. Attachment or what Kittay calls a positive 
affective bond is needed for parents to give care well. In an attempt to characterise the 
bond of care in the parent-child relationship, Amy Mullin argues that ‘parents and 
children need to manifest their understanding of one another as unique, irreplaceable 
individuals, with identifiable needs and interests through their interactions with one 
another’ (Mullin 2006, 183). She emphasises the need for reciprocity of caring action 
within this relationship and I would argue that this reciprocity can be extended to all 
members of a family; that the demonstration in caring action of the irreplaceability of 
family members is part of what holds families together. Caring relationships within the 
family are not only good for childhood development; ‘they are also important to the 
development of the adult caregivers’ skills and virtues (which may be exercised outside 
these relationships as well)’ (Mullin 2006, 184). In exercising the skills of parenting, 
motivated by the positive affective bond, and directed by practical reasoning the parent is 
able to develop caring virtues. This claim supports the MacIntyrean view that family life is 
a ‘school of the virtues’, not just for the children learning to become independent 
practical reasoners but also for the adults who care for children and other dependent 




7.3 The goods of healthy couple relations or supported single 
parenthood 
A second good internal to family life is a healthy relationship between committed 
couples, and the modern form of this relationship is analogous to Aristotle’s idea of 
character friendship, but with some differences. The relationship between friends is good 
in itself, from an Aristotelian perspective, when each values the other for his or her own 
sake. Aristotle’s conception of philia denies the possibility of true and equal character 
friendship between spouses because his account of the household presupposes certain 
ancient Greek social structures and the moral inferiority of women. While he does 
concede that there is a certain type of philia between spouses, it is not one of moral 
equality, unlike the friendship between male citizens. For Aristotle it is complementary 
but unequal. As we no longer accept that women are morally and intellectually inferior in 
contemporary Western society, it seems fruitful to look at Aristotle’s conception of true 
character friendship, which rests on the idea of the friend being loveable without 
qualification, in relation to spouses. This is surely the ideal for those making and 
sustaining a family together. Of course, when people live together, so closely, they cannot 
be expected to achieve perfection in their character and relations with one another. In 
other words, they are bound to disagree and have arguments from time to time, some 
more serious than others. Aristotle is not suggesting that one should love another 
without qualification if they are not a good person. True character friendship, for 
Aristotle, can only be achieved when both friends are genuinely good and, therefore, such 
friendship is rare. It might be more useful to modify Aristotle and say that minor 
character flaws could be overlooked for the sake of family life but if serious flaws are 
overlooked, to the detriment of one’s own good or the good of the family, it could 
damage familial flourishing. Genuine friends will want to improve each other, however, 
and we would expect this to also be the case for couples. This argument relates back to 
Schwarzenbach’s Aristotelian argument, discussed in chapter 6 in relation to parent-child 
relations, where a reciprocal moral equality is the goal of true philia, and not just a 
prerequisite.   
Family life is unlikely to flourish on the foundations of an unequal relationship between a 
couple, even if it manages to survive because it will likely result in irresolvable conflict or 
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in one or both parties not feeling secure or irreplaceable. Thus it seems that in order to 
build and sustain a family life which flourishes, it is necessary for the adults who make a 
family life together to have a strong bond built on the internal goods of reciprocal love, 
mutual trust and a friendship which entails the wishing of the good for each other’s sake, 
and adapting to changes in one another over time. This does not entail an idealised 
notion of romantic love which dominates in Western society, packaged and sold to us in 
the form of advertising and products, but rather a mutual admiration, respect and care 
for each other’s character and wellbeing. This may be initially motivated by romantic love 
or attraction but does not require this to sustain it; though arguably it does require some 
kind of enduring affection and sexual compatibility if it is to be sustained over a complete 
life. The parents’ affection, in a flourishing relationship will express the value of each 
other’s contribution to the life of the family, such that neither parent feels like they do all 
the work. 
Aristotle also identifies two other inferior species of friendship; one based on utility and 
one based on pleasure (see chapter 1). He argues that neither of these can last beyond 
the usefulness or pleasure that the friends afford to each other. Therefore, if the 
relationship between people who want to have a family together is based on either 
pleasure or utility alone, this too seems to be a shaky foundation on which to build a 
family life. Nevertheless, one would expect to find both usefulness and pleasure in true 
character friendship. For example, partners may be useful to each other in terms of 
financial support, if one adult has to take time off to study or is incapacitated by illness. 
One would also expect to find that partners find pleasure in each other’s company and 
want to spend time together in common pursuits and activity. Furthermore, one would 
expect there to be sexual compatibility in order that partners can develop bonds of 
intimacy which further strengthens their relationship with one another. However, a 
relationship based on sex purely for pleasure in the context of family life would not 
guarantee this strengthening of intimate bonds. The difference between character 
friendships and the morally inferior friendships discussed by Aristotle is that true 
friendship does not seek pleasure or utility as an end itself. While people should be free 
to do this in other aspects of life such as relationships built on business transactions or 
casual friendships, it seems that these inferior friendships are not good grounds for a 
flourishing family life due to their impermanence and fragility. Furthermore, adults who 
choose to live together as a family will be more successful in their common ends if they 
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value all that the other brings to the relationship and if they view their relationship as one 
of interdependence. If one partner continues to value their independence more than 
their relationship then that will inevitably lead to a lack of reciprocity, mutual trust and 
the advantages of deliberation with another on whose wisdom one can draw.  
Is there something distinctively good about conjugal relationships which make them 
distinguishable from platonic friendships? Apart from the potentiality for having children 
in such a relationship, a familial commitment is more unconditional than that of 
friendship. What we are prepared to do and to sacrifice for a spouse or partner, for 
someone we are in love with and are committed to long-term, differs from what we are 
prepared to do for a friend or someone we are dating. Of course this is dependent on the 
relationship flourishing.  The love needs to be mutual and not obsessive or blind to 
rationality. It is not easy to describe the concept of mutual and stable love between 
partners. What we can say is that one loves one’s spouse or partner in a quite distinct 
way from how one loves one’s friends. Friedrich Engels characterises this love between 
spouses as ‘sex love’ and argues that it only becomes a feature of family life in modernity. 
In earlier epochs, when parents chose who their children were to marry, spousal love was 
based more on duty and obligation than sexual desire, love and friendship:  
The idea that the mutual inclinations of the principal parties should be the 
overriding reason for matrimony had been unheard of in the practice of the 
ruling classes from the very beginning. Such things took place, at best, in 
romance only, or - among the oppressed classes, which did not count (Engels 
1968, 514).  
Furthermore, sexual desire (eros) as understood by the ancients, did not presuppose 
mutual love. In modern love there is not the asymmetry of the lover and beloved, as 
described by Aristotle. Mutual equal love based on character friendship and genuine 
affection is, therefore, a necessary condition of the flourishing of committed sex-love 
relationships. If one removes oneself from the relationship and no longer reciprocates 
then the relationship is transformed and the roles constitutive of it cease to exist. 
Unrequited love only exists in the mind and is not actualised in relationship form. 
The goods of family life that we consider to be important will also differ from the goods 
which hold families together in other cultures, and at different times in history. We 
cannot say, therefore, that these are the only goods of family life; that these goods, 
pursued in a particular way are the key to good familial functioning. For some families in 
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different cultural or historical contexts, the quality of the relationship between the 
women of a kinship group may be more important than the quality of the relationship 
between spouses. However, it does seem that participation in the practice of family life, 
in some form, is more conducive to flourishing than not participating, particularly if we 
are not able to construct some kind of familial substitute. Crucial to an Aristotelian 
perspective is that human beings are social as well as political animals. We desire intimate 
relationships, people with whom to share our lives. As social animals we value 
relationships with others but according to evolutionary anthropologists, like Robin 
Dunbar, our brains are only capable of coping with a finite number of meaningful 
relationships involving trust, reciprocity and obligation. Moreover, he argues that the 
quality of the relationship deteriorates as the social group widens (Dunbar 2010). We 
might infer from this that our most intimate relationships have the potentiality for being 
the highest quality of our relationships and more often than not, our most intimate 
relationships are familial in nature.  
Furthermore, in a globalised world where citizens have to become increasingly mobile in 
order to find work, true character friendship, as envisaged by Aristotle, between citizens 
of a political community is harder to find let alone maintain. Perhaps it is more likely to be 
found now in loving familial relationships. The committed sex-love couple relationship, 
sustained by marriage, civil-partnership or some other kind of symbolic commitment is 
one way in which one might satisfy these desires for character friendship and intimacy 
which constitute our flourishing. However, it is not the only way and many adults 
successfully raise children in different contexts, for example, as single-parents.  
In single-parent families22, the goods of the conjugal relationship often have to be found 
in other relationships. The bond between parent and child may become stronger, as 
might the bonds with extended family such as with siblings and parents. As discussed in 
the earlier chapter on liberal feminism, some theorists argue in favour of the state 
privileging the two-parent family. This is because it is believed by some that the two-
parent family is the most effective way of bringing up children to be independent citizens. 
Iris Marion Young claims that in this context independence means,  
having a well-paid secure job sufficient to support oneself and one's children 
at a  level that can enable  them  to  develop the capacities and acquire the 
                                                          
22
 The discussion of single-parents is meant to encompass parents of all genders, though reference may be 
made to one gender to illustrate an example. 
146 
 
skills to achieve such jobs themselves, and can also provide enough savings so 
that one does not become  dependent  on  those  children  or others  when  
one  is too  old  to work (Young 1995, 544). 
This privileging of independence ignores the facts of dependence which one inevitably 
encounters at different life-stages, for example, if one becomes unemployed due to an 
economic recession or if one contracts a debilitating illness.  As MacIntyre has argued, the 
virtues of rational independence need to be balanced by the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence. When we are a part of a family, we are never completely independent.  
Even an economically independent father and husband will depend on his partner for the 
care of their children; it is not just the partner and child who are dependent on him. If he 
is a single-parent and continues to work full-time, he will depend on his extended family 
or child care services to care for his children. The virtues of acknowledged dependence do 
not just apply to us when we are in a state of obvious dependence on others either. 
Throughout our lives we rely on the practical reasoning of others, through consulting with 
those we trust and deliberating on matters affecting common goods. If, as a single-
parent, we had no partner who could help us to make decisions about setting rules for 
our children or who could share childcare with us so that we could both work and 
participate in activities outside of the home, then we would need to find that kind of 
support elsewhere.  
One important question is what effect does single-parenthood have on children’s 
wellbeing? Young rejects William Galston’s claim that single-parent families are always 
bad for children because they receive less emotional support and less supervision than 
children of two-parent families. She argues that, 
[While] it is certainly plausible to claim parenting is easier and more effective 
if two or more adults discuss the children’s needs . . .  it does not follow that 
the second adult must be a live-in husband, however, and some studies have 
found that the addition of any adult to a single-parent household, whether a 
relative, lover, or friend, tends to offset single-parent tendencies to relinquish 
parental decision making too early (Young 1995, 540). 
Thus having another adult with whom to deliberate and on whom one can depend does 
not necessarily require one to have a married partner. Families do not exist in a vacuum. 
Therefore, single-parents will often have other support on which they can draw such as 
grandparents, aunts, uncles or close friends.  
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An isolated single-mother who has no contact with the father of her child and no support 
on which to draw should be of concern to any society, both for the sake of the mother 
and of the child, but not as someone who should be demonised. The main mechanism by 
which many single-parents are helped in Western countries by the state is through 
welfare payments. However, a single-parent may need help other than financial welfare 
to help raise her children, and institutions outside the family could play a role in this. 
Support networks of single-parents who live near one another or local authorities helping 
to keep extended families together when placing people in care homes might be 
encouraged.  
While it may be the case that in general it is better to have a partner with whom to raise a 
child, there are also many situations in which it can be damaging to the flourishing of the 
family and its members. In such circumstances a strong case can often be made that 
divorce or separation, which may cause short-term pain, may secure long-term flourishing 
if the right conditions are in place. Kristi Williams concludes from her study on 
psychological wellbeing and marriage that ‘Being in a satisfying, supportive marriage 
offers similar benefits to women and men, and exiting such a marriage or being in a 
strained marriage confers similar costs’ (Williams 2003, 483). Her findings suggest, firstly, 
that the quality of married life rather than marital status is more important for the 
wellbeing of both men and women, contrary to previous assumptions that status 
mattered more than quality to men. Secondly, they suggest that sometimes it is better to 
divorce for the sake of future wellbeing than stay in a difficult and strained relationship if 
the problems which characterise it cannot be overcome. Moreover, a number of studies 
argue that the quality of parental relationships is more important to the wellbeing 
outcomes of children than avoiding divorce and remaining in a strained relationship (Hair 
et al. 2009; Davies 2002). The need for extended family, friends, and reliable neighbours 
is important for the wellbeing of any family but becomes necessary for a single parent 
family to flourish.  
 
7.4 The goods of care and support for adult dependency 
Finally, in this chapter, it is argued that family life supports the goods of care and support 
for dependent adults. While Archard argues that the primary function of family life is the 
care, guidance and protection of children, this thesis argues that the family’s functions 
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are wider and extend beyond childhood. The well functioning family, which affords 
security to all of its members, is a family that is there for its members when they need it 
most. Whether we are talking about a wife who has lost her job, an elderly parent who 
can no longer live alone, a daughter who becomes pregnant or a son who is trying to live 
independently with a disability, family life can provide the security they need to carry on 
with their lives when they encounter dependency. However, in order for the family to 
flourish and to be there when a particular family member needs support, the family 
cannot simply be a means to an individual end or a source of collective goods which 
family member can help themselves to. It requires all family members to care about its 
continuation and to contribute to its functioning. Characteristic of family members is to 
go above and beyond what is expected of them in their multifarious roles, for example, 
when grandparents contribute to parenting their grandchildren or when children take 
care of their parents during an illness or in old age.  
Finding the right balance between dependence and independence, which is so important 
when a child is growing up, is also important for dependent adults. Adults who take care 
of or assist elderly parents have to find the right balance between leaving their parents to 
look after themselves and infantilising them. In countries with aging populations, many 
children will see their parents suffer from age-related diseases such as Alzheimer’s, 
Parkinson’s and dementia. Finding the right level of care which affords them the most 
independence for as long as possible has to be balanced against the needs of one’s own 
children and the demands of a working life. Furthermore, the needs of a child with 
disabilities who reaches adulthood are very particular. A few decades ago, many 
disabilities were poorly understood and adults often found themselves in mental 
institutions or care homes for elderly people when they could have been living semi-
independently. In doing so, the capacities they did have were not developed as far as they 
could have been. Striking the right balance between dependence and independence is 
hard and can require a great deal of professional assessment and advocacy, particularly 
with cognitive disability. Nevertheless it can and should be found so that those of us with 
disabilities are treated as persons, with all the capacities of a person who is both mentally 
and physically able, even if all of those capacities cannot be fully realised in the usual way. 
For MacIntyre,  
It matters . . .  that those who are not yet disabled by age recognize in the old 
what they are moving towards becoming, and that those who are not ill or 
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injured recognize in the ill and injured what they often have been and always 
may be. It matters also that those recognitions are not a source of fear (1999, 
146).  
What he means is that these recognitions are a source of understanding about our 
common needs and common goods. It means that those who are disabled, sick or injured, 
however permanent or impermanent their condition, are recognisable as us and not as 
the Other. Not recognising this leads to the dehumanisation of the disabled, the sick and 
the elderly. Many families may be guilty of abandoning their elderly parents or disabled 
adult children in care homes or other institutions out of fear of the vulnerability of the 
human condition and denial of the possibility that it might happen to them too. This is not 
to suggest that, out of guilt, all families should look after their dependent adult family 
members in their own homes. Rather it is to suggest that care institutions at best 
supplement family life, cultivate friendships and enable a decent level of physical and 
mental independence according to the capacities of the adult in care. If they are a place 
that families can leave those members who illustrate all too vividly human vulnerability, 
to be forgotten about or to be hidden from view, then care institutions are not 
functioning well and those families are failing to flourish.  
In the conclusion of chapter 3 I tentatively suggested that liberal perfectionism’s concern 
with autonomy as an intrinsic human good was worthy of further exploration from an 
Aristotelian perspective. For Raz, autonomy is partial authorship over one’s own life. 
MacIntyre is not ignorant of the importance of this authorship and dedicates a great deal 
of space to discussions of independent practical reasoning and developing the ability to 
stand back from one’s immediate desires in order to reason about what is good for me to 
do. However, we often find ourselves in situations where, no matter how well we are able 
to reason about our good and stand back from our desires, we are not able to do what is 
good for us; only what is good for another who is in our care. Furthermore, if we are a 
somewhat dependent adult (and here I am thinking of adults with cognitive disabilities) 
we may not be able to stand back from our desires or reason to our full capacity as 
humans. In such cases, autonomy in Raz’s sense, as a non-individualistic concept, seems 
to be a necessary enabling good. To be autonomous is to be free from subjection, 
subordination and servitude. As suggested previously, for family life to flourish, the good 
of some cannot be sacrificed for the good of others. Yet many caregivers give up on other 
projects which are important to them, which contribute to their own flourishing, for the 
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sake of caring for a dependent family member. This can be true of parents who are said to 
live for their children but it is more acute when the caregiver has to care for a dependent 
adult whose limited independence decreases with age or with the progression of a 
terminal illness. While the caregiver might not have been forced by the power of another 
into servitude, nonetheless, they often feel they have no choice, and a lack of external 
goods often limits the caregiver’s options even further.  While caregiving can be an 
integral part of a flourishing human life, if it becomes overly burdensome and damages 
the caregivers ability to pursue other projects alongside caregiving, then it can harm 
flourishing and the good of the family. This is one reason why families need to share the 
burden of care with one another and, where that is not possible or where that is not 
enough, they also need external institutions of care to support them and provide relief. 
As discussed in chapter 6, caring about someone does not require that we directly and 
physically care for them. We may respond to our affective disposition of caring about that 
person by making sure that they have what they need to live in the way that is most 
suited to them. We may take care of their financial concerns or we may visit them 
regularly to maintain familial bonds, combat loneliness and check that they are content 
and being well cared for. The power of partial authorship over one’s own life is therefore 
important for both the giver and receiver of care. Caregiving should enable the cared-for 
person to live as independently as possible such that they can exercise their capacities to 
their fullest potential but it should not result in the caregiver living-for the cared-for 
person. Easy access to respite care which takes into account both the needs of the 
caregiver and the cared for is one way in which autonomy might be enabled. Autonomy, 
in Raz’s sense, is therefore a good for human beings but it is an enabling good; a capacity 
which we have as human beings, which we are not born with but must cultivate and help 
others to achieve. It requires certain external goods and support from others in order to 
be exercised. It also requires some capacity for independent practical reasoning, or an 
advocate who pursues the independent adult’s interests, in order to be used effectively 
to direct our activity.  
The good that families can provide, of care and support for adult dependency, is 
dependent on various factors being in place. The first is that the right balance between 
dependence and independence is struck such that dependent adults are not infantilised, 
nor are they abandoned or hidden away. Secondly, that disability in all of its forms is 
understood as something which can happen to any human being in virtue of our 
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vulnerability and, therefore, that the needs of the sick, elderly and otherwise disabled are 
part of our reasoning about the common good of both families and wider communities. 
Thirdly, that caregivers are adequately supported by the wider family and that institutions 
outside of the family are made available to them so that they can continue to pursue 
other worthwhile projects alongside caregiving, and are not entirely consumed by the 
activity. Alongside care for the caregiver, there must also be the conditions to enhance 
the autonomy of dependent adults such that they are able to fully exercise their 
capacities and pursue worthwhile projects. This requires a combination of support from a 
caring family and healthy, caregiving institutions which promote friendship formation, 
physical and mental independence and the involvement of families in the lives of the 
cared for. Where there is no family to speak of, and a dependent adult lives in an 
institution, the institution should not be ignorant of the lack of family support and should 
do whatever is necessary to promote healthy relationships with paid caregivers and other 
residents. Where a dependent adult lives in their own home and has no family, then it is 
incumbent on that person’s neighbours and paid caregivers to include the dependent 
person in the life of the community.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined what a flourishing family life involves.  I have argued that the 
highest good of family life is that the family functions well such that all family members 
are afforded the security to act outside of the family. Various goods are ordered towards 
this highest good and I have examined three of those goods here, though there may be 
many more. The first is that in raising children, they are cared for well both physically and 
morally. This is achieved through play, trusting and being trustworthy, and caregiving. 
These activities and behaviours are both good in themselves and are good for the sake of 
raising children well. In order for children to be raised well, however, it might not be 
sufficient that parent-child relationships are healthy, though this is of course necessary. 
For children to be enabled to play with their peers safely, parents must also have access 
to good schools, playgroups, extended family members who can keep a watchful eye on 
playing children or safe places to live with trustworthy neighbours. The more or these 
support networks and external institutions that families have access to, the more familial 
flourishing is enabled.  
152 
 
The second good I have identified, which a flourishing family life supports and is 
supported by, is healthy couple relations. Healthy couple relations are characterised by a 
foundation of equal character friendship and reciprocal love, mutual trust, and the ability 
to adapt to changes in one another over time characterised by commitment to one 
another. The goods of this relationship are supported by institutions such as marriage or 
civil partnership and, to a lesser extent, common law marriage. The legally recognised 
unions distribute external goods conferring status and powers and distributing some 
wealth, particularly in the event of divorce, through marriage rights. Over time, in the 
Western world at least, these marriage rights have been increasingly equalised to reflect 
the increasingly equal status of women and gay people, such that marriage no longer 
obviously disadvantages women to benefit of men and is increasingly inclusive of same 
sex couples. The same cannot be said of marriage in all cultures where power is 
distributed in favour of men and heterosexual unions. Nonetheless, marriage is seen by 
some as an outdated institution and some couples choose to cohabit long-term. Common 
law marriage, as it is sometimes known, has only some status attached to it and is 
modelled along the lines of marriage without the legal benefits. For example, in the UK a 
mother in a common law marriage has more rights to custody of her child in the event of 
a separation than the father does (GOV.UK 2013). Where there is no marriage and a child 
is raised by a single parent, I have argued that the goods of a couple relationship are 
often found elsewhere if the parent is supported by extended family or reliable friends. 
Therefore, single parents who are isolated need support from external institutions in 
wider society in more constructive ways than just being given welfare payments.  
The third good identified, which families provide, is support and care for dependent 
adults. This is a good for both dependent adults and family members. Not only is the 
family able to provide for dependent adults in a multiplicity of ways but when it does so, 
this is good for the whole family because it maintains bonds between family members 
beyond childhood and helps us to recognise our own vulnerability and dependence. 
Again, in order for the family to flourish in this respect, it requires support from outside of 
the family, particularly in the form of respite for family caregivers or caregiving 
institutions, including care homes and care within a person’s own home. 
The next chapter looks at how families might become dysfunctional or might encounter 
barriers to flourishing. This will be done in two ways: 1) examination of the ways in which 
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external goods can become ends in themselves and corrupt the good of family life and 2) 
looking at how institutions, which are designed to sustain the family, can end up 
corrupting it. 
 
8. How do Families Fail to Flourish? 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Now that we have a general picture of what a flourishing family life involves, it is possible 
to outline some of the issues which might impair or prohibit families from flourishing. 
Thus far, I have argued that in order for families to flourish they must pursue the goods 
internal to the practice of family life. Many family forms are capable of doing this but 
some will find it easier than others and some will encounter barriers. Below I will discuss 
some of the ways in which families may fail to flourish or at least the barriers to 
flourishing.23 Many of the ways in which families fail to function well, I will argue, is 
related in some way to external goods. External goods, as has already been explained, are 
those goods ‘that when achieved they are always some individual’s property and 
possession’ (MacIntyre 1985, 190). This makes them characteristically scarce goods 
because the more one person has of them the less others have. Internal goods on the 
other hand are characteristically ‘good for the whole community who participate in the 
practice’ (1985, 190-1). From this understanding of the goods we can see how placing too 
high a value on external goods might lead a person to be greedy and more self-interested. 
However, it would be a mistake to suggest that external goods cannot be common goods, 
or at least collective goods, when used for the benefit of the practice.  
When we pursue external goods, those necessary for life and those that supposedly 
improve it, we always do so qua some particular role which may or may not have a 
competing claim over our roles in the practice of family life. For Aristotle, it was the oikos 
or economic household itself which provided ‘such things necessary to life’ (P I 1256b 30). 
                                                          
23 One barrier to flourishing might be the bad character (or vice) of family members. In the 
previous chapter I discussed the importance of couple relations and the necessary virtues of 
family members in order for families to flourish. The counterpart to this argument is that bad 
character and vicious behaviour are likely to prevent families from flourishing. However, as I 
already discussed the effect of bad character in the previous chapter, in this chapter I focus on 
institutional and contextual barriers to flourishing.  
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Furthermore, the household was a constitutive part of the village or kinship group and 
when several of these were united the city state (polis) came into existence ‘originating in 
the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life’ (P 1252b 30-
31). The household aimed at life itself while the polis aimed at the good life. For Aristotle 
and for many pre-modern communities, the household was the site of economic activity – 
of producing those things needed to sustain human beings. One hunted, toiled or traded 
for the sake of the good of the household and all those who constituted it. In particular, 
Aristotle thought that the household and its management should be oriented towards the 
education of children into the political life of the polis. It appears that for Aristotle, it was 
not so much that there was an intrinsic worth to the relationships fostered within the 
family but rather that the family served the higher goods of the polis. As such Aristotle 
claimed that the art of household management was not the art of wealth getting for its 
own sake (i.e. the unlimited acquisition of wealth; what he called the vice of pleonexia) 
but rather to provide those necessary goods which will sustain human life and which are 
instrumental to the pursuit of human excellence.  
Aristotle could see clearly the danger in the pursuit of wealth, and other external goods, 
for their own sake at the expense of human excellence. This danger seems even more 
pronounced when we think that wealth-getting is now mostly divorced from the family in 
modern societies.  As such, the supply of the everyday needs of human beings usually has 
to be achieved through compartmentalised roles outside of, and separate from, family 
life. The unlimited acquisition of wealth is, therefore, not obviously limited by the internal 
goods of family life. When an individual takes employment to provide for her family, she 
takes on a role such as a banker, teacher or shop worker. In her role as banker, teacher, 
or shop worker she is encouraged to no longer think of herself primarily as a family 
member. From her employer’s perspective, she is an employee first and perhaps a 
mother, daughter or wife second.  
In some ways, this separation of work and family life might be an advantage over the pre-
modern economically productive household of Aristotle’s time. There is less opportunity, 
for instance, for family life to be used instrumentally for the pursuit of external goods by 
exploiting vulnerable family members, such as young children, for labour. Family life, if 
separated from work, might be seen more as a haven from the drudgery of working life 
(Lasch 1997) and people may have more opportunity to find intrinsic value in familial 
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relationships beyond their instrumental worth. However, as the external goods achieved 
in working life are divorced from the activities of family life, it is harder to see the single 
causal order those goods make with the internal goods of family life, described in the 
previous section. The goods of those practices in which we do achieve external goods 
may compete with the goods of family life. Furthermore, one may be virtuous at home 
but when one goes to work in certain occupations, the end is often to make as much 
profit for the company and for oneself as possible, potentially resulting in the vice of 
pleonexia and failing to contribute to the common goods of society, by unjustly taking 
more than one needs or deserves.  
It is clear that how we practice family life and the institutions which support family life 
have been vastly transformed since pre-modern times. The economic function of the 
household has been significantly limited or removed in most families and the composition 
of the household has also transformed. There are few examples of economically 
productive households (e.g. family farms) in Western democracies and so the practice of 
family life now has the function of providing stability and a loving environment for 
children to grow up in, as well as a support network of caring relationships for adults 
when they are sick, aging, disabled or need support in their various goals. Furthermore, 
children are not so much prepared for a political life, as Aristotle thought they should be, 
but rather for a working life. Of course, there are economic and other external benefits 
and burdens to being part of a family. Pursuit of the benefits for their own sake, for 
example through marriage or prioritising those benefits for children over the goods 
internal to family life, can damage flourishing. On the other hand, external goods are 
indeed goods which are needed to sustain family life and a deficiency of them can also 
damage familial flourishing. These issues will be explored in this chapter. 
 
8.2 The relationship of external goods to practices 
The goods internal to family life, outlined in chapter 7, can only be pursued with the right 
amount of instrumental or external goods. Without these external goods family carers 
cannot provide good caregiving and the family cannot function well. The issue of external 
goods to sustain family life can be addressed by governments. For example, the Family 
Breakdown Working Group of the Centre for Social Justice think tank states in its briefing 
paper that ‘Extended family relationships are breaking down and the state provides little 
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or no support and encouragement for them to flourish e.g. by making it financially viable 
for care of children and the elderly to take place within the family’ (Callan 2007). Yet 
when individuals pursue external goods to sustain family life, in particular the goods 
necessary for life but also including wealth, power and status, which, in moderation, can 
improve life, it is not usually qua family member. As MacIntyre points out, in modern 
societies we tend to live compartmentalised lives in which one’s role as mother is 
divorced from one’s role as a teacher and one’s role as member of a club: ‘So work is 
divided from leisure, private life from public, the corporate from the personal’ (1985, 
204). Even childhood and old age are made into such distinctly separate spheres of life 
that they are not seen as part of a narrative whole.  Such a fragmented life is antithetical 
to one in which each role is inseparable from, and informs, the others.  
This thesis has instead viewed the good family as both constantly changing and 
narratively unified, rather than something easily defined by its form, and as constituted 
by activity and particular relationships aimed at common goods (by examining family life 
as a practice rather than as a static institution composed of parents and dependent 
children). This view of the family as evolving makes more sense for looking at the whole 
human life from beginning to end and how family life shapes, and is a part of, it. Thus in 
my family life I may be a daughter, a granddaughter, a mother, a sister, a cousin, a 
girlfriend, a wife, an aunt and a grandmother at different stages in my life and sometimes 
more than one of these roles simultaneously. Some of these roles may have a greater pull 
and authority over my choices and activity at different points in my life but they all 
contribute to the narrative unity of my life alongside my other roles as an academic, a 
student, a friend etc. In order to determine which roles will have the greatest authority 
over me at different times I need to be able to reason well about the good and deliberate 
with others whom I share common goods with. 
But what of the roles of different practices other than that of family life and the authority 
of the goods I pursue in each? Even when a human life is informed by the conception of 
the virtues as rooted in practices, the individual may still encounter arbitrariness in 
choosing between different and competing claims of practices:  
Commitment to sustaining the kind of community in which the virtues can 
flourish may be incompatible with the devotion which a particular practice . . .   
requires. So there may be tensions between the claims of family life and those 
157 
 
of the arts . . . or between the claims of politics and those of the arts 
(MacIntyre 1985, 201).  
Most people at some point in their life have to make choices between family and work 
commitments. To weigh up these commitments MacIntyre argues we the need an 
overriding conception of the telos of the whole human life whereby the goods pursued 
are hierarchically ordered. Human beings need to be able to exercise their faculty of 
practical reason, through deliberation with others, to order their particular goods. While I 
am not fully convinced that MacIntyre solves the problems of weighing up and ordering 
competing and sometimes incompatible goods, his concept of the narrative unity of a 
human life is still powerfully appealing. It stands in opposition to analytic philosophy 
which attempts to reduce human action to simple components, ignoring its 
embeddedness in particular and concrete human circumstances.  
In the contemporary Western world, supplying the goods to sustain family life very 
understandably may not be the only ends for which we work. Employment can provide 
goods which are worthwhile for their own sake, for example, if I am a scientist and I seek 
a cure for a life-threatening disease or I develop a new theory. Nonetheless, external 
goods are usually one product of that work, often in order to attract the most talented to 
the job, and these goods are then often used to sustain family life either as a parent, or 
someone’s son/daughter or sibling. The pursuit of other worthwhile goods, outside of the 
practice of family life, is not necessarily harmful to family life. In fact, it is often good for 
family members because it is important to maintain identities outside of being a parent or 
someone’s son/daughter in order to develop different human capacities for excellence 
and live a full and flourishing life. Furthermore, a good family life should encourage such 
activity, as argued in chapter 7. These other goods, however, for example, of science, fine 
art, building, sport or academic philosophy, may compete with the goods of family life 
and it may depend on what stage we are at in our lives as to what is prioritised.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that we pursue goods in a range of practices including family life. 
We are rewarded for our work outside of the family with external goods which we then 
use to support ourselves and, if we have a partner and children or a relative to take care 
of, our families. Sometimes that work is also rewarding in itself and the goods achieved in 
that work may compete with the goods of family life and need to be rationally ordered. 
However, practical reasoning and deliberation also needs to be applied to the ordering of 
external goods achieved either through our efforts in our jobs or, more rarely, through 
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the efforts of the household (in the case of family farms or family businesses). The 
external goods we achieve, if pursued for their own sake, can damage our achievement of 
the goods internal to family life in a number of ways, which will be discussed in this 
chapter. Yet without some of those goods families are also unable to pursue the goods 
internal to family life. 
 
8.3 The potential harm of external goods 
When the goods we achieve outside of the family are only external goods, the goods 
internal to family life can become subordinated to these external goods. For example, a 
society in which families are bombarded with messages that more consumer goods will 
make them and their families happier is not conducive to familial flourishing because it 
prioritises external goods. People often work more outside of the home, not for the sake 
of the goods internal to their employment activity but because they think having more 
external goods will make them and their families happier. In doing so, they find they have 
less time to spend with their family. Moreover, pursuit of these goods when families do 
not earn enough can lead to the problem of a lack of external goods such as debt, poverty 
and loss of one’s home. A family which prioritises consumption over the goods internal to 
family life is also harmful to children because it teaches them the vices of greed, belief 
that they can always get what they desire, and poor management of finances.  
What I will argue is that family members who are motivated by, and directed towards, the 
internal goods of family life and have fostered the virtues will not seek external goods at 
the expense of internal goods. Thus, when a parent goes out to work to earn wages or to 
produce food, it is not merely for her own good but for the good of some or all of her 
family members to pay for her children’s food, clothes, schooling, toys etc., to contribute 
to the elder care of her parents, to pay for a family holiday or to support her spouse 
through a time of unemployment, illness, full-time parenting or adult education.  In fact, 
her own good is inextricably tied up with the good of the practice of family life.  If her 
family life is failing to flourish then she will not be able to live well either.  She, therefore, 
acquires certain basic external goods in order to feed and clothe her children and other 
dependent family members who may not be able to work themselves due to other 
responsibilities within the family, such as caregiving, or due to incapacity. She also 
acquires goods which will give her children the best opportunities for flourishing and 
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these may be status, forms of power or wealth. Furthermore, if her family is flourishing in 
the Aristotelian sense, then this will enrich the wider community. The children will grow 
up to be responsible, caring and thoughtful members of society who have good character 
and a concern for the common good. Adult family members who are vulnerable and 
dependent will have strong advocates for their needs and a support network which will 
enable them to live as independently as they can and participate as much as possible in 
society.  
Nevertheless it is obvious how easily one can become corrupted by these external goods, 
making them the object of one’s desires. Sometimes it seems as if more money, more 
possessions, fame, power or status will make us happy. We can easily imagine the parent 
who works all hours of the day, leaving their children with nannies or nurseries in order to 
have a nice house, expensive holidays and a college fund for the children, but at what 
cost? If the particular relationships of family life are that for the sake of which families 
exist and are valued then what good are wealthy powerful parents who spend little or no 
time with their children or each other? At the other end of the spectrum we can imagine 
with little difficulty the parent who gets into debt trying to provide all of those things that 
we are constantly told will make us and our families happy.24 Living beyond their means, 
such parents borrow more than they can pay back to provide the house, car, holidays and 
clothes that will increase their status as a family and supposedly bring them that ever 
elusive happiness. Yet both of these apparent routes to happiness are more likely to lead 
to a failure to flourish. The former leads to the pursuit of external goods as ends in 
themselves at the expense of fostering flourishing relationships, the latter eventually 
leads to a severe depletion of external goods after the initial acquisition of those goods, 
and lands families in poverty with spiralling debt. Rawls seems to have been right then to 
worry about the unjust distribution of benefits and burdens which families contribute to. 
Just as a family can set you up for life, it can also limit your possibilities and tie you to 
poverty indefinitely. A child born into poverty is more likely to experience poverty as an 
adult and pass that on to his or her children, continuing the cycle (Stephens, Markus, and 
Phillips 2014).  
                                                          
24 According to the Consumer Credit Counselling Service (CCCS) UK households accumulated 
massive personal debts in the decade leading up to the financial crisis with the total UK personal 
debt reaching £1.4 trillion by the end of 2010. Despite the financial crisis and a slight fall in 
personal debt since 2010, the report states that the Office for Budget Responsibility predicts that 
personal debt as a percentage of household income will rise from the current level of 160% to 
175% of household income by 2015 (The Financial Inclusion Centre 2011, 1). 
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The common goods of family life are achieved through practitioners cultivating the 
virtues, not only in themselves, but also in those for whom they are responsible in the 
practice i.e. children. If one or more persons are pursuing external goods only, even if 
they believe it is for the benefit of the family, they will not be practicing the virtues 
essential to their own flourishing and the flourishing of the practice.  Managing the 
economy of the household, without an orientation towards the internal goods of family 
life, could quickly change into the pursuit of wealth-getting. By only pursuing external 
goods family members might lose sight of the fact that these external goods are 
subordinate to the internal goods of family life. In doing so they also set an example to 
their children that the pursuit of external goods is of worth to a human life in itself. As 
children are unable to reason soundly for themselves, they may learn from their parent(s) 
or other family members that they desire external goods and a capitalist, consumerist 
society which fosters self-interestedness, actively encourages this. MacIntyre argues that,  
Families at their best are forms of association in which children are first 
nurtured, and then educated for and initiated into the activities of an adult 
world in which their parents’ participatory activities provide them both with 
resources and models (MacIntyre 1999, 133). 
If the models of participatory activities prioritise the accumulation of resources or 
external goods, for example if a parent values wealth above all else or only takes their 
children shopping on a family day out, then this is what children will be initiated into. As 
the comparative UNICEF report into child-wellbeing demonstrates, UK children 
apparently feel trapped in a materialistic culture and engage in high levels of 
consumption compared with Spanish and Swedish children (Nairn 2011a, 47; Nairn 
2011b). Without the support of schools or other community influences, children have 
fewer opportunities to learn the necessary virtues in order to give care to others, or what 
is required to be a sound practical reasoner when they are adults. It follows then that 
they will not flourish in the Aristotelian sense. 
However, this description of parents who only pursue external goods does not explain 
how it comes to be that parents or other family members get drawn into the pursuit of 
external goods alone and lose sight of the internal goods. One explanation I would like to 
offer is that the family in the contemporary Western liberal context is often shaped, not 
by the particular needs required by families for them to flourish, but by the external 
forces of consumerist capitalism and the state. Advanced capitalism places demands on 
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families which constrain its structure. It demands that parents work long hours to grow 
the economy and to meet the financial demands placed on them by consumerism, by 
constantly leading families to desire more material goods. A great deal of advertising is 
targeted at families with companies like Nintendo describing their consoles as a way of 
bringing families together in a common activity (Rosenberg 2009) and many 
advertisements portraying idyllic happy families, implying that buying their product will 
bring about this idealised, but ultimately materialistic, happiness. Thus families need 
more income in order to fulfil these consumerist ideals. Not only does advertising claim 
that happiness is found in consuming but it is also, according to Arjun Appadurai, ‘the key 
technology for the word-wide dissemination of a plethora of creative, culturally well-
chosen ideas of consumer agency’ (1990, 307). He goes on to argue that these images of 
agency which mask a world of merchandising are so subtle that ‘the consumer is 
consistently helped to believe that he or she is an actor, when in fact he or she is at best a 
chooser’ (1990, 307).  
Children especially, are targeted by advertisers because of the power children have over 
parents, due to the desire of parents to make their children happy. Furthermore, peer 
pressure, particularly in adolescence, to have the latest possessions, deeply affects self-
esteem and the child’s desire to conform to their social group (Isaksen and Roper 2012). 
The fact that some children from poor homes ‘would not talk to someone who was not 
wearing the right trainers and that they would be embarrassed to be seen with someone 
wearing unfashionable shoes’ (Elliott and Leonard 2004, 357) is one example of children 
prioritising external goods of status and wealth over the goods of genuine friendship and 
the virtues. Studies and reports commissioned by UNICEF and the British government 
demonstrate growing concern about the effect of rampant consumerism on the lives of 
children and, in particular, the effect that it has on family life (Bailey 2011; Nairn 2011a). 
Advanced capitalism also demands that families are geographically mobile; able to move 
wherever the work is. In doing so it uproots families from local communities and 
fragments them from extended family relations, in effect, creating the nuclear family and 
using that family form to sustain advanced capitalism.  In a study by Anne Green and 
Angela Canny on the effects of geographical mobility on family life one participant 
reported that he and his family, who had already made one move away from extended 
family support, ‘were reluctant to move again and make a similar split from a friendship 
162 
 
network they had built up as a substitute’ (Green and Canny 2003, 23). Another 
participant in her mid-50s who had relocated for her partner’s job ‘missed seeing her 
grandchildren and helping her adult children and extended family. She admitted that the 
family was financially better off having relocated, but her family ties and sense of 
unfulfilled responsibilities were such that “I would go back in the morning if I could”’ 
(2003, 28). Adults in families that try to stay put when they have extended family ties, or 
have built up strong community ties, often have to resort to commuting long distances, 
particularly in dual-career families. This is likely to result in not being able to spend quality 
time with family members.  
 Second wave feminist goals were primarily oriented towards freeing women from 
domestic drudgery and improving their access to the workplace. However, this end, 
without some orientation to the goods of family life suits capitalism because it grows the 
workforce. Furthermore, because women tend to still do most of the domestic work (as 
argued in chapter 4), in particular care work, they provide a workforce of cheaper part-
time labour. Perhaps now that feminists are beginning to recognise the value of so-called 
feminine work and activity (as argued in chapter 5) the aim should be to equalize this 
activity and draw men and women more towards the practice of family life. In order to do 
this successfully without reverting to a time when men worked and women looked after 
the home, there would need to be a cultural shift away from a work obsessed, consumer-
driven society. Such a transformation is unlikely, however, in Western societies such as 
Britain, where economic growth, and therefore an increase in consumption, is needed in 
order pay down national debts in an economy that is no longer very productive. 
 
8.4 The state, marriage and the family 
The state also shapes the practice of family life. It places constraints on who can and 
cannot marry. It encourages marriage as the basis of family life by rewarding marriage in 
the tax system or using rhetoric about the importance of marriage and, in doing so, 
marginalising those who do not marry. Many of the state’s demands on the family come 
from ideological policies of governments who believe that a particular family structure is 
always the ideal family form and that other forms are deviant or imperfect. The focus of 
governments on encouraging a particular family structure ignores the complexities of 
family life; that family life is fluid and constantly changing. More importantly, from an 
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Aristotelian perspective, this focus on idealised family structures ignores the necessity of 
the family to meet the needs of family members whatever their structure, to achieve the 
internal goods of family life and flourish. Within Western liberal democracies, many 
different types of marriage have emerged from a complicated history. The post-war 
nuclear family with married parents is often upheld as the most appropriate model for 
raising children (as argued in chapter 7); though the legal admission of same sex couples 
into civil partnerships, with the eventual aim to include them in civil marriages, has 
changed that model somewhat. However, the fact that same sex couples are demanding 
marriage rights in order to have their commitment fully recognised and to establish 
families must mean that marriage, whether civil or religious, still has some cultural and 
social significance. Marriage is thus thought to bring stability and is taken seriously as a 
key institution of the family in many cultures.  
However, other forms of marriage persist and are tolerated with more and more couples 
living in common law marriages, or cohabiting, and having children out of wedlock due to 
the removal of social stigma. For example, ‘in 2010 there were an estimated 17.9 million 
families, an increase from 17.0 million in 2001 with an increase of 0.6 million cohabiting 
couple families and 0.4 million lone parent families offset by a decrease of 0.1 million in 
the number of married couple families’ (Office for National Statistics 2011a). Despite this 
decrease in civil and religious marriage, however, relationships and commitments 
between couples often reflect the marital model. Moreover, adoption is permitted and 
encouraged, single parents are provided with welfare from the state, and child 
maintenance is demanded from absent parents. Different types of parenting are thus 
recognised and supported by the liberal state even when there is no legally or religiously 
sanctified union of parents.  As has already been said, in a liberal democratic society it is 
not for the state to dictate a particular way to live; to value a particular conception of the 
good. It is, therefore, left to individuals to choose how they make and sustain their family 
life subject to very specific safeguarding constraints. Children must be educated to a 
certain standard and should not be sent to work for the family. Children must not be 
beaten or abused by parents, nor should they be neglected. As Archard argues, parents 
can choose how to raise their children as long as they give them a minimally decent life 
and give them the freedom to make their own choices once they become adults.  
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Paradoxically, however, the liberal state does promote married family life as the best 
model for raising children, even while it tolerates and, some would argue, encourages 
other models.  Due to the fact that marriage is becoming increasingly informal again and 
there is now greater importance placed on the care and education of children than there 
was before 1700s, when marriage became more formalised, state interference has 
become increasingly necessary to sustain the institution of marriage. If marriage as an 
institution is insufficient to bear the practice of family life then the state will make up the 
shortfall because it has an interest in promoting stable families and educating and 
protecting children who constitute the next generation of workers and citizens.  This is 
not necessarily good for the practice. The more the state interferes in marriage and 
attempts to promote it the more it is taken out of the hands of the practitioners of family 
life.  
In privileging one family form over others, families are shaped by the demands of status 
rather than by the internal goods of particular families. High divorce rates are cited by 
governments as a failure or breakdown of the family itself. However, families continue to 
exist after divorce and divorce is sometimes, as argued in chapter 7, the only way of 
securing future flourishing. Parents who stay together but who are in constant conflict 
can be more harmful to the wellbeing of family life, in particular children, than parents 
who separate and employ practical reason and deliberation in how they go about the 
separation. The lack of practical reason and the prevalence of selfish ideas of revenge are 
more damaging than the separation itself. Moreover, divorce is usually necessary in cases 
of domestic abuse. The questions that ought to be asked therefore are, firstly, why so 
many people rush into marriage and having children the first place? If people feel social 
pressure to marry and have children or feel that they have somehow failed in life if they 
do not achieve this relatively young then they may not take the time to consider whether 
their partner is really the person they want commit to and have children with. The fact 
that one of the main reasons for divorce in the UK is ‘growing apart’ or ‘no longer being in 
love’ suggests that either couples are not compatible in the first place, or that they are 
not willing to adapt to changes in each other and work at the relationship. Many people 
also falsely believe that having children will fix their marriage and so children become a 
means to an end rather than ends in themselves. The second question is: why do certain 
people abuse and deliberately hurt those closest to them and what can be done to reduce 
familial violence? I cannot do justice to any attempt at an answer to this question here 
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but it may require more consciousness-raising, greater access to mental health services, 
and improvements in how domestic violence is reported and spotted in the first place.  
Sometimes, however, the breakdown of family life can have a more easily treatable 
cause. 
Material resources and other external goods are needed for families to stand a chance of 
flourishing. Many families who are deemed to be in poverty in the UK really only have the 
resources to survive in a limited way, never mind sustain a flourishing family life. The 
primary cause of child poverty in single-parent households is women’s lack of earning 
power. In general women tend to earn less than men. For example, in 2011 the ONS 
reported that while the pay gap has narrowed in full-time employment, the median gross 
annual earnings for men were £28,400 whereas for women they were £22,900 (Office for 
National Statistics 2011b). However, women are more likely to take part-time work due to 
child care responsibilities or the fact that labour, traditionally done by women, is often 
part-time such as secretarial, social care and cleaning work. The statistics for 2011 show 
that ‘for male employees, 88 per cent worked full-time and 12 per cent worked part-time, 
while the comparable figures for female employees were 58 per cent and 42 per cent 
respectively’ (2011). What the ONS found was that when we look at hourly rates of pay, 
part-time workers tend to get paid considerably less: ‘Median hourly earnings, excluding 
overtime, of part-time employees were 36.6 per cent less than the earnings of full-time 
employees in April 2011’ (2011).  
Another problem is that some single-mothers do not work and are instead full-time 
parents. Young argues that due to the undeniable fact that single-parent families are 
more likely to be in poverty, some believe that the cure for childhood poverty is stable, 
intact, two parent families. Yet Young claims this is a great exaggeration when, in the USA 
at least, 40 percent of poor families are married couple families (Young 1995). Yet 
statistics also show that the presence of a partner in the household has a considerable 
impact on the working status of a mother: ‘According to the Labour Force Survey, more 
than seven in ten (72 per cent) married or cohabiting mothers with dependent children 
were working in Q2 2008. The comparable figure for lone mothers with dependent 
children was more than one-half (56 per cent)’ (Office for National Statistics 2009). 
Furthermore, 66 percent of children growing up in poverty in the UK live in a household 
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where at least one parent works, therefore, employment does not necessarily end child 
poverty (Alzubaidi et al 2013, 112 [table 4.3db]). 
However, if both parents are working it does not necessarily mean that the household will 
be free from poverty. Even if material circumstances are improved by two parents, it does 
not entail that a flourishing family life will follow from this; if there is conflict between 
parents, for example, or if both parents have to work so much that they are unable to 
dedicate time to their children. Young also points out that married couples usually 
appoint household and child-rearing duties to mothers, which may explain why they 
usually take part-time work. Combined with the fact that men tend to have higher wage-
earning power this ‘means that  most  economically  well-off  women  and  children  
depend  on  a  male  wage  to  keep  them  out of  poverty’ (Young 1995, 542). Therefore, 
the privileging of marriage by the state and by the New Familialists like Galston, Young 
argues, leads to the subordination of mothers and dependent children to wage-earning 
men. This is not a just arrangement because it leaves women and dependents vulnerable 
if wage-earning men have the potential to take away their wage-earning power and leave 
mothers dependent on the welfare state. One remedy to this, put forward by the UK 
centre-right think tank, the Centre for Social Justice, is to make fathers who leave their 
families contribute, not just financially but practically to child care (Pickles 2010). This 
approach would entail making fathers who leave their families more responsible for their 
children. How this would be put into practice is an issue for policy-makers but it would 
require either penalties for fathers who were not responsible or a more directly 
interfering approach which aimed to influence, teach or coax men who left their families 
into taking responsibility for their fatherhood.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
If the making and sustaining of family life is to flourish, then it has to be a socially 
established cooperative human activity through which parents and other relatives work 
together to realise the internal goods, and attain the standards of excellence that the 
activities of family life entail.  This can apply to families of different types from married, 
two-parent families, to single parent families, to step-families, particularly if all family 
types have good extended family bonds. From MacIntyre’s point of view it is for the 
practitioners to exercise practical reason through deliberation with other family members 
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to determine the ordering of goods and the means to achieving those goods. Where there 
are those who cannot have a voice in deliberation then their good must be represented. 
Families flourish in different ways and to different degrees, at different stages in the life 
of the family. This is why the state cannot be too heavy-handed in its family policy, 
picking and choosing what families it supports and privileges, and which it punishes 
through legislation. Each family encounters different circumstances both material and 
relational which affect their chances of flourishing.  
This chapter has picked out just some of the ways that family life encounters barriers to 
flourishing, particularly in relation to external goods. Thus when goods external and 
contingent to family life are prioritised over the goods internal to family life outlined in 
the previous chapter, then the overall good functioning of family life is damaged. Children 
who are encouraged to value material goods, status and wealth over goods internal to 
practices are likely to become alienated from the activities of family life or at least see 
family life as a means to their external ends. This can come about as a result of parents 
believing that buying their children what they want will make them happy, children 
feeling pressured by their peers, a culture which is built on consumerism and glorifies 
material possessions as status symbols and the means to happiness, or a combination of 
all of these factors. Consumerism also places pressures on adults who are made to think, 
through subtle directed advertising, that they are agents in control of their lives, when all 
they can be is choosers between different packaged lifestyles. As a result they believe 
that their consumer choices are actually independent rational choices that they have 
made for the benefit of their family. Global consumer capitalism also demands that the 
workforce is geographically mobile, able to move to where the work is with little concern 
for the effects this has on extended family ties and being part of a community.  
Moreover, at different life stages the ends of family life change so that instead of raising a 
child one might be caring for elderly parents, or providing supplementary care for a 
nephew or grandchild. This way of looking at the practice of the making and sustaining of 
family life attends to its nuances and particularities, rather than claiming that a good 
family is of a particular form or that the good family is one free from certain defects.  
What is needed for families to flourish then are the virtues and an orientation towards 
the internal goods of family life in order to resist the corrupting power of external goods 
and familial institutions used to attain external goods. However, I have also tried to show 
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that external goods and institutions of the family are not all bad and are actually 
necessary for the continued functioning of family life. Families need external goods in 
moderation and institutions, of marriage and of state welfare, are well-placed to secure 
those goods for families. It may be that we also need new institutions, or to re-design old 
ones, in order to support the wide variety of families that make up our societies. With 
high divorce rates and increasingly atomised families, perhaps we need public institutions 
which minimise the impact on children of divorce, which help extended families to stay 
connected or which help single-parents to form strong local networks of support. In the 
UK and some other Western countries, the institution of marriage has been redesigned to 
include same sex unions for the first time. This came about through grassroots 
organisation and because same sex couples wanted to start families and have the same 
power as heterosexual couples to protect and sustain their families. This is just one 







In this thesis, I have explored what a flourishing family life involves from a feminist 
Aristotelian perspective. In doing so, I applied MacIntyre’s theoretical framework of social 
practices to the family. According to MacIntyre, through practices, humans pursue 
common goods constitutive of a flourishing life.  I argued that in order to give an account 
of the goods internal to the practice of family life, we need to integrate the particular 
insights of feminist care ethics with MacIntyre’s Aristotelian virtue ethics. I then applied 
this approach to the question of what a flourishing family life involves by outlining some 
of the key goods internal to family life. Finally, I suggested some ways in which families 
are prevented from flourishing through the pursuit of external goods as ends in 
themselves. 
Using an Aristotelian approach, as I have done by building on MacIntyre, allows 
practitioners of family life, those writing about the family and those who work with 
families, to differentiate between those goods which make family life worthwhile and 
those goods which are necessary to sustain family life. Those goods which make family 
life worthwhile are those internal goods which are achieved through participation in the 
activity of family life; the activity being constitutive of the good for human beings as such. 
I have argued that this is primarily caring activity including forming and sustaining bonds 
of affection, friendship, trust and security. The activity of family life also includes, as 
MacIntyre suggests, introduction to and participation in institutions outside of but 
coextensive with the family which are the bearers of a range of other practices 
constitutive of human flourishing.  
The external goods, those goods needed to sustain family life, are subordinate to the 
goods internal to family life. This is important for understanding both what makes a good 
family and what families need in order to live well. One does not have to be an 
Aristotelian to accept these conclusions. What I have shown is the strength of MacIntyre’s 
approach for explaining these features of family life. Furthermore, I have explored other 
contemporary moral theories which can provide insights lacking in the Aristotelian 
approach, such as the importance of partial authorship over one’s own life as emphasised 
by perfectionist liberals and the unequal division of caring labour between the sexes 
highlighted by liberal feminists. In particular, one of the problems with Aristotle is the 
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perception of dependence as a weakness and, as a result, the lack of attention to 
caregiving and caring virtues. However, I have also argued that using a MacIntyrean 
approach can help us to develop a different kind of language for dealing with questions of 
social justice. One in which rights and autonomy are not abstract concepts but rather 
social goods external to practices which can be instrumental in different ways to the 
flourishing of practices, or can become detrimental to practices when pursued as ends in 
themselves along with other forms of power, status and wealth. 
What I have shown is that a well-functioning family should not be defined negatively, by 
what it is not. The good family is not just one where the defects of the dysfunctional 
family are absent. Thus, we cannot say that a good family is one without a single-parent, 
or one without an obsession with consumer goods, or one without violence or conflict. 
These factors may pose real threats to flourishing but because of this a theory needs to 
spell out what flourishing involves first so we can they say how these barriers are 
overcome and how these threats can be resisted.  
An Aristotelian virtue ethics approach spells out what the goods of family life are for 
human beings and how family life can be a constitutive part of human flourishing when it 
functions well, in accordance with excellence. The pursuit of the internal good of family 
life is actualised through the participatory activities of caregiving and receiving and 
activities within the family which develop our moral and intellectual capacities, from an 
early age, with play, the exercise of basic practical reason and empathy, through to caring 
for other family members later in our lives (as shown in chapter 7). This kind of activity, 
which is social in nature, develops not only good character and strong social bonds but 
also provides resources to cope with what life throws at us and to resist or overcome 
many of the barriers to our flourishing. However, no matter how resilient and virtuous we 
are, some barriers, which are a result of bad fortune, cannot be overcome without 
structural changes at the level of society. It is incumbent on those who recognise the 
importance of support for families, beyond the family itself, who need to persuade the 
wider political community of the implications of this through examples of where families 
already receive practical support and of where families can be engaged participants in 
community life. 
In answer to the thesis question, ‘what does a flourishing family life involve?’ which 
motivated the project, I answer that it is a family which enables family members to 
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achieve their goods in common. It provides membership of a foundational social group 
which offers its members the security to act outside of family life as well as to feel that 
each of them is irreplaceable within family life. I have argued that the flourishing family 
has to provide more than ‘the care, guidance and protection of children’, though this 
must be one of its functions. If the function of family life was limited to the care of 
children, then there would be no need for the practice of family life to continue once a 
child reached adulthood, unless the child was severely cognitively impaired. I have looked 
to Aristotle who argues that human beings are naturally social and that we form families 
not only for reproductive purposes but also for those things necessary to sustain life. 
Drawing on care ethics I have shown that caregiving is an essential activity of human 
relationships and that it is this activity in accordance with excellence, rather than the 
requirements of justice or friendship alone, which holds families together. The family’s 
good is also found in the care of vulnerable and dependent adults. All human beings are 
vulnerable to dependence and, therefore, we should treat that dependence as a fact of 
human existence rather than as something belonging to the Other. Where people are 
dependent and are also deprived of the attentive affectionate regard of others then those 
that are not so deprived have an obligation to meet the needs of those who are.  Being 
part of a family which functions well enables us to know what it is to be regarded 
attentively and affectionately and to treat others outside of the family with similar care.   
A related function then is a moral and political education beginning in childhood and 
continuing throughout adulthood. Most of this education will take place in childhood to 
prepare us for adulthood and the wider social and political life. Our moral and political 
education is not something given to us as a set of lessons by parents but is encountered in 
all of the activities of every day family life from how to control our appetites and take 
only what we need, to play with parents and other children, to learning how to do things 
and make decisions independently (a process which in itself is dependent on others), to 
taking care of another vulnerable and dependent human being whether he or she is a 
parent, grandparent, spouse, sibling or one’s own child. A moral education will also 
demonstrate excellence in activity – not just how to do such and such but how to do it 
well. Furthermore, a political education is not about choosing a political party which best 
represents one’s own beliefs but instead will enable a person to be able to make 
fundamental decisions about common goods and how they should be ordered and 
achieved, through shared deliberation with others who participate in a co-operative 
172 
 
practice. The good achieved is that the family enables its members to act within and 
outside of the family according to their full moral and intellectual potential. Each 
constitutive activity of family life which aims at some internal good is an activity which 
cultivates virtue, such that the family member of a flourishing family is one who has 
developed, or is developing, a settled but complex set of character traits which are good 
in themselves and direct the person towards good actions according to the particular 
situation. A flourishing family life not only prepares individuals for life outside of the 
family but also continues to support them in their various activities throughout their lives. 
To illustrate briefly how the family prepares and sustains the individual I refer to the 
different activities of family life identified in this thesis and the standards of excellence 
which pertain to those activities. Firstly, familial caregiving needs to be compassionate, 
friendly, patient, generous, trusting, forgiving, trustworthy, affectionate and respectful. 
At times, other virtues and powers will be needed such as courage, perseverance and 
tolerance. Activity in accordance with empathy, being able to feel with and understand 
the position of another human being, is necessary in order to cultivate such virtues. A 
moral and political education needs to be just, rational (good reasons need to be given 
beyond reward and punishment) and deliberative. Virtues and powers of temperance, 
frugality, industry, perseverance, respect and self-respect, justice and friendliness will 
both be embodied in and taught through the actions of those who provide the education. 
The activities of educating and of being educated require action in accordance with 
reason. We must be able to provide good reasons for rules and for why something should 
be done in this way or that, even if to begin with we teach moral lessons through reward 
and punishment. However, we may also become educated through our own activity such 
as when we are faced with a vulnerable and entirely dependent baby for the first time or 
if our spouse develops a disease of the mind or body which renders them dependent on 
us for the rest of his or her life.   
Arguably many of these standards of excellence already exist within the practice of family 
life in our society which is how we might think we know intuitively if a family is a bad 
family or not. It may be easier to identify a family which is not flourishing but it is more 
difficult to achieve flourishing when family life encounters and throws up so many 
problems. After all, the practice of making and sustaining family life is one characterised 
by fragility, dependence and vulnerability. The more dependent people are the more 
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vulnerable they are to exploitation or neglect. Furthermore, obviously bad families are 
few and far between but families which meet basic needs without doing so well are 
harder to identify and the moral damage they cause may not be as apparent as are 
physical bruises and scars.  
MacIntyre’s conceptual framework which I have used in this thesis also demonstrates the 
power of external goods over families. External goods are those goods necessary to life 
which families share with their own family members, particularly dependent ones such as 
children or dependent adults. These goods however are often mistakenly thought to bring 
happiness in their own right. The thought is that the more wealth, status and power one 
has the happier one will be. It may be the case that having more of these goods will 
enable one to pursue activities which contribute to overall wellbeing but as ends in 
themselves they cannot be constitutive of flourishing because the desire for them can 
never be satisfied; one can always get more. Furthermore, it is not just how much of 
these goods one has but also how they are used. We can use external goods for good or 
bad ends whereas internal goods are good in themselves. One might have enough 
external goods to live a flourishing life but may not put them to good use. Money can be 
squandered; status and power can be abused. How they are acquired is also relevant. 
External goods can be put to good use even when acquired viciously.  In the context of 
the family, parents may use their external goods in the service of caring well for their 
children or elderly parents but if they acquired it viciously, through extortion, theft, or 
exploitation then this will have a corrupting effect on their characters  and consequently 
on the practice. Thus families need external goods to survive but in order to resist the 
corrupting effects of external goods they need the virtues.  
The work I have presented represents an original contribution to knowledge in that it 
builds on MacIntyre’s Aristotelian conceptual framework of practices and applies it to the 
particular practice of family life. In doing so, I have been able to propose an answer to the 
question of what a flourishing family life involves. What a well-functioning family life 
entails is of great concern to a wide range of individuals, groups and institutions and 
particularly to the modern state. Focussing on family structure is unhelpful before we 
have established what the goods of family life are, particularly when, as I have argued, 
many different forms of family life can achieve flourishing.  Furthermore, when we talk of 
functioning in relation to practices, it becomes not merely the functioning of individuals 
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but rather the collective purpose of the practice and thus the responsibility of 
practitioners and the institution which sustains the practice. It may be that the good 
functioning of families is better achieved through small communities where practitioners 
have a greater deliberative role, as MacIntyre suggests, or it may be that this approach 
can filter through education, psychological therapies, government policies, charitable 
organisations and institutions of welfare.  
This work also does not claim to represent the definitive Aristotelian position, but instead 
takes inspiration from the dynamic tradition of Aristotelian thought and corrects or builds 
on a specific approach to Aristotelianism by incorporating the insights of other theoretical 
perspectives. Care ethics, in particular, provides resources which are compatible with 
virtue ethics and which improve the standpoint of Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
Further research, which builds on the premises established here, could be more 
empirical. Areas, in particular, which would be worth exploring further might be how real 
families resist the corrupting effects of external goods or the reasons people give for 
familial breakdown. While reasons for divorce vary widely from lack of compatibility and 
growing apart to infidelity I would expect to find that some of the reasons cited would 
relate to abuses of external goods in some way, either through the excessive use of 
power by one family member over another, lack of resources through unemployment or 
debt, overemphasis on external goods, and overworking as a result, or reckless uses of 
external goods. Other research could look at how a particular institution outside of the 
family might work to support the family either through education, social work or 
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